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BRINGING PRIVACY LAW OUT OF THE
CLOSET: A TORT THEORY OF LIABILITY
FOR INTRUSIONS IN PUBLIC PLACES
ANDREW JAY MCCLURG*
In this Article, Professor McClurg posits that the right to
privacy in tort law must be expanded. His proposal offers relief
to a class of plaintiffs that are routinely denied a forum for
litigation-those who suffer invasions of privacy in a "public"
place. McClurg asserts that this lack of protection is ironic: while
the right to privacy in tort law has been limited by courts in recent
years, the excesses of modern journalism and the proliferation of
video camcorders have greatly increased the threat that individual
privacy might be invaded, particularly in public places.
Consequently, McClurg argues for legal recognition of a right of
"public privacy." While some courts have intuitively recognized
such a right, McClurg asserts that express recognition of a right of
action is necessary. McClurg's proposal redefines the tort of
intrusion (as incorporated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS) to allow recovery for highly offensive instances of public
intrusion. He enlists a multifactored standard to assess the
offensiveness of intrusive conduct, a standard that balances privacy
interests against the countervailing interests of free social
interaction and free speech.
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I. INTRODUCTION
One lesson of modem privacy law in the tort arena is that if you
expect legal protection for your privacy, you should stay inside your
house with the blinds closed. Tort law clings stubbornly to the
principle that privacy cannot be invaded in or from a public place.
However sound this rule once may have been, it is flawed in a
modem technological society where the video camcorder has become
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a permanent fixture and where invasive tabloid and reality television'
programming have become standard forms of journalism and
entertainment. Instances of intrusive conduct in public places are
becoming increasingly common and more brazen.2
This Article posits that invasion of privacy law should be
modified to allow a cause of action in limited circumstances for the
tort of "public intrusion."3  The tort of intrusion is one of four
invasion of privacy torts widely recognized by American courts.4 It
is intended to protect against intrusions, physical or otherwise, "upon
the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns
... if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person."5  As interpreted by almost all courts, the tort does not
protect persons in places accessible to the public.6 Thus, tort law
1. "Reality" television is a label used to describe a genre of television programming
often featuring live video coverage of dramatic events. Popular segments include footage
of police officers stopping, questioning, searching, or arresting motorists, and emergency
response teams, such as firefighters or paramedics, responding to calls for assistance. See
infra notes 117-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the threat that reality
television programming poses to privacy.
2. This Article discusses many examples of such intrusions. A notorious recent
illustration involved the publication of photographs of Princess Diana of Wales taken as
she exercised at a London fitness club. The camera was hidden in the ceiling and captured
the Princess in various suggestive poses as she exercised on a leg press machine. See
WOWI Di as you've never seen her before, STAR, Nov. 23, 1993, at 1, 35-37 (publishing
several of the photographs).
As used in this Article, the term "public place" refers broadly to any place accessible
to one or more members of the public. This categorization includes health clubs,
restaurants, shopping mails, and other businesses, as well as public parks and streets.
3. This Article involves only the right to privacy under tort law. It does not address
constitutional rights to privacy.
4. The four invasion of privacy torts are intrusion, public disclosure of private facts,
appropriation, and false light. See infra notes 39-42, 56-66 and accompanying text for a
general discussion of these torts. Most states that recognize the four privacy torts adhere
to the definitions offered in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B-652E (1977)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS]. See infra note 41 and accompanying
text (citing cases).
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 652B. The full text of the
Restatement definition of intrusion reads: "One who intentionally intrudes, physically or
otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person." Id
6. See, e.g., Hartman v. Meredith Corp., 638 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (D. Kan. 1986)
("The plaintiffs must show that there has been some aspect of their private affairs which
has been intruded upon and does not apply [sic] to matters which occur in a public place
or place otherwise open to the public eye."); Fogel v. Forbes, Inc., 500 F. Supp. 1081, 1087
(E.D. Pa. 1980) ("[T]his tort does not apply to matters which occur in a public place or
a place otherwise open to the public eye."); Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 502 A.2d
1101,1116-17 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) ("There is no liability for observing him in public
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currently provides little protection from intrusive videotaping,
photography, or surveillance, so long as the activity occurs in a public
place.
The steadfastness with which courts have clung to the rule that
what occurs in public cannot be private traditionally has meant that
most instances of public intrusion do not result in litigation. When
they do, the plaintiffs lose early and often. Consider the results in the
following cases:
e Without her consent, a woman who belonged to a health club
was videotaped while exercising at the club. A portion of the
video was shown on television as part of a commercial for the
health club. Summary judgment for the defendant was upheld.7
* Police conducted surveillance (for no legitimate purpose
discernible from the opinion) of employees of a company who
were meeting to organize a union. The police recorded and
traced the license numbers of those in attendance and provided
the names to the employer. The plaintiffs' complaint was
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.8
o Suspecting a security guard of fraternizing with a company
employee contrary to company policy, the employer watched the
guard's house and ran license checks on visiting cars. When the
guard sued the employer, summary judgment for the defendant
was granted. 9
o A fourteen-year-old girl was photographed in a classroom and
hallway by a teacher who served as the "unofficial" school
photographer. The teacher required her to assume various poses,
including sitting in a chair with her legs open. An appellate court
places, 'since he is not then in seclusion.' "); Forster v. Manchester, 189 A.2d 147, 150 (Pa.
1963) ("It should also be noted that all of the surveillances took place in the open on
public thoroughfares where appellant's activities could be observed by passers-by. To this
extent appellant has exposed herself to public observation and therefore is not entitled to
the same degree of privacy that she would enjoy within the confines of her own home.");
see also infra note 13 (citing additional cases making this point).
7. Foster v. LivingWell Midwest, Inc., No. 88-5340, 1988 WL 134497, at *1 (6th Cir.
Dec. 16, 1988).
8. International Union v. Garner, 601 F. Supp. 187, 189, 191-92 (M.D. Tenn. 1985)
(mem.).




held that the defendant teacher was entitled to summary
judgment on the plaintiff's invasion.of privacy claim."
e Without consent, three boys were photographed on a city
sidewalk while talking to a policewoman. The policewoman
posed nude for Playboy, and the photograph of her with the
three boys was published alongside the nude photographs. The
complaint filed on behalf of the boys was dismissed."
* During a company conference, plaintiff was photographed at
the moment a fellow employee approached her from behind and
cupped his hands over her breasts. The photograph was used in
a company slide show and repeatedly shown to other employees.
Plaintiff's privacy claims for intrusion and public disclosure of
private facts were dismissed. Only her false light claim survived
pretrial dismissal.'2
In each of these cases, the plaintiffs lost in large part because the
invasions of privacy occurred in places accessible to the public. 3
10. Jarrett v. Butts, 379 S.E.2d 583, 585 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
11. Jackson v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 10, 11 & n.1, 14 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
12. Borton v. Unisys Corp., Civ. A. No. 90-4793, 1991 WL 915, at *2, *11 (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 4, 1991) (mem.).
13. Foster v. LivingWell Midwest, Inc., No. 88-5340, 1988 WL 134497, at *2-3 (6th Cir.
Dec. 16,1988) ("No one has the right to object merely because his name or his appearance
is brought before the public, since neither is in any way a private matter and both are
open to public observation."); Borton, Civ. A. No. 90-4793, 1991 WL 915, at *10 ("In my
opinion, the photograph in this case does not disclose such an [sic] private, intimate detail.
The photograph was taken in a public place and in full view of other Unisys employees.");
Fayard, Civ. A. No. 89-0108, 1989 WL 145958, at *2 ("The defendant alleges that the only
surveillance that took place, was of activities in the public view. Since this was not
controverted by the plaintiff, these facts are considered admitted. The alleged surveillance
of watching plaintiff's house and running license checks on cars, constituted activities which
were entirely open for public viewing."); International Union v. Garner, 601 F. Supp. 187,
191 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (mem.) ("[I]f the plaintiffs truly wanted their participation in the
meeting to be private, they would not have left their cars in front of the meeting hall. The
cars were in plain view for all to see .... In sum, the Court finds that a person does not
have a legitimate expectation of privacy, solitude, or seclusion in being free from the
dissemination of inferences drawn from observations readily perceivable in public view.");
Jackson, 574 F. Supp. at 13 ("Plaintiffs have not alleged that Defendant intruded into a
private place or private seclusion; nor does it appear that Plaintiffs could. Rather, the
photograph of which Plaintiffs complain clearly shows that policewoman Schantz and
Plaintiffs were on a city sidewalk in plain view of the public eye."); Jarrett, 379 S.E.2d at
585 ("The photographs were taken in the classroom and hallway of a school building
during regular school hours when other students were present, and did not reveal any
aspect of Cynthia Butts' person that was not readily visible to anyone who saw her during
1995]
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Moreover, all of the claims were dismissed without trial, a telling
indication of the dismal protection that privacy law affords to persons
in public.
There are some indications that privacy law may be poised for a
change as plaintiffs' attorneys become cognizant of the gap between
existing law and the public's perception of what constitutes reasonable
expectations of privacy.14 For instance, a spate of recent lawsuits
based upon intrusive videotaping has been filed against producers of
tabloid television shows.'5 However, while plaintiffs have obtained
favorable rulings in a few cases where the videotaping occurred inside
private residences, 6 the "no privacy in public" rule continues to be
a roadblock for plaintiffs whose privacy is invaded in a public place.
An unreported California case illustrates this roadblock quite
vividly. In Shulman v. Group W,7 the Shulman family sued the
syndicated television program On Scene: Emergency Response for
videotaping and broadcasting the aftermath of an automobile
accident. The family was driving on a freeway when their 19-year-old
daughter lost control of the automobile, causing it to plunge one
hundred feet and overturn.'8 Ruth Shulman and her 18-year-old
son were trapped inside the vehicle when a paramedic team,
accompanied by a cameraman working for the defendant, arrived to
render assistance. According to the plaintiffs' attorney, the
paramedic wore a hidden microphone while he rendered aid to Ms.
the day.").
14. See Gail D. Cox, Privacy's Frontiers At Issue: Unwilling Subjects of Tabloid TV
Are Suing, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 27, 1993, at 1, 34 ("Such a gap between the public perception
and the law is attractive to the plaintiffs' attorneys who increasingly are suing to
'update'-that is, tighten-the century-old legal concept of privacy.").
15. See id. (discussing several recent lawsuits of this type). A review of court records
in Los Angeles found five recent lawsuits against television producers for invasion of
privacy. Id. at 34.
16. See Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 679 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987) (reversing summary judgment on intrusion claim granted to defendant broadcasting
company against wife of heart attack victim who was filmed in his home without consent
as paramedics unsuccessfully attempted to resuscitate him); Rogers v. Buckel, No. 180799,
1992 WL 487187 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 16,1992) (reversing summary judgment on intrusion
claim granted to television station that filmed plaintiffs during drug raid at apartment);
Cox, supra note 14, at 34 (discussing suit against television network for sending camera
crew to accompany crisis intervention team into plaintiff's living room while team
responded to a 911 domestic disturbance call; trial court denied defendant's motion for
summary judgment as to invasion of privacy claim).
17. No. BC31250 (L.A. Super. Ct. Nov. 16,1993). For a discussion of this unreported
case, see Cox, supra note 14, at 34-35.
18. Cox, supra note 14, at 34.
19. Id. at 34.
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Shulman, who was critically injured." As reported by the National
Law Journal, "Ruth Shulman can be clearly heard on the broadcast
tape moaning, asking to be allowed to die and begging to be told it
is all a dream. Blood, bare parts of her body distorted by injury, and
the lower half of her face are visible."'" The trial court granted
summary judgment for the defendants.' The case is currently on
appeal.'
The rigidity with which courts adhere to the rule that privacy
cannot be invaded in a public place demonstrates an incomplete
comprehension of the nature of privacy and the interests it is designed
to protect. This Article will show that persons do have a limited
legitimate expectation of privacy even when they are visible in or
from places open to the public. In other words, there is such a thing
as "public privacy" that tort law should recognize and protect.
To afford this protection, this Article proposes the adoption of
a multifactor test that would allow persons to recover in appropriate
instances for public intrusions, while also recognizing the importance
of protecting the substantial countervailing interests of free social
interaction and free speech.24 By requiring a balancing of all
relevant factors, the proposal is actually a modest one. It would not
open the courthouse doors to victims of any and all public affronts,
but only to those subjected to highly offensive public intrusions of a
serious nature.
Part II of this Article discusses the current state of privacy law,
concluding that the right of privacy in tort law has shrunk con-
20. Id. at 34-35.
21. Id. at 35.
22. Id. at 34. The trial court apparently accepted the defendant's argument that the
public interest in automobile accidents shielded the defendant under the First Amendment.
Id. at 35. A critical problem for privacy plaintiffs is overcoming the First Amendment
implications of tort liability based upon the public dissemination of information. This
problem is most acute in connection with the privacy tort known as the public disclosure
of private facts. The United States Supreme Court has severely limited, if not abrogated,
this tort out of a concern for protecting free speech. See infra notes 447-58 and
accompanying text. The tort of intrusion, which is the subject of this Article, does not
directly implicate the First Amendment because it focuses upon the manner in which
information is acquired, rather than the dissemination of such information. See infra notes
420-31 and accompanying text. However, in proposing expansion of the tort of intrusion
to make actionable some intrusions in public places, this Article asserts in Part VI that
public dissemination of images or other information acquired during an intrusive act is a
factor courts should consider in imposing liability. See infra notes 420-58 and accom-
panying text.
23. Cox, supra note 14, at 35.
24. See infra notes 374-495 and accompanying text.
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siderably, and explains that this provides support for recognizing a
tort of public intrusion.' Part III discusses the growing threat to
public privacy, focusing on the trend towards excess in the mass
media and the impact of video technology.26 Part IV posits a theory
of public privacy, explaining how the narrow focus of current law
upon private physical space fails to take account of important aspects
of privacy2 Part V examines how, despite the rigidity of the rule
that privacy cannot be invaded in public, some courts have
instinctively recognized that there should be recovery for incidents of
public intrusion.s Part VI proposes a redefinition of the tort of
intrusion, using a multifactor test that would allow recovery for public
intrusions in appropriate cases.29
II. THE SHRINKING RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN TORT LAW
Regrettably for those who care about privacy and believe tort law
should protect it,30 the right of privacy in tort law is shrinking.
Indeed, it is not hyperbole to suggest that the right may be ap-
proaching extinction, at least in some of its variants. Judges have
been the engineers of the tort's destruction, both by the rules of
positive law they have fashioned31 and, just as significantly, in the
way they administer the tort.32 The shrinking right of privacy is
important to this Article because of the gap in the law that has
resulted with respect to intrusive conduct that occurs in public places.
Some context is necessary to understand this point.
There have been two great developments in the history of privacy
law, both of them emanating from works of legal scholarship. The
25. See infra notes 30-99 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 100-204 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 205-89 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 290-364 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 365-95 and accompanying text.
30. These are two different issues. Professor Kalven, for example, has written that he
believes privacy to be "a great and important value," but that "tort law's effort to protect
the right of privacy seems... a mistake." Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy In Tort Law-Were
Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327 (1966). Other
commentators have questioned whether the privacy torts "are worth the candle," Harvey
L. Zuckman, Invasion of Privacy-Some Communicative Torts Whose Time Has Gone, 47
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 253, 253 (1990), and whether the "elegant vessel" constructed by
Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in their landmark article The Right To Privacy "is in
fact a leaky ship which should at long last be scuttled." Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem
for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CoRNELL. L.
REV. 291, 294 (1983).
31. See infra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 67-92 and accompanying text.
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first was the article published by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
in 1890 entitled The Right To Privacy,33 in which the idea of a tort
remedy for invasions of privacy was conceived. 4 The Warren and
Brandeis article has been analyzed by many able commentators" and
no useful purpose would be served by reanalyzing it here. In short,
Warren and Brandeis surveyed a number of decisions in the areas of
defamation, property, implied contract, and copyright law and
concluded that, in reality, they represented recognition of a right to
privacy.3 6 They asserted that this right, which they characterized as
"the right to be let alone,"37 should be recognized as an independent
tort.
The second great monument in the development of privacy law
occurred when Dean William Prosser published his famous article on
the subject in 1960.38 Prosser reviewed court decisions in invasion
of privacy cases and determined that the law of privacy actually
comprised four distinct torts. He described the four torts as follows:
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into
his private affairs [referred to in this Article as "intrusion"];
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
plaintiff ["public disclosure of private facts"];
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the
public eye ["false light"];
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the
plaintiff's name or likeness ["appropriation"]. 39
33. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890). The article has been described as "the very fount of learning on the subject."
Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren and Brandeis'
Tort Petty and Unconstitutional As Well?, 46 TEx. L. REv. 611, 611 (1968). A Justice of
the United States Supreme Court has called it "the most famous of all law review articles."
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 80 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Other
accolades for the article are collected in James H. Barron, Warren & Brandeis, "The Right
To Privacy," 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFoLK
U. L. REV. 875, 876 (1979).
34. See infra notes 101-05, 147-49 and accompanying text for additional discussion of
the Warren and Brandeis article.
35. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 33; Bloustein, supra note 33; Kalven, supra note 30;
Zimmerman, supra note 30.
36. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 33, at 197-213.
37. Id. at 195 (attributing the origin of the phrase to THOMAS M. COOLEY, TORTs 29
(2d ed. 1888)).
38. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
39. Id. at 389.
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Prosser's definitions of the four privacy torts were subsequently
adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts." Courts in at least
twenty-eight states have explicitly or implicitly accepted each of the
four torts delineated by Prosser, almost always relying upon the
Restatement definitions."' Several other states have adopted the
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, §§ 652A-652E. This is not
surprising, because Dean Prosser served as Reporter for the project. The Reporter for a
Restatement project prepares all drafts pertaining to the subject undertaken. AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT IN THE COURTS: HISTORY OF THE INSTITUTE AND THE
RESTATEMENT 5 (permanent ed. 1945). While the final Restatement represents the
successive composite work of all members of the American Law Institute, "[i]n relation
to any subject of the Restatement the most important person is the Reporter. The
ultimate result is his work as discussed, changed and developed by group consideration."
Id. at 6.
Dean Prosser served as Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts until poor
health forced him to resign in June 1970. Upon Prosser's resignation, Dean John Wade
became the Reporter. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS vii (Tentative Draft No. 22,
1976). Although the volume of the Restatement containing Chapter 28A (pertaining to
invasion of privacy) was not published until 1977, Chapter 28A was prepared by Prosser
and approved by the American Law Institute in 1967. Id. at 11; see RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652J (Tentative Draft No. 13, 1967). Intervening changes
'in the constitutional limitations upon defamation law required some substantive changes
in section 652D (pertaining to the tort of public disclosure of private facts) and section
652E (pertaining to the tort of false light). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 11
(Tentative Draft No. 22, 1976). However, review of the black letter law and comments
regarding the tort of intrusion as adopted in the Restatement (Second) of Torts reveals that
only minor changes were made from the draft submitted by Dean Prosser to the American
Law Institute in 1967 and approved at that time. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS, supra note 4, § 652B (and comments) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652B (and comments) (Tentative Draft No. 13, 1967). Accordingly, for all practical
purposes, there is no separate identity between Prosser's observations concerning the tort
of intrusion in his law review article and the text of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
pertaining to intrusion.
41. See International Union v. Garner, 601 F. Supp. 187, 189 (M.D. Tenn. 1985)
(stating that no Tennessee court has adopted the four-part division, but nevertheless
proceeding to apply it); Jackson v. Playboy Enterps., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 10, 12 (S.D. Ohio
1983) (stating that Ohio has adopted Restatement provisions); Johnson v. Corporate Special
Servs., Inc., 602 So. 2d 385,387 (Ala. 1992); Godbehere v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 783
P.2d 781, 784-85 (Ariz. 1989); Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat Co., 590 S.W.2d 840, 844
(Ark. 1979); Forsher v. Bugliosi, 608 P.2d 716, 725 (Cal. 1980); Goodrich v. Waterbury
Republican-American, Inc., 448 A.2d 1317, 1329 (Conn. 1982); Barbieri v. News-Journal
Co., 189 A.2d 773, 774 (Del. 1963); Yarbray v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 409 S.E.2d
835, 836 (Ga. 1991); Near East Side Community Org. v. Hair, 555 N.E.2d 1324, 1334-35
(Ind. Ct. App. 1990); Winegard v. Larsen, 260 N.W.2d 816, 822-23 (Iowa 1977); Dotson v.
McLaughlin, 531 P.2d 1, 6 (Kan. 1975); McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co.,
623 S.W.2d 882, 887 (Ky. 1981); Norris v. King, 355 So. 2d 21, 23 (La. Ct. App. 1978);
Berthiaume v. Pratt, 365 A.2d 792,795-96 (Me. 1976); Hollander v. Lubow, 351 A.2d 421,
424-25 (Md. 1976); Beaumont v. Brown, 257 N.W.2d 522,527 (Mich. 1977); Sofka v. Thai,
662 S.W.2d 502,509-10 (Mo. 1983); N.O.C., Inc. v. Schaefer, 484 A.2d 729,731 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1984); Smith v. City of Artesia, 772 P.2d 373, 374-75 (N.M. Ct. App. 1989);
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privacy torts of intrusion, public disclosure of private facts and
appropriation, but not the tort of false light.42 Virtually all states
have recognized a tort cause of action for invasion of privacy in some
form.4' Rhode Island appears to be the sole exception, adhering to
the position that recognition of the tort should be a matter of
legislative determination.'
However, while courts in most states purport to recognize the
four privacy torts, they do not receive them favorably. Indeed, a
review of court decisions involving privacy claims raises doubts as to
whether there really is a tort remedy for invasion of privacy. It is
noteworthy that, in the six cases summarized at the beginning of this
Article,' the plaintiffs not only lost on their privacy claims, but they
lost without the opportunity to present their claims to juries.'
This pattern is disturbingly widespread in invasion of privacy
cases. Courts too often preempt jury consideration of privacy claims
McCormack v. Oklahoma Publishing Co., 613 P.2d 737, 740 (Okla. 1980); Anderson v.
Fisher Broadcasting Co., 712 P.2d 803, 808 (Or. 1985) (applying the four-part division for
convenience, but stating that it is not necessarily an authoritative statement of Oregon
law); Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 327 A.2d 133,136 (Pa. 1974); Montgomery Ward v. Shope,
286 N.W.2d 806, 808 (S.D. 1979); Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 563 (Utah 1988); Lemnah
v. American Breeders Serv., 482 A.2d 700, 703-04 (Vt. 1984) (applying the four-part
division because it was applied by lower court, but cautioning that Vermont has not
specifically adopted it); Mark v. Seattle Times, 635 P.2d 1081,1094 (Wash. 1981) (en banc);
Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 S.E.2d 70, 82-83 (W.Va. 1983).
42. See, e.g., Prescott v. Bay St. Louis Newspapers, Inc., 497 So. 2d 77, 79-81 (Miss.
1986) (refraining from adopting the tort, but stating that plaintiff failed to establish its
elements as delineated in the law of other jurisdictions); Sullivan v. Pulitzer Broadcasting
Co., 709 S.W.2d 475, 478-81 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (leaving door open for future
recognition, but quoting extensive criticism of the tort); Renwick v. News & Observer
Publishing Co., 312 S.E.2d 405, 413 (N.C.) (explicitly rejecting the tort), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 858 (1984); Snakenberg v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 2,5 (S.C. Ct. App.
1989) (stating that South Carolina recognizes three invasion of privacy torts, omitting any
reference to false light); Diamond Shamrock Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. Mendez, 844 S.W.2d 198,
200-01 (Tex. 1992) (refusing to decide whether the tort exists in Texas because the issue
was not adequately briefed by either party); Zinda v. Louisiana Pac. Corp., 440 N.W.2d
548,555 (Wis. 1989) (discussing Wisconsin statute which corresponds to Prosser's four-part
division, except that it omits a false light provision).
43. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at
851 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEErON ON TORTS].
44. Kalian v. People Acting Through Community Effort, Inc., 408 A.2d 608,609 (R.I.
1979).
45. See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
46. The only exception was the plaintiff's false light claim in Borton v. Unisys Corp.,
No. Civ. A. 90-4793, 1991 WL 915, at *8-11 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4,1991). See supra note 12 and
accompanying text for discussion of this case. In the several states that fail to recognize
the tort of false light invasion of privacy, this claim would not be available to the plaintiff.
See supra note 42 for a listing of those states.
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by granting pretrial motions for summary judgment or dismissal. A
survey of every reported invasion of privacy case decided in the state
and federal courts in 199247 provides somewhat startling support for
this proposition. Of the forty-nine invasion of privacy cases reported
by state courts in 1992,' trial courts granted summary judgment to
the defendant in twenty-one of the cases,49 and granted the defen-
dant's motion to dismiss the complaint in fifteen of the cases.5" In
other words, in thirty-six of the forty-nine cases (73 percent) trial
47. I selected 1992 rather than 1993 to allow adequate time for full appellate review
of the cases surveyed.
48. Search of Westlaw, Allstates database (Aug. 1, 1993) (search term "invasion of
privacy").
49. Hoover v. Tuttle, 611 So. 2d 290, 294 (Ala. 1992); Johnson v. Corporate Special
Servs., Inc., 602 So. 2d 385, 386 (Ala. 1992); D.D. v. C.L.D., 600 So. 2d 219, 220 (Ala.
1992); Hall v. Van's Photo, Inc., 595 So. 2d 1368, 1370 (Ala. 1992); Spitler v. Children's
Inst. Int'l, 14 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197,199 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Barker v. Huang, 610 A.2d 1341,
1342 (Del. 1992); Jackson v. Nationwide Credit, Inc., 426 S.E.2d 630, 632 (Ga. Ct. App.
1992); Kennedy v. Johnson, 421 S.E.2d 746, 747 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (affirming grant of
summary judgment to one defendant and denying it to others); Doe v. Anoka County Bd.
of Comm'rs., No. C8-92-544,1992 WL 238373, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 29,1992); Salek
v. Passaic Collegiate Sch., 605 A.2d 276, 279 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992); M.J.
Dicorpo, Inc. v. Sweeney, No. 61017,1992 WL 356382, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 3,1992);
Rogers v. Buckle, 615 N.E.2d 669,671 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (reversing summary judgment
for defendant); Linley v. DeMoss, 615 N.E.2d 631, 632 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); Anthony v.
Wonnell, No. 91AP-995, 1992 WL 230583, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 7, 1992); Cramton
v. Brock, No. CA91-05-011, 1992 WL 56765, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1992); Cook
v. Carrigan & Mains Funeral Home, Inc., 607 N.E.2d 466, 468 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992);
Hadnot v. Shaw, 826 P.2d 978,979 (Okla. 1992); Jenkins v. Bolla, 600 A.2d 1293,1294 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992); Mitre v. Brooks Fashion Stores, Inc., 840 S.W.2d 612, 623 (Tex. Ct. App.
1992); Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1992) (reversing
summary judgment for defendant); Hodgdon v. Mt. Mansfield Co., 624 A.2d 1122, 1124
(Vt. 1992).
50. Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass'n., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 299,301 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992) (reversing decision dismissing complaint); Trolle v. City of Danbury, No.
30-73-71, 1992 WL 17114, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 24,1992); Martin v. Widener Univ.
Sch. of Law, Civ. A. No. 91C-03-255, 1992 WL 153540, at *19 (Del. Super. Ct. June 4,
1992), appeal dismissed, 612 A.2d 158 (Del. 1992); Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp.,
607 N.E.2d 201, 210 (Ill. 1992) (reversing decision dismissing complaint); Beverly v.
Reinert, 606 N.E.2d 621, 622 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); Geick v. Kay, 603 N.E.2d 121, 129 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3040 (1993); Furno v. Citizens Ins. Co. of Am., 590
N.E.2d 1137, 1141 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); Veydt v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 614 A.2d
1318, 1328 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992); Nazeri v. Missouri Valley College, 860 S.W.2d 303,
317 (Mo. 1993) (en bane) (affirming dismissal of privacy claim); Brandt v. Medical Defense
Assocs., No. 60267, 1992 WL 77537, at *1 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. Apr. 21, 1992); Carlson v.
Chain, No. A-92-042, 1992 WL 479526, at *5 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992); Levine v. Board of
Educ., 589 N.Y.S.2d 181, 183 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Howell v. New York Post Co., 581
N.Y.S.2d 330, 331 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Majebe v. North Carolina Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 416 S.E.2d 404,409 (N.C. App.), disc. rev. denied, 421 S.E.2d 355 (N.C. 1992);
Rooks v. State, 842 P.2d 773, 777 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992).
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judges deprived plaintiffs the opportunity to have their privacy claims
heard by a jury. Only four of these pretrial dispositions that were
reviewed at the appellate level were reversed."
The situation was almost identical in the federal courts. Of forty-
three reported federal cases involving invasion of privacy claims
decided in 1992,52 defendants obtained summary judgment in twenty
of the cases,53 and succeeded in having the complaints dismissed in
an additional eleven cases. 4 Thus, defendants won thirty-one of the
51. Nahrstedt, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 301 (reversing decision dismissing complaint);
Kolegas, 607 N.E.2d at 210 (same); Rogers, 615 N.E.2d at 671 (same); Russell, 842 P.2d at
898 (same).
52. Search of Westlaw, Allfeds database (Aug. 1, 1993) (search term "invasion of
privacy").
53. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992) (reversing
summary judgment for defendant), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2443 (1993); Munson v.
Milwaukee Bd. of Sch. Directors, 969 F.2d 266,268 (7th Cir. 1992); Sharp v. United States
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 961 F.2d 1578, 1578 (6th Cir. 1992); Baggs v. Eagle-
Picher Indus., Inc., 957 F.2d 268, 269 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 466 (1992); Juarez
v. Ameritech Mobile Communications, Inc., 957 F.2d 317, 324 (7th Cir. 1992); Jackson v.
Village of Bellwood, No. 91C-7089, 1992 WL 396443, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 1992)
(mem.); Dow v. Teramara, Inc., No. 90-1412-PFK, 1992 WL 403093, at *8 (D. Kan. Dec.
4, 1992) (granting summary judgment on privacy claim in favor of plaintiff-counterdefen-
dant); Mayne v. B. Green & Co., Civ. A. No. HAR-92-431, 1992 WL 356122, at *1 (D.
Md. Nov. 20, 1992) (mem.); Estiverne v. Sak's Fifth Ave., No. CIV.A.91-4691, 1992 WL
364776, at *1 (E.D. La. Nov. 19, 1992), aff d, 9 F.3d 1171 (5th Cir. 1993); Wesley v. WISN
Division-Hearst Corp., 806 F. Supp. 812, 815 (E.D. Wis. 1992); Vocal New York Mid-
Hudson Chapter v. Dutchess County Dep't of Social Servs., No. 91-CIV-5826, 1992 WL
170584, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1992); Matrix Essentials, Inc. v. Karol, No. 89-C-9611,1992
WL 166926, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 1992); Booth v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 799 F.
Supp. 1086, 1091 (D. Kan. 1992); Watkins v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 797 F. Supp. 1349,
1360 (S.D. Miss.), aff d, 979 F.2d 1535 (5th Cir. 1992); Joplin Enters. v. Allen, 795 F. Supp.
349, 352 (W.D. Wash. 1992); Sparks v. Regional Medical Ctr. Bd., 792 F. Supp. 735, 748
(N.D. Ala. 1992); Norris v. Bd. of Educ., 797 F. Supp. 1452, 1466 (S.D. Ind. 1992);
Cambridge Title Co. v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 817 F. Supp. 1263,1278 (D. Md. 1992);
Kersey v. Dennison Mfg. Co., No. 89-2650-MA, 1992 WL 71390, at *13 (D. Mass. Feb. 21,
1992); Moldea v. New York Times Co., 793 F. Supp. 335,335 (D.D.C. 1992), affd, 22 F.3d
310 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
54. Lockard v. Lockard, 977 F.2d 589, 589 (9th Cir. 1992) (reversing trial court
decision granting defendant's motion to dismiss); Beck v. Interstate Brands Corp., 953 F.2d
1275, 1276 (11th Cir. 1992); All the Answers, Inc. v. Amtelco, No. CIV.A.92-5177, 1992
WL 392590, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18,1992) (motion to dismiss granted as to one defendant,
denied as to other); Kinard v. National Tea Co., No. 92-0099-B-M, 1992 WL 459572, at *4
(S.D. Ala. Dec. 11,1992); Torretto v. I.B. Diffusion, L.P., No. 92-C-2758,1992 WL 345048,
at *7 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 1992); Watkins v. General Refractories Co., 805 F. Supp. 911, 918
(D. Utah 1992); Suarez Corp. v. CBS, Inc., No. 1:92CV0045,1992 WL 503593, at *2 (N.D.
Ohio June 24, 1992); Jeff Isaac Rare Coins, Inc. v. Yaffe, 792 F. Supp. 13, 18 (E.D.N.Y.
1992); Bruss Co. v. K & S Brokerage, Inc., No. 91-C-1561, 1992 WL 80537, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 14, 1992); Ferragamo v. Signet Bank, No. CIV.A.WN-88-3333, 1992 WL 219826, at
*8 (D. Md. Mar. 17, 1992); Smith v. Bendix Field Eng'g Corp., No. 91-896-CIV-J-16, 1992
WL 316313, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 1992).
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forty-three cases (or seventy-two percent) at the trial level via
dispositive pretrial motions. Only two of these decisions reviewed at
the appellate level were reversed 5
Much of the defendants' success can be explained by the fact that
the current state of privacy law simply does not favor plaintiffs. For
example, the tort of public disclosure of private facts, 6 with which
Warren and Brandeis were concerned, 7 is for most practical pur-
poses dead, laid to rest by the United States Supreme Court in
Florida Star v. B.J.E58 The test the Court adopted in Florida Star
for when a state may constitutionally punish (through the award of
tort damages) the publication of true speech is so stringent that
Justice White, writing in dissent, argued that the Court had
"obliterate[d]" the tort of public disclosure of private facts. 9
The other privacy torts also present substantial legal obstacles to
plaintiffs. The tort of appropriation' has evolved into a property-
based claim unrelated to the protection of personal privacy. It is used
primarily as a tool for helping celebrities protect the commercial value
55. Lockard, 977 F.2d at 589 (reversing trial court decision granting defendant's
motion to dismiss); White, 971 F.2d at 1399 (reversing summary judgment for defendant).
56. This tort is intended to protect against the revelation of true, embarrassing details
concerning a person's life. It is defined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts as follows:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized
is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is
not of legitimate concern to the public.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 652D.
57. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 33, at 196, 215-16.
58. 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989). Florida Star is discussed infra notes 447-58 and
accompanying text.
59. Id. at 550 (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court accepts appellant's invitation...
to obliterate one of the most noteworthy legal inventions of the 20th century: the tort of
the publication of private facts.")
60. This tort is designed to protect against appropriations of a person's name or
likeness for one's own use or benefit. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4,
§ 652C. The first invasion of privacy case to reach an appellate court in the wake of the
Warren and Brandeis article involved appropriation. In Roberson v. Rochester Folding
Box Co., 64 N.E. 442,442 (1902), the defendant used a photograph of a young girl without
her consent to advertise its flour. The New York Court of Appeals rejected her claim,
causing a public outcry that prompted the New York legislature to enact a statute making
it a tort and a misdemeanor to use a person's name or photograph for "advertising
purposes or purposes of trade" without her consent. See Prosser, supra note 38, at 385
(discussing Roberson). Three years later, the Georgia Supreme Court became the first
state high court to recognize the tort of appropriation in a case involving an insurance
company that used the plaintiff's name and 'picture as part of a bogus testimonial.
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 73 (Ga. 1905).
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of their "right of publicity."'61 False light, a sickly stepchild of
defamation,62 has been rejected by several states63 and even where
accepted, "the chances of a plaintiff ultimately prevailing on a false
light claim are slim."' Intrusion is limited in some jurisdictions by
61. The original purpose of the tort was to protect against injured feelings resulting
from interferences with the solitude or anonymity of the plaintiff. Christopher Pesce,
Note, The Likeness Monster: Should the Right of Publicity Protect Against Imitation?, 65
N.Y.U. L. REv. 782, 789 (1990). However, most appropriation cases filed today seek to
protect pecuniary rather than emotional interests. See Prosser, supra note 38, at 406 ("The
interest protected is not so much a mental as a proprietary one, in the exclusive use of the
plaintiff's name and likeness as an aspect of his identity."). The cases usually involve
claims by celebrities or their surviving relatives against one who has, without consent,
profited from commercial exploitation of the celebrity's identity. See, e.g., Midler v. Ford
Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Young & Rubicam,
Inc., v. Midler, 112 S. Ct. 1513 (1992) (suit by singer Bette Midler); Carson v. Here's
Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 1983) (suit by comedian Johnny
Carson); Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 427 (Cal. 1979) (suit by relatives of
actor Bela Lugosi); see also Lee Goldman, Elvis Is Alive, But He Shouldn't Be: The Right
of Publicity Revisited, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 597, 597 n.1 (1992) (collecting several other
celebrity cases).
In this latter form, the tort of appropriation has nothing to do with protecting personal
privacy. Celebrities suing for commercial exploitation of their identities are not
complaining about unwanted publicity. They want publicity; they simply want to maintain
exclusive control over its proprietary value. See Richard Ausness, The Right of Publicity:
A "Haystack in a Hurricane," 55 TEMP. L.Q. 977, 981 (1982) ("Celebrities and entertainers
who have actively sought publicity cannot honestly claim to be offended by public
exposure alone."). Thus, properly characterized, the modem tort of appropriation is more
a kind of property claim than a privacy claim. Pesce, supra, at 791. Recognizing this,
many courts have approved an independent cause of action for interfering with a person's
"right of publicity." For general discussion of this tort, see Barbara A. Burnett, The
Property Right of Publicity and the First Amendment: Popular Culture and the Commercial
Persona, 3 HOFSTRA PROP. L.i. 171, 174 (1990); Goldman, supra, at 602; Sheldon W.
Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative Value of
Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1202 (1986); Barbara Singer, The Right of Publicity:
Star Vehicle or Shooting Star?, 10 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. LJ. 1, 6 (1991); J. Stephen
Bingman, Comment, A Descendible Right of Publicity: Has the Time Finally Come for a
National Standard?, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 933, 935 (1990); Pesce, supra, at 789.
62. The tort of false light is intended to protect against objectionable false portrayals
of a person. It is defined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts as follows:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other
before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
his privacy, if (a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in
reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in
which the other would be placed.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 652E.
63. See supra note 42 (citing cases).
64. Diane L. Zimmerman, False Light Invasion of Privacy: The Light That Failed, 64
N.Y.U. L. REv. 364,366-67 (1989). Professor Zimmerman explains that this is due to the
overlap between defamation and false light. Plaintiffs suing for false light usually also sue
for defamation. Id. at 367 n.16. When they prevail, it is usually on the defamation claim.
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the requirement of a physical trespass,'5 and in virtually all jurisdic-
tions by the rule that no intrusion can occur in a public place.66
However, it is not only restrictive legal definitions that hinder
privacy plaintiffs. Review of the case law discloses a judicial wariness
of-if not outright hostility towards-the invasion of privacy torts. In
disposing of invasion of privacy cases through pretrial mechanisms,
courts often decide on their own what would appear to be questions
of fact more appropriate for jury resolution. Dempsey v. National
Enquirer67 serves as an illustrative example.' The plaintiff filed
several tort claims against the National Enquirer arising out of an
article concerning plaintiff's remarkable escape from injury after he
fell out of an airplane.69 One of the counts pleaded by plaintiff was
Id. The conceptual difficulties involved with the claim of false light are obvious: If a false
statement damages reputation, it is actionable as defamation; if it does not damage
reputation, one may ask whether there is any point in providing a legal remedy.
65. E.g., Pierson v. News Group Publications, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 635, 640 (S.D. Ga.
1982) (holding that "[a]n essential element of this tort is a physical intrusion analogous to
a trespass"); Nelson v. Maine Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1223 (Me. 1977) ("[A] complaint
should minimally allege a physical intrusion upon premises occupied privately by a plaintiff
for purposes of seclusion.").
66. See supra notes 6, 13 (collecting cases).
67. 702 F. Supp. 927, 932-33 (D. Me. 1988).
68. See also Aisenson v. American Broadcasting Co., 269 Cal. Rptr. 379, 387-88 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1990) (affirming summary judgment for defendant who videotaped plaintiff
outside his home as part of news story, implicitly holding as a matter of law that intrusion
was not highly offensive to a reasonable person); Mastroberti v. Hall, No. 058336,1993 WL
58277, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 18,1993) (granting motion to strike complaint because
allegations that defendant intruded upon and photographed portions of plaintiff's business
which were closed to the public were insufficient as a matter of law to show highly
offensive conduct); Wallace v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 1989 WL 100423, at *1 (Del.
Super. Ct. Aug. 4, 1989) (granting summary judgment for defendant based upon court's
determination that broadcast footage of exterior and portion of interior of plaintiff's home
was not highly offensive to an ordinary person); Lewis v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 339
N.W.2d 857,860 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (affirming summary judgment for defendant whose
employee spied on suspected shoplifter in dressing room from grille in ceiling, deciding as
a matter of law that signs outside dressing room warning that area was under surveillance
immunized defendant's conduct); Bitsie v. Walston, 515 P.2d 659, 663-64 (N.M. Ct. App.
1973) (deciding as a matter of law that printing sketch of Navajo child in newspaper, which
offended traditional beliefs of Navajo tribe, was not offensive to persons of ordinary
sensibilities; dissent argued courts should "not be frightened to allow a jury to play its
role-to determine issues of fact").
69. Dempsey, 702 F. Supp. at 928 n.1. The plaintiff also sued News America
Publishing, Inc., publisher of the Star (another tabloid newspaper) in connection with a
story about the incident which appeared in that publication. Dempsey v. National
Enquirer, 702 F. Supp. 934, 935 (D. Me. 1989). Both the National Enquirer's and the
Star's accounts of the incident contained fabricated quotations atttributed to the plaintiff.
Id at 935, 937. The Star went so far as to report the story as a first-person narrative under
a byline using the plaintiff's name. Id at 935.
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an intrusion claim alleging the following conduct by an Enquirer
reporter:
She allegedly came to his house and continued to press for
an interview even after the plaintiff refused, repeatedly
drove past his house for more than three-quarters of an hour
after the refusal, returned to the plaintiff's house two days
later and was again rebuffed, followed the plaintiff to a
restaurant and again requested an interview, attempted to
photograph the plaintiff at the restaurant, and then left after
the plaintiff threatened to call the management."
In concluding that the plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted, the court stated that although the contacts
may have been annoying, they could not "reasonably be seen as
highly offensive."'" This conclusion addressed the generally accepted
element of the tort of intrusion that the defendant's conduct must "be
highly offensive to a reasonable person."'72 However, objective
reasonable person tests are usually for the fact finder to apply and
resolve.73 Undoubtedly, there are cases involving trivial invasions in
which it would be appropriate for a court to make this determination
as a matter of law;74 however, Dempsey does not appear to be one
of them. Construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff and resolving every doubt on his behalf, as the court is
required to do in passing upon a motion to dismiss,75 the allegations
set forth a colorable claim of intrusion. It is likely that many
reasonable persons would find it highly offensive to be placed under
surveillance, followed about and accosted at their homes and in
restaurants.
70. Dempsey, 702 F. Supp. at 931.
71. Id.
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 652B; see supra note 5
for complete text of the Restatement definition of intrusion.
73. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 43, § 37, at 237 (discussing
the determination of the standard of reasonable conduct to govern in a negligence case,
the authors state that "[u]nder our system of procedure, this question is to be determined
in all doubtful cases by the jury").
74. See Bennett v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 798 F.2d 1413, 1413 (6th Cir.
1986) (upholding the granting of defendant's motion to dismiss based upon determination
that plaintiff's receipt of two pieces of "junk mail" from defendant after requesting not to
receive any did not constitute an intrusion which a reasonable person would find highly
objectionable).
75. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) ("In appraising the sufficiency of
the complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.").
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The judicial animus towards privacy claims probably stems in part
from a desire to exert jury control over a tort that has been criticized
as having no "legal proffle."'76 Particularly because of the free
speech implications of many privacy cases, courts no doubt feel
obliged to screen privacy cases carefully before sending them to juries.
However, it also appears that some judges simply "don't get it" when
it comes to complaints of invasion of privacy. This lack of perception
is reflected in Albright v. United States.' The plaintiffs, a group of
Social Security Administration employees, were denied promotions."
At the request of the employees, the Bureau of Hearings and Appeals
of the Social Security Administration ("Bureau") held a meeting to
explain the employment decision.79 When the employees arrived at
the meeting, they discovered that the proceedings were being
videotaped." Afterwards, the employees sued under the federal
Privacy Act, claiming emotional injuries resulting from the
videotaping."
The court of appeals upheld the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims,
agreeing with the district court that the plaintiffs failed to establish a
causal connection between the videotaping and their asserted
emotional distress.' Despite several of the plaintiffs' direct tes-
timony on this issue,' the district court stated that the plaintiffs
presented "no credible evidence ... linking the adverse [emotional]
effects with the videotaping."'
76. Kalven, supra note 30, at 333. Professor Kalven was referring specifically to the
invasion of privacy tort known as public disclosure of private facts, but similar observations
have been made concerning other privacy torts. See, e.g., Zimmerman, supra note 64, at
369 (arguing that the tort of false light is "a conceptually empty tort"); id. at 371
(commenting that there is a "surprising vagueness" regarding the interests the tort is
intended to protect); id. at 371-72 (stating that "[tihe common law has yet to provide a
coherent answer" to the question of what kinds of false depictions should be remedied by
the tort).
77. 732 F.2d 181, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
78. Id. at 182.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 183-84.
81. lId at 182. The Privacy Act proscribes the Bureau from maintaining a "record
describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless
expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained
.... " 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(7) (1988).
82. Albright, 732 F.2d at 186-88. The court also held that the plaintiffs did not show
that the defendants acted intentionally or willfully as required by the Privacy Act. Id. at
188-90.
83. Id at 187.
84. Id. at 186.
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In recounting the testimony of three of the plaintiffs regarding
the adverse effects they suffered as a result of the videotaping, the
court of appeals stopped just short of openly ridiculing them. One
plaintiff analogized the taping to intrusive state repression in
totalitarian countries;' the second testified that the videotaping
evoked the same feeling of invasion as when the plaintiff's home had
been burglarized; 6 the third testified that "I felt like I was a nonen-
tity, that I was just a person there that things could be done to me
without my knowledge, approval or say or anything .... "' Citing
these examples, the court characterized the plaintiffs' testimony as so
exaggerated as to make "their whole case ... unbelievable." 88 The
court also commented that "[i]f the videotaping had truly been so
offensive," the plaintiffs should have left the meeting.89
The tone of the court's opinion reveals its insensitivity to the
possibility that a person could be legitimately and seriously offended
by nonconsensual videotaping. This was a meeting held by
management to discuss what amounted to job demotions of the
affected employees. According to the court, "[t]ensions... ran high"
at the meeting and "there were several heated exchanges" between
the employees and management.' It is not unreasonable to believe
that the employees, already in a vulnerable position, would feel
violated and suffer adverse effects by having their attendance,
comments, and even facial expressions captured on permanent
videotape by their superiors. This is particularly true because the
employees had no advance notice that the meeting would be
videotaped and had no control over what would happen to the
videotape.9' Nor is it unreasonable that the employees would feel
compelled to remain at the meeting despite their repugnance to being
videotaped. The analogy to intrusive behavior by totalitarian regimes




89. Id. The court did not go so far as to hold that the employees consented to the
videotaping, which would be a defense under the Privacy Act, see supra note 81, as well
as under the common law tort of invasion of privacy. See Prosser, supra note 38, at 419
("Chief among the available defenses is that of the plaintiff's consent to the invasion,
which will bar his recovery as in the case of any other tort.").
90. Albright, 732 F.2d at 183.
91. Id. at 184. After the meeting, the agency offered to destroy the videotape, but the
analysts refused the offer in order to preserve the videotape as evidence in their suit. Id.
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was not, as the court implied, ridiculous. 2
The shrinking right of privacy in tort law is important to this
Article not only because of the dismal prospects it presents for
privacy claimants generally, but also because of the specific impact it
has upon those whose privacy is invaded in public. The four privacy
torts are closely interrelated. Most privacy plaintiffs assert claims
based upon more than one of the four torts and sometimes all four of
them. If the other three privacy torts were strong, it would be less
objectionable that the tort of intrusion is weak. More liberal judicial
treatment of the torts of public disclosure of private facts, ap-
propriation and, to a lesser extent, false light would permit recovery
in appropriate cases involving invasions of privacy that occur in public
without the necessity of redefining the tort of intrusion. But that has
not occurred.
Consider the case of the three boys who were photographed
without their consent while they spoke with a policewoman on a
public sidewalk.' The photo subsequently appeared in Playboy
magazine next to nude photos of the policewoman, and the three boys
sued the magazine for invasion of privacy." Their position evokes
sympathy. It seems wrong for one to secretly photograph a person
without his consent and then to disseminate the photo to a wide
audience, particularly in a manner and publication many would find
objectionable. However, the court held that the facts fell short of
satisfying the requirements of any of the four invasion of privacy torts
and dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint.95
The court ruled that no intrusion occurred because the photo was
taken on a public sidewalk "in plain view of the public eye.,96
Appropriation failed because the boys did not allege "that their
likenesses have value in and of themselves" that could be taken by
someone else for commercial benefit. 7 A claim for public disclosure
of private facts did not lie because " '[t]here is no liability when the
defendant merely gives further publicity to information about the
92. Cf Lena H. Sun, Chinese Government Takes Ambivalent Approach to Released
Dissidents, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 1992, at A13 (discussing plainclothes police of Chinese
regime following dissident and filming him with video camera hidden inside a shoulder
bag).
93. Jackson v. Playboy Enters., 574 F. Supp. 10, 11 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
94. Id. at 11.
95. Id.




plaintiff that is already public.' "98 Finally, a false light claim was
not available because the plaintiffs did not allege that the photograph
was a false depiction of their appearances or that it attributed false
characteristics or conduct to them.9
This case reveals that restrictive interpretation of the four privacy
torts has left a large gap in the law with respect to invasive behavior
that occurs in public places. Before discussing how that gap should
be filled, it is important to discuss why it needs filling; that is, to
understand the magnitude of the threat to privacy in public places.
III. THE GROWING THREAT TO PRIVACY: REVISITING THE
FEARS OF WARREN AND BRANDEIS
While the right to privacy in tort law shrinks, the threat to
privacy is growing. We live in an increasingly intrusive, uncivi1'f
society. To appreciate how much so, we need only summon up the
ghost of privacy law past and make some comparisons. In their
landmark article The Right To Privacy,°' 1 Warren and Brandeis
identified two principal threats to privacy. The first was the press,
which they saw as "overstepping in every direction the obvious
bounds of propriety and of decency."'"m  The second was the
development of "numerous mechanical devices" which "threaten[ed]
to make good the prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet shall
be proclaimed from the house-tops.' ,,103
A. The Uncivil Media
If the fears of Warren and Brandeis were well grounded in the
late nineteenth century, they are much more so today. Indeed, the
empirical basis for their anxiety about privacy seems almost trivial
98. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs, supra note 4, § 652D cnt. b).
99. Id. at 14.
100. Professor Robert Post advanced the theory that invasion of privacy tort law
safeguards societal "civility rules," which he defines as normative expectations of decency
toward one another. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and
Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REv. 957, 962-63 (1989).
101. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 33.
102. Id. at 196. They continued:
Gossip is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become
a trade, which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery. To satisfy a prurient
taste the details of sexual relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the
daily papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is filled with idle
gossip, which can only be procured by intrusion upon the domestic circle.
Id. /
103. Id. at 195 (source of internal quotation not cited in original).
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when compared to modern events. Consider first their concern over
the gossipy press. In his own classic article on the subject of privacy,
Dean Prosser gave credence to the theory that the Warren and
Brandeis article was motivated by Warren's annoyance with the
Boston newspaper coverage of parties hosted by his socialite wife and
by publicity given to the wedding of a family member."° If Warren
was annoyed by the newspaper revelation that the Warrens "gave a
handsome wedding breakfast after the ceremony" or the observation
that there were "no bridesmaids" at the wedding,'05 one can imagine
he would be apoplectic reading and viewing media coverage concer-
ning the private lives of citizens in modern times.
While the press has been attacked before 6 and since"° the
time of Warren and Brandeis, it seems fair to conclude that things are
getting worse. Recent times have produced more than one notable
example of invasive journalism,08 but the low point seems to be the
104. Prosser, supra note 38, at 383-84. This theory has been debunked by others. See
Barron, supra note 33, at 892-93. Barron and other researchers have concluded that
Warren and Brandeis greatly overstated their case with regard to the press. Id. at 895-97.
Barron states that while there were instances in which the press showed little regard for
the privacy of individuals, Boston newspapers in the late nineteenth century were actually
quite tame and, in fact, this period represented "the golden age of Boston journalism."
Id. at 895. He concluded that references to the Warren family, which supposedly sparked
the Warren and Brandeis article, "were virtually nonexistent, let alone lurid." Id. at 896.
105. Barron, supra note 33, at 893-94. These quotations are from the only two
descriptions of the wedding that appeared in Boston newspapers. Id. The articles
revealed no details more personal than those quoted in the accompanying text. See id.
106. See id. at 889 ("[S]ignificant criticism of the irresponsible excesses of the American
press had been published before the Warren-Brandeis article appeared in the Harvard Law
Review.").
107. See, e.g., Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 960 (D. Minn.
1948) ("[O]thers contend that the Press has overstepped the bounds of propriety in
pursuing the trade of gathering all trivial gossip and sensational stories which may be
unfolded in any court trial in order to cater to the lowest tastes in our citizenry and
thereby increase the sale of their newspapers.").
108. See, e.g., Alexander Cockburn, A Ruritanian Plot Against Prince Charles: Scotland
Yard Bodyguards had the Equipment to Overhear Royal Phone Indiscretions, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 1993, at M5 (quoting a secretly taped conversation in which Prince Charles, the
Prince of Wales, tells his alleged mistress that he would like to "live inside [her] trousers");
Alex S. Jones, Report of Ashe's Illness Raises an Old Issue for Editors, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
10,1992, at A25 (describing ethical debate regarding whether media should have disclosed
that former tennis star Arthur Ashe had contracted AIDS).
Of course, if one considers the tabloid press, the examples of invasive reporting
multiply quickly. The following headlines concerning the private lives of entertainment
celebrities appeared on the covers of three popular tabloids published during the week of
July 6, 1993: Burt's 4-Year Affair With Waitressl, GLOBE, July 6, 1993, at 1; Oprah's Hot
Love Secrets, id.; Danson Romance Turns Ugly Duckling Whoopi Into A Beautiful Swan,
id.; Angry Loni: I Want $15 Million-Her Side of Burt Reynolds Divorce Drama, NAT'L
ENQUIRER, July 6, 1993, at 1; Shannen Strikes Again! Cops Called As She Battles Fiance's
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media's continuing obsession with President Bill Clinton's sex life.
During the 1992 presidential campaign, the media fed voraciously on
allegations of President Clinton's sexual indiscretions. To measure
societal changes in civility since the time of Warren and Brandeis, try
to picture an editor in the 1890s giving the green light to an article
detailing the sexual prowess of a United States president. It is
ludicrous to imagine reading that Benjamin Harrison rated "9 out of
10" as a lover or that Grover Cleveland performed oral sex "like a
champ." Yet these were among the titillations offered to readers
about Bill Clinton in 1992."09 The "no holds barred" campaign
coverage was not limited to Clinton. Innocent, private figures were
also swept into the fray."'
Mom, STAR, July 6,1993, at 1; Conway Twitty's Shocking $50M Will: Country King Forgot
to Include His Wife!, id.; Loni Begs Burt: Let's Start Over, id.; Sexy Secrets Oprah Doesn't
Want You To Read, id.
Total forfeiture of one's private life seems too high a cost for the decision to seek the
public limelight in a professional capacity. As Stanley Bern commented in his essay
Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons:
If a person is in the public eye for some performance that he intends to be public
or that is in its nature public ... this may ... make "human interest stories"
about him more entertaining and exciting than similar stories about an unknown.
But the fact that many people enjoy that kind of entertainment is no reason at
all for overriding the principle of privacy .... To treat even an entertainer's life
simply as material for entertainment is to pay no more regard to him as a person
than to an animal in a menagerie.... [M]erely to be a celebrity-even a willing
celebrity-does not disable someone from claiming the consideration due to a
person.
Stanley I. Bern, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in NoMos XIII: PRIVACY 14
(J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1971).
109. See Flowers In Bloom, MACLEAN'S, Nov. 23, 1992, at 11 (recounting details of an
interview published in Penthouse magazine with Gennifer Flowers, the former nightclub
singer who claimed to have carried on a twelve-year extramarital affair with Bill Clinton
while he was governor of Arkansas).
110. Former Little Rock journalist Deborah Mathis was named in the Star tabloid as
one of then-candidate Bill Clinton's extramarital lovers. Eleanor Clift et al., Surviving the
Smear: One Woman's Story, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 10,1992, at 26. Mathis told Newsweek how
she had to sit down with her children and explain to them: " 'A sleazy publication is
about to print lies about your mama. Some idiot might come up to you and offer you
money to tell lies. Some kids you know might taunt you about your mama.' " Id at 27.
The intrusion into Mathis's life cannot be dismissed simply as sleazy tabloid
journalism. While the Mathis story originated in a tabloid, Mathis said she subsequently
received calls from several "mainstream reporters" as well. Id. This reflects the disturbing
" 'symbiotic relationship [that] has arisen between the two extremes of American
journalism, with charges trumpeted by supermarket tabloids picked up by serious news
organizations and converted from dross to journalistic gilt.'" Christopher Clausen, Culture
Watching: Reading the Supermarket Tabloids, NEW LEADER, Sept. 7, 1992, at 11 (quoting
an article from the New York Times).
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At the end of Clinton's first year in office, when the clamor
concerning his sex life had quieted down, an article in The American
Spectator"' reignited the furor. The article detailed lurid ac-
cusations of sexual misconduct made by two Arkansas state troopers
who served on Clinton's security detail while he was governor of
Arkansas. A NEXIS computer search revealed an astounding 13,210
newspaper articles written about President Clinton and his sex
life,"' as well as 1,394 magazine articles.13  To appreciate the
magnitude of these figures, consider that print coverage of the Brady
Bill,"4 involving a controversial public policy issue that generated
Even if invasive stories were limited to tabloids, they could not be dismissed as
insigificant. The National Enquirer has a weekly circulation of 3.8 million, the largest of
any newspaper in the United States. Id. at 10 (reporting also that the Wall Street Journal
is second with a circulation of 1.8 million and USA Today is third at 1.4 million).
111. David Brock, His Cheatin' Heart: David Brock in Little Rock, AM. SPECTATOR,
Jan. 1994, at 18. The state troopers told Brock
their "official" duties included facilitating Clinton's cheating on his wife. This
meant that, on the state payroll and using state time, vehicles, and resources, they
were instructed by Clinton on a regular basis to approach women and to solicit
their telephone numbers for the governor, to drive him in state vehicles to
rendezvous points and guard him during sexual encounters; to secure hotel rooms
and other meeting places for sex; to lend Clinton their state cars so he could slip
away and visit women unnoticed; to deliver gifts from Clinton to various women
... ; and to help Clinton cover up his activities by keeping tabs on Hillary's
whereabouts and lying to Hillary about her husband's whereabouts.
Id. at 21.
112. Search of NEXIS, News library, Papers file (November 31, 1994) (search term
"Clinton and sex! but not homosexual! or gay or sex! discrimination").
113. Search of NEXIS, News library, Mags file (November 31, 1994) (search term
"Clinton and sex! but not homosexual! or gay or sex! discrimination").
In what might be characterized as the ultimate illustration of psychological denial, an
apparently serious Newsweek reporter recently wrote: "The national press has been
restrained in its accounts of Bill Clinton's private life.... ." Joe Klein, The Politics of
Promiscuity, NEWSWEEK, May 9, 1994, at 16. Some of the articles written about President
Clinton's sex life (although only a small percentage) pertain to the lawsuit filed against him
by Paula Jones, a former Arkansas state employee who alleges that Clinton made
unwanted sexual advances towards her in 1991 while he was Governor of Arkansas. See
generally Stephen Labaton, Suit Accuses President of Advance, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1994,
at 9 (describing allegations of lawsuit). While it is reasonable to expect the press to report
any lawsuit filed against the President of the United States, query whether the lawsuit ever
would have been filed but for the tabloid climate concerning Clinton's sex life created by
the media.
114. The Brady Bill is the popular name of a federal law that created a five day waiting
period for handgun purchases, during which law enforcement agencies must conduct
background checks upon buyers to determine whether they are convicted felons or
otherwise legally prohibited from purchasing firearms. Brady Handgun Violence Protection
Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(s)(1) (West 1994). For a thorough analysis of the controversy
surrounding the Brady Bill, see Andrew J. McClurg, The Rhetoric of Gun Control, 42 AM.
U. L. REv. 53 (1992).
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fierce debate for seven years before its passage, has produced a
comparatively meager 5,733 newspaper articles" 5 and 328 magazine
articles." 6
The media's willingness to print just about anything about just
about anybody carries over to the methods media representatives" 7
use to gather information. This, in turn, has direct implications for
the tort of intrusion, including intrusions in places accessible to the
public. In television today, life does not just imitate art; it is the art,
as demonstrated by the seemingly endless supply of so-called "reality
shows""' on the air, such as I Witness Video, Cops, Firefighters, Real
Stories of the Highway Patrol, On Scene: Emergency Response and
Rescue 911."' It appears that the goal of these programs is to
compress as much human suffering and failing as possible into the
allotted thirty- or sixty-minute time slot. In its premiere episode in
the fall of 1992, I Witness Video showed footage of four real-life
slayings,"' prompting a weekly newsmagazine to label it "TV's first
'snuff' show."' 2
Much footage for the reality shows comes from camera crews
who travel with police, firefighters, and emergency rescue personnel
115. Search of NEXIS, News library, Papers file (November 31, 1994) (search term
"Brady Bill").
116. Search of NEXIS, News library, Mags file (November 31, 1994) (search term
"Brady Bill").
117. "Media representatives" is a more appropriate term than "journalists." Though
the public may not always recognize the distinction, the tabloid and reality television shows
are entertainment programs rather than news programs. See Jane Hall, Ruling May Affect
Taping of Searches: Television Executives Say Sending TV Crews Out With Law-
Enforcement Agents Will Be Looked At On A Case-By-Case Basis, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 28,
1992, at F1 (quoting John Langley, co-executive producer of the Fox Network series Cops:
"We don't claim to be journalists operating under the aegis of the news-we're considered
entertainment."); see also Perspectives, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 11, 1993, at 19 (quoting CBS
anchorperson Dan Rather "It's the ratings, stupid, don't you know? They've got us
putting more fuzz and wuzz on the air, cop-shop stuff, so as to compete not with other
news programs but with entertainment programs-including those posing as news
programs-for dead bodies, mayhem and lurid tales.").
118. See supra note 1 for definition of reality television programming.
119. These programs appeared in the TV Guide for the week of Aug. 14-20, 1993. TV
GUIDE, Vol. 41, No. 33, Issue No. 2107. See, e.g., Cops (CBS television broadcast);
Firefighters (KASN (Little Rock; Ind.) television broadcast); I Witness Video (NBC
television broadcast); On Scene: Emergency Response (KASN (Little Rock; Ind.)
television broadcast); Real Stories of the Highway Patrol (KTVT (Fort Worth; Ind.)
television broadcast); Rescue 911 (CBS television broadcast).
120. I Witness Video (NBC television broadcast).
121. Harry F. Walters et al., Networks Under the Gun, NEWSWEEK, July 12,1993, at 64,
65.
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and videotape persons unlucky enough to suffer a heart attack,'2
have an automobile accident," or be the subject of a search war-
rant124 on that particular evening. At least one of the programs
regularly features videotape of hapless drunk drivers being pulled
over by the police and humiliating themselves while they botch field
sobriety tests and slur denials of being drunk."2
A second disturbing trend in modem television relevant to the
tort of intrusion is the increasingly widespread use of hidden
microphones and cameras. A writer for the Washington Post labeled
the use of hidden video cameras as the "hottest trend in
television." 126 A representative of CBS News recently stated that
the use of hidden cameras is "up considerably in the industry,"'27 a
disturbing prospect in light of a survey ten years earlier showing that
sixty-four percent of television stations doing investigative stories were
using hidden cameras and microphones.s
122. See Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 232 Cal. Rptr, 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(reversing summary judgment on intrusion claim which had been entered by trial court in
favor of defendant broadcasting company against wife of heart attack victim who was
filmed in his home without consent as paramedics unsuccessfully attempted to resuscitate
him).
123. See supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text (discussing intrusive filming of
accident victim by camera crew working for syndicated program On Scene: Emergency
Rescue).
124. See Anderson v. WROC-TV, 441 N.Y.S.2d 220,222 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (suit by owner
of home filmed during search by Humane Society for mistreated animals); Rogers v.
Buckel, 615 N.E.2d 669, 670 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (suit by bystander and child filmed
during drug raid); Magenis v. Fisher Broadcasting, Inc., 798 P.2d 1106, 1107-08 (Or. Ct.
App. 1990) (suit by family filmed during drug raid); Hall, supra note 117, at Fl (describing
raid of fraud suspect's home by U.S. Secret Service, which was filmed by crew for
television program Street Stories, and during which suspect's wife tried to shield herself and
five-year-old child from filming).
125. E.g., Real Stories of the Highway Patrol (KTVT (Fort Worth; Ind.) television
broadcast). The producers of the programs seem to have become much more careful
about blurring the faces of many of the subjects. This may be in response to the increasing
number of tort suits being filed against the programmers. See Cox, supra note 14, at 34-35
(describing several recent lawsuits).
126. Howard Kurtz, Hidden Network Cameras: A Troubling Trend? Critics Complain
of Deception as Dramatic Footage Yields High Ratings, WASH. POST, Nov. 30,1992, at Al.
127. Kenneth R. Clark, Secret Cameras, Mikes Arouse Ethical Dilemma, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, July 9, 1992, at E6 (quoting David Corvo, vice-president of public affairs for
CBS News).
128. Alvin P. Sanoff, Ethics, Bias, Accuracy: Fresh Attacks on TV News, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Sept. 5, 1983, at 55 (discussing survey by Charles Burke, associate
professor of journalism at the University of Florida).
1014 [Vol. 73
PUBLIC PRIVACY
Although in some situations the "greater good" may justify using
hidden cameras,129 more often than not the practice may amount to
lazy journalism and an unwarranted invasion of privacy. In Min-
neapolis, a television news team placed unlocked bicycles around the
city and then waited with hidden cameras for people to steal
them. 3 They filmed and followed the thieves, who were usually
youths.131 In another incident, ABC and correspondent Geraldo
Rivera sought to interview a woman in connection with an inves-
tigation of a judge who allegedly exchanged leniency in criminal cases
for sexual favors. 32 The woman agreed to be interviewed for the
program, but refused to appear on camera. 33 Betraying this
condition, the defendants secretly videotaped the interview and
broadcast a portion of it.Y In another incident that led to a
lawsuit, representatives of the Sally Jessy Raphael show secretly taped
a confrontation between a group of adult children and their mother
129. A well-publicized incident involving misrepresentation and hidden cameras has
fostered debate on this point. In November 1992, a woman working for ABC's Prime
Time Live program applied for a job in the meat department of a Food Lion supermarket
as part of an investigation into meat handling practices. The reporter stated on the
application: "'I really miss working in a grocery store, and I love meat wrapping. I would
like to make a career with the company.' " Lies and Videotape, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Dec. 7, 1992, at 12A. She quit eleven days later, stating that she had to care for a
grandparent. Id. While she was an employee she used a hidden video camera to film
unsanitary meat handling practices. See Kurtz, supra note 126, at Al (stating that the
broadcast charged the supermarket chain with repackaging old meat). Food Lion has sued
ABC News over the incident. Id. at A4; see also Marc Gunther, Hidden Cameras Catch
All: In Its Quest To Perfect Investigative-TV Journalism, 'Prime Time Live' Is Pushing the
Limits of Concealed Minicams, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 14, 1991, at El (referring to
other examples of journalists using video cameras hidden in such items as hats, handbags,
and teddy bears).
Don Hewitt, executive producer of the television news program 60 Minutes, admits
to being "troubled" by such practices, but states: "'It's the small crime versus the greater
good .... If you can catch someone violating "thou shalt not steal" by your violating
"thou shalt not lie," that's a pretty good trade-off.' " Kurtz, supra note 126, at Al, A4.
Others have condemned misrepresentation and the use of hidden cameras by journalists.
See id. at A4 (quoting Tom Goldstein, dean of the journalism school at the University of
California at Berkeley: "I just think it's wrong.")
To ward off a hidden camera investigation, Tyson Foods, Inc., the nation's largest
poultry producer, filed suit against the news magazine program 20/20, seeking to enjoin
representatives of the program from taking hidden cameras into the company's processing
plants. D.R. Stewart, Tyson Sues '20-20' to Stop Hidden-Camera Bid, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETrE, Nov. 24, 1993, at D1.
130. Sanoff, supra note 129, at 54.
131. Id. at 55.
132. Boddie v. American Broadcasting Co., 881 F.2d 267, 268 (6th Cir. 1989).
133. Id. at 268.
134. Id. The dismal state of invasion of privacy law is demonstrated by the fact that
the woman lost her lawsuit on all counts. Id. at 271-72.
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over how the mother's participation in the Church of Scientology had
disrupted the family relationship. Without the mother's consent,
one of the children transmitted their conversation to a hidden camera
crew using a miniature microphone hidden in her clothing.16  The
mother, a Scientology instructor, sued.137
All of this appears to be part of a trend toward excess in mass
communication generally. Outrageousness seems to be the name of
the game. Whether it be "shock jock" Howard Stem sitting on a
toilet surrounded by scantily clad women vying to be Miss Howard
Stern 1994, 13 rap artist Ice-T singing about killing police of-
ficers,139 or actress Demi Moore posing nude on the cover of a
national magazine while eight months pregnant,140 the goal seems
to be to go farther than anyone has gone before. 41  Nothing,
apparently, is off limits.
135. See Cox, supra note 14, at 35 (citing Sally Jesse Raphael (CBS television
broadcast)).
136. Id.
137. Id. A jury returned a verdict against the mother after a month-long trial. Id.
Prior to the encounter, legal counsel for the defendant advised the children to hold the
meeting in a public park. Id
138. Ring Out the Old, Gross Out the New, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 17,1994, at 33 (containing
a video still shot of this scene from Stem's New Year's Eve pay-per-view special on cable
television; the picture included the superimposed caption "cause our breasts are the
best"). Stem offered $50,000 in prize money to beauty contestants willing to perform
stunts such as eating maggots. Id.
In December 1992, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") imposed a
record $600,000 fine against a company that employed Stem, who has built a reputation
upon "explicit references to genitals, homosexuals, and masturbation and other sexual
activity." Paul Farhi, FCC to Levy Record Indecency Penalty: $600,000 Fine Expected On
Howard Stern Broadcasts, WASH. PosT, Dec. 18, 1992, at D1, D2. In response to a
separate fine handed down by the FCC earlier in the year, Stern stated on the air that he
hoped FCC Chairperson Alfred C. Sikes's "prostrate cancer would spread and that the
other FCC commissioners would die in a car wreck." Id. at D2.
139. See Eric Snider, Ice T Takes the Plunge and Wins, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Aug.
1, 1992, at ID (discussing controversial rap singer's song "Cop Killer," which contains
lyrics such as "I'm about to bust some shots off; I'm about to dust some cops off").
140. The actress posed for the cover of Vanity Fair. Bo Emerson, It's No Apparition,
Just More of Demi: Vanity Fair Covers All As Actress, Proud of Pregnancy, Covers Little,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., July 11, 1991, at D1. An editorial writer commented on the
change in attitude represented by her bold move: "Society has come a long way since
pregnant women were referred to discreetly as being 'in the family way' or 'with child.'
In 1952, the nation's most famous mother-to-be, Lucille Ball, couldn't even say the word
pregnant on television." Sexes Watch: Picture Perfect, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 1991, at B6.
141. See Martha Bayles, The Shock-Art Fallacy, ATLANTiC, Feb. 1994, at 18,20 ("The
compulsion to shock dominates popular music, movies, television, publishing, talk radio,




Of course, the responsibility for this excess cannot be placed
solely upon those who pander it. If it did not sell, it would cease to
exist. Regrettably, the American public has proven to be an all too
willing consumer of shocking, titillating, and voyeuristic entertain-
ment. In August 1993, five of the top ten rated network programs in
the United States were newsmagazine shows, many of which rely
upon hidden camera investigations to spice up their fare.42 Two
hundred reporters attended the trial of Lorena Bobbitt, the woman
charged with cutting off her abusive husband's penis.43 The Cable
News Network broadcast the trial live and doubled its ratings."
The network was flooded with viewer complaints when it cut away
from the trial to cover President Clinton's Moscow Summit with
Russian Leader Boris Yeltsin. 45 Some 375,000 viewers paid $39.95
each to watch Howard Stem's repulsive New Year's Eve beauty
pageant on pay-per-view. 46 Clearly, the public is interested in this
kind of entertainment.
B. Video Cameras: The Newest Threat to Privacy
The second threat to privacy identified by Warren and Brandeis
a hundred years ago-technology-looms even larger today. Warren
and Brandeis did not specify the particular "mechanical devices" that
concerned them when they expressed their fear that "what is
whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops."' 47
Film and magnetic sound recording were not invented until the
twentieth century,"4 and while "detective cameras" concealed in
items such opera-glasses, revolvers, and books were popular toys
among the rich in the 1890s, they had little practical use because of
their poor quality.149
142. Jonathan Alter, 'Candid Camera' Gone Beserk?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 30,1993, at 36.
143. Davie A. Kaplan, Bobbitt Fever: Why America Can't Seem To Get Enough,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 24, 1994, at 52.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Ring Out the 01d Gross Out the New, supra note 138, at 33.
147. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 33, at 195.
148. 7 A HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY 1263-64 (Trevor I. Williams ed., 1978).
149. 5 A HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY 732 (Charles Singer et al. eds., 1958). It is
possible that Warren and Brandeis were referring to the development of printing presses
and other technology which facilitated the mass dissemination of news and information,
rather than to snooping devices. See Barron, supra note 33, at 890 n.72 (discussing impact
of Industrial Revolution upon printing techniques). However, their reference to the threat
from "mechanical devices" follows conjunctively from their reference to "[i]nstantaneous
photographs and newspaper enterprise." Warren & Brandeis, supra note 33, at 195
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Whatever snooping devices concerned Warren and Brandeis, it
is safe to say they are to modem surveillance technology what the
slide rule is to the personal computer. Anyone with the inclination
to intrude upon the lives of others may choose from a frightening
array of surveillance devices: 50 video cameras built into brief-
cases,15' tie-tacs, 52  clocks,53  smoke detectors, 54  and ceiling
sprinklers;"5 microphones and transmitters that can "hear thru
walls" 56 and at great distances,5 7 and that come concealed in
everything from writing pens 58 to electrical outlets;'59 telephone
("Instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts
of private and domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the
prediction that 'what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-
tops.' ") (emphasis added).
150. Orwellian adjectives are not required to describe the threat to privacy posed by
modem technology. The following excerpt from the catalog of a company specializing in
surveillance equipment speaks volumes:
COVERT VIDEO SURVEILLANCE
INSTALLATION & RENTAL AVAILABLE
Catch Them In the Act! Video Provides Solid Proof!
EPPI's expertise and equipment enables you to solve more cases.
We will configure a covert video system to meet your operational needs and
RENT you the system by the Week or Month. Our experience has taught us that
every covert video surveillance is a little bit different and requires equipment that
is specific to that particular installation. For example, in one situation you may
need a camera hidden in a clock, in the next situation the clock doesn't fit your
environment but an emergency light camera will; or possibly you will need a
pinhole lens kit, not a disguised camera, and so on.
EXECTuriVE PROTECrION PRODUCTS, INC. PROFESSIONAL CATALOG, 1993, at 2
[hereinafter EPPI CATALOG] (copy on file with author). The company includes a warning
inside the front cover that the equipment is "[n]ot to be used for surreptitious interception
of oral communication." Id. at 1 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1988) (prohibiting the
interception of wire and oral communications)). Purchasers are admonished that it is their
responsibility and not the seller's "to consult legal counsel for interpretation of any laws
applicable to the area of intended use." Id. I do not intend to single out this company
for negative attention. It is only one of several companies that sell such products.
151. Id. at 2.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2-3.
154. Id. at 2.
155. Id. at 3.
156. Id. at 6. A similar product called the "Sound Detector" is touted as being capable
of hearing through "glass, wood, plaster, brick, or even 12 [inch] concrete walls."
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE APPLICATIONS, INC., 1993, at 3 [hereinafter CIAI CATALOG]
(copy on file with author).
157. EPPI CATALOG, supra note 150, at 7 (describing microphone that can "hear at
distances up to 100 yards and beyond").
158. Id. at 12 (transmitter built into writing pen).
159. Id. at 13 (transmitter built into electrical outlet).
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tapping devices;"6 night vision scopes;'6 ' electronic lock picks; 62
and even devices to track the movement of vehicles.63 For those
uninitiated in surveillance skills, helpful reference books are available.
How to Get Anything on Anybody explores topics such as "eleven
devices for listening through walls," and "expert ways to secretly bug
any target."'164 The ultimate in high-tech invasion of privacy may
come from photographs taken by space satellites "that can pinpoint
a back yard barbecue or distinguish between a Buick and a
Volkswagen Beetle.', 61 The Central Intelligence Agency recently
ended its long-standing opposition to the private sale of satellite
photographs, a move that United States firms estimate will generate
as much as $1 billion in annual revenues. 66
While this prospect is perhaps chilling, a more realistic threat to
privacy comes from a much more mundane device: the video
camcorder. Video technology has changed the way we view the world
160. Id. at 9.
161. These are sophisticated light amplication devices that allow a person to see at
night. Judging from advertisements in magazines appealing to survivalists and gun
enthusiasts, the instruments are quite popular. Indeed, there appears to be something of
a price war going on among sellers of night vision devices, with advertisements boasting
"Now You Can Afford Night Vision!," SOLDIER OF FORTUNt, July 1993, at 68, and
"Brand-New Military Night Vision Scopes: Now-From As Low As $495 Each." AM.
SURVIVAL GUIDE, June 1993, at 49. The latter advertisement boasts that its product is
"used by the KGB, Russian commandos and military." Id. The seller offers the following
list of potential uses for its product: "Camp, fish, hunt, play games in the dark & see an
intruder before he sees you!" Id. In the same issue in which this advertisement appeared,
the publisher of the magazine offered readers a chance to win a "model MPN 1000-I
enhanced Russian night vision scope." Id. at 51.
162. AM. SURVIVAL GUIDE, supra note 161, at 78 (advertisement promoting the "Cobra
II Electronic Pick," billed as "a technological dream come true"; buyers receive a copy of
Lock Picking Simplified as "an added bonus").
163. CIAI CATALOG, supra note 156, at 11.
164. Id. at 14 (advertising LEE LAPIN, How TO GET ANYTHING ON ANYBODY). The
advertisement explains that the book can be used to "get the goods on others like they are
getting the goods on you." Id. The book apparently was popular enough to prompt Lapin
to write a "long-awaited follow-up." Id. (advertising LEE LAPIN, BOOK II: How TO GET
ANYTHING ON ANYBODY: THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PERSONAL SURVEILLANCE). Some
other book and video titles offered for sale by the company include: Counter-
measures-How to Protect Yourself from Electronic Surveillance; Covert Surveillance and
Electronic Penetration; Electronic Surveillance-A Technical Manual; People Tracking: You
Can Find Anyone; Investigating by Computer, Serious Surveillance for the Private
Investigator, Spycraft: Inside Secrets of Espionage and Surveillance; Shadowing and
Surveillance: A Complete Guidebook; Spygame: Winning through Super Technology;
Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance. Id. at 13-14.
165. John Mintz & R. Jeffrey Smith, CIA to Allow Firms to Sell Satellite Photos, WASH.
POST, Nov. 13, 1993, at C1.
166. Id.
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around us and, in turn, the way we are viewed. The odds are high
that today, and every day, some part of our daily routine will be
captured by a video camera, whether it be at a hotel, 67 in a parking
lot," in a courthouse,16 9 at a rock concert,' 70 at a sporting
event, 71 on a school bus," at work, 73 at a highway toll
booth, 74 or perhaps even at church. 75 Much of this videotaping
167. Joanne Ball Artis, Sheraton Official Urged To Quit, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 16,1993,
at 39. A security chief at Boston Sheraton Hotel allegedly secretly videotaped workers in
a hotel locker room. Id. A spokesperson for ITT Sheraton stated that the corporation
uses surveillance cameras to protect guests and employees, but denied that they are used
in employee locker rooms. Id.
168. Jonathan Rabinovitz, Shopping Malls Beefing Up Security Systems to Reassure
Skittish Public, CHI. TRM., Dec. 13,1992, at IC (zone N) (describing hidden video cameras
in parking lot of shopping mall that "can zoom in on license plates in the farthest reaches
of the [10,000 car] lot").
169. Joseph Sjostrom, Bar Group Sues County; Courthouse's Surveillance Systems
Worry Lawyers, CHI. TRIB., June 7,1988, at I (zone D) (discussing lawsuit filed by county
bar association seeking information regarding audio and video surveillance system installed
at courthouse).
170. Christopher John Farley, Latter-Day Grunge, TIME, July 12,1993, at 17 (discussing
video surveillance by Utah police of teenagers debating public issues at a "speaker's tent"
set up at the Lollapalooza rock concert).
171. Hooligans Beware: America On Lookout For Fan Invasion, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETrE, June 19, 1993, at 2C (discussing closed circuit video security system at
Silverdome sports arena in Pontiac, Michigan).
172. Lisa Leff, New Video Camera Boxes On Pr. George's School Buses Help Keep
Students In Line, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1993, at D5 (discussing video cameras installed
on school buses to monitor students' behavior); Unruly Students on the Bus Can't Hide
From a Camera, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 1993, at A13 (reporting that "[h]undreds of school
districts around the country are turning to video surveillance to stop students' misbehaving
on buses").
173. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co. v. Jackson, 964 F.2d 706, 707 (7th Cir. 1992)
(employer installed video camera in ceiling of hallway leading to women's locker room to
verify rumors that male supervisor was visiting the locker room with a female employee);
Jim Doyle, Judge Dismisses Lawsuit By 33 Concord Police, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Feb. 17,
1993, at All (video surveillance camera installed in rafters of men's restroom to catch
vandal who was clogging urinals with toilet paper); see also Martha Neil, Women Settle Suit
Over Surveillance In Store, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 12, 1987, at 4 (reporting that
three department store detectives alleged that while they were dressing in a store office
they were taped by a video surveillance system which was installed to ensure that the
detectives were not loafing).
174. Eric Zorn, You Better Smile When You Pay Toll, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 15, 1991, § 2, at
1 (zone C) (reporting on plan to install video cameras at highway toll booths which would
record faces and license numbers of persons passing through the unattended booths).
175. David E. Pitt, Dignity Sues St Patrick's Over Taping, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1988,
at Bi, B2. A gay rights group filed suit against a Catholic church for videotaping persons
who appeared at Sunday mass to protest church policies relating to gays and AIDS. Id.
at B1. New York Deputy Police Commissioner Robert Goldman asked, "What's wrong
with having a large event, and having the capacity of being able to videotape it in the
event of criminal activity?" Id. at B2.
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occurs for security purposes, fueled at least in part by the fear of tort
liability for negligently failing to protect customers from criminal
attack. Nevertheless, while security surveillance systems may serve a
worthy purpose, they are subject to abuse.'76
Prospects for maintaining personal privacy are dimmed further by
the millions of video camcorders now owned by Americans.
Introduced in 1985, the video camcorder"7 has the potential to
become "the greatest leveler of human privacy ever known." 78
Fourteen million camcorders have been sold in the United States,'79
with statistics showing consistently large sales increases each year.' °
Camcorders have become fixtures at weddings, graduations, parties,
parks, zoos, beaches, amusement parks, scenic sites, and other places
open to the public. An editor of a video magazine analogized the
impact of the camcorder to that of the Walkman portable stereo,
stating that "it will become increasingly hard to imagine society
without the camcorder.' 8'
176. See, e.g., Doe v. B.P.S. Guard Servs., Inc., 945 F.2d 1422, 1423 (8th Cir. 1991)
(security guards used surveillance cameras to videotape fashion show participants while
they were dressing); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 750 S.W.2d 76,78-79 (Mo. Ct. App.
1988) (security guards videotaped son of plaintiff, who was an employee of defendant
corporation, while he masturbated in parking lot, then exhibited the tape to numerous
employees).
177. Portable home video cameras were introduced in the early 1980s, but were
expensive and bulky, requiring the user to shoulder a separate camera and recording unit.
Roll 'Em= Video Camera Explosion, FORTUNE, Feb. 6, 1984, at 13. Camcorders combine
the video camera and video recorder in one unit. The introduction of eight millimeter
video in the mid-1980s allowed manufacturers to make camcorders even smaller and
lighter. See generally William D. Marbach & Connie Leslie, Video's New Focus,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 30, 1985, at 56 (describing the capabilities and specifications of eight
millimeter video). More than 30 brands of camcorders are currently sold in the United
States. Douglas C. McGill, The Media Business: Camcorders Spread Video's Power, N.Y.
TIMES, June 26, 1989, at D1.
178. The phrase is borrowed from Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion in United States
v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In that case the Supreme
Court held that consensual audio recording of a conversation does not constitute a
"search" under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 753 (plurality opinion). Justice Douglas
was referring to electronic surveillance in general. Id. at 756 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see
also United States v. Mittleman, 999 F.2d 440, 443 (9th Cir. 1993) (analogizing
intrusiveness of video surveillance to wiretapping); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875,
882 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.) ("[T]elevision surveillance is exceedingly intrusive ... and
inherently indiscriminate, and.., could be grossly abused-to eliminate personal privacy
as understood in modem Western nations.").
179. John Koch, Quick! Somebody Hit 'Pause,' BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 23,1992, at B27.
180. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES 764
(1991) (showing camcorder sales figures for the years 1986-89 as follows: 1986: 1,090,000
units; 1987: 1,600,000 units; 1988: 2,108,000 units; 1989: 2,348,000 units).
181. McGill, supra note 177, at Dl (quoting Art Levis, editor of Video Magazine).
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Camcorders are being heralded as "a democratization of
technology"'"m and a tool for "empowering people."1 3  Police
laud neighborhood crime-fighting volunteers who "perch in the dark
on rooftops or crouch in vacant apartments" with their camcorders,
calling their activity "the crime-fighting technique of the future." 184
A college professor extols video cameras as a "new truth-telling
device that can cut through lies," analogizing them to the six-gun of
the Wild West as a "great equalizer."'1 There have been a few
notable instances in which surreptitious filming with a camcorder
arguably served the public good. The most celebrated was George
Holliday's videotape of Los Angeles police officers beating Rodney
King. Other well-publicized examples include an environmentalist
who filmed fishermen slaughtering dolphins caught in tuna nets, 18
6
a suspicious parent who taped his baby sitter abusing his child,"8
and a gay man in California who, fed up with abusive taunting from
his neighbor, set up a camcorder and filmed the neighbor assaulting
him in his front yard."
For every laudable episode of surreptitious videotaping, however,
there are many more instances in which camcorders have been used
to intrude unreasonably upon privacy. It is becoming clear that video
cameras have provided a new tool for achieving sexual gratification
for many people. Rock and roll legend Chuck Berry has been sued
for allegedly installing a video camera in the restroom of a friend's
restaurant.'89 The plaintiffs alleged that Berry taped more than 250
women using the restroom, some as young as six years old.9 '
Comedian Rich Little is being sued by his former girlfriend for
182. Id. at D7 (quoting Stuart Ewen, professor of media studies at Hunter College).
183. Id.
184. Jim H. Zamora, Gotcha! Citizen Volunteers Take Lead In Catching Crime In the
Act, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 21, 1993, at All (quoting Los Angeles police lieutenant Kyle
Jackson); see also Christine Bertelson, Neighbors Suffer In Question of Taste In Tenants,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 5, 1994, at 1B (describing neighbors videotaping rowdy
teenagers across the street); Tom Coakley, Street Vigilance Continues; Metro Update,
BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 20, 1994, at 30 (describing residents videotaping "street walkers,
drug dealers and the license plates of cars believed to be driven by their customers").
185. Melinda Beck, Video Vigilantes, NEWSWEEK, July 22,1991, at 42,43 (quoting Jack
Nachbar, a professor of popular culture at Bowling Green State University).
186. Id. at 42.
187. Id. at 45.
188. Id. at 42.
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secretly taping their sexual encounters. 9' Actor Rob Lowe was
sued by the mother of a sixteen-year-old girl who alleged that Lowe
lured the girl and a second woman to his hotel room, where he
videotaped a sexual encounter with them." However, it is not just
prurient entertainers who engage in this kind of activity.'93  Many
non-celebrity video-voyeurs have been accused of similar conduct. 94
191. Roger Anderson, Seen, Heard, Said, SEATrLE TIMwES, Jan. 24, 1992, at E2.
192. Barry Koltnow, Rob Lowe Bounces Back After Scandal, ORLANDO SENTINEL
TRIB., Mar. 15, 1990, at El.
193. For sharing this information regarding celebrity sex scandals, I may be subject to
the same criticism that I have so enthusiastically bestowed on the media. See supra notes
104-41 and accompanying text. However, the examples are offered not to titillate, but to
support an important premise of the Article: that video camcorders are being employed
in abusive and intrusive ways.
194. See, e.g., In re Thomas, 118 B.R. 421, 422 (Bankr. S.C. 1990) (bankruptcy case
involving claims by two women against debtor for intentional infliction of emotional
distress and invasion of privacy arising from debtor secretly videotaping sexual encounters
with the women and displaying the tapes at his bachelor party); Miller v. Willis, No. 92AP-
1410, 1993 WL 76303, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 16, 1993) (suit for videotaping plaintiff
through peephole while she used tanning bed); Snakenberg v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 383
S.E.2d 2, 4 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989) (suit against man who advertised for swimsuit models and
then videotaped them while they were changing clothes); Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593,
594 (Tex. 1993) (suit against defendant who made secret videotape of sexual intercourse
with plaintiff and showed it to others); Gallun v. Soccer U.S.A., Inc., No. 92-1268, 1994
WL 133053, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 1994) (suit based upon employee's secret
videotaping of woman changing clothes in locker room); Anna Cekola, Orange County
Focus: Huntington Beach; Neighbor Sued Over Videotape of Woman, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
2, 1994, at B-2 (describing lawsuit against neighbor who videotaped undressed woman
through her window); Zachary R. Dowdy, McNei4 Pleading Guilty, Receives 7 1/2-to-9-
Year Term For Bribery, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 5, 1993, at 80 (discussing defendant's
indictment for secretly videotaping his 15-year-old godson having sexual intercourse with
19-year-old nanny of defendant's child); Philip Hager, High Court OKs Drug Tests of Job
Applicants; Law: Justices Reject A Challenge To A Court of Appeal Ruling On the
Constitutionality of A Mandatory Urinalysis, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1990, at A3 (referring
to a state court of appeals decision upholding defendant's criminal conviction for secretly
videotaping sexual encounters with three women); Laura A. Kiernan, Exeter Teacher
Sentenced To 5 Years, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 14, 1993, at 25 (discussing respected prep
school teacher who set up "video camera in his dormitory apartment and secretly filmed
male students in their bathrooms and bedrooms"); Kimberly D. Kleman, Insurance Fund
Sues To Cancel Dubin's Policies, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 3, 1987, at 2 (discussing
physician who made secret videotapes of patients in various stages of undress); Mississippi,
USA TODAY, Nov. 25, 1991, at 8A (referring to lawsuits being prepared by three models
against man who allegedly secretly videotaped them as they changed clothes in his studio);
Patricia Nealon, Weymouth Officer Charged With Secretly Taping Sex, BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 25, 1992, at 21 (describing case in which police officer was charged with making
videotapes of sexual encounters with two women and offering to show the tapes to a
fellow officer); St. Pau" Man Charged With Video Voyeurism, STAR TRIB., Feb. 18, 1994,
at 2B (St. Paul Edition) (discussing case in which man was charged with making secret
video of neighbor through her window); South Bay: Arrest Warrant Issue In Nude Photo
Case, SAN FRAN. CHRON., Dec. 9, 1992, at A24 (describing secret videotaping of 16-year-
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Surreptitious videotaping has been abused in other ways.
University officials have videotaped coaches and athletes to detect
violations of NCAA rules.195 Law enforcement officials have made
surreptitious videotapes of attorney-client conferences.196 Business
executives have secretly videotaped competitors' products.'9' One
may reasonably assume that, because surreptitious video surveillance
is intended to be secret, these reported incidents are only a small part
of a far wider pattern of conduct.
Television news organizations contribute to incidents of surrep-
titious videotaping by encouraging viewers to send them amateur
videos of newsworthy events.' Everyone, it seems, wants to be the
next George Holliday."9 The tabloid media, not surprisingly, are
more directly involved in the problem, as exemplified by the media
coverage of the Amy Fisher scandal."0 The television program
old model changing clothes).
195. Sports People: Pro Basketball; From Rebels to Sonics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1992,
at B14 (discussing incident where officials of the University of Nevada at Las Vegas
secretly videotaped an assistant basketball coach holding a conditioning class one week
before NCAA's starting date for basketball practice).
196. Michelle Hiskey, Sheriff Admits Taping Inmates' Conversations; Possible Violation
of Civil Rights Laws, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 5, 1991, at D2 (describing claims of
secret videotaping of attorney visits with client inmates).
197. John Markoff, Apple Mixes Desktop, Laptop, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 20,1992, at 7 (zone
C) (reporting that head of Apple Computer's portable computing division sent a product
manager to an industry trade show to videotape competitors' products).
198. See Tom Blackwell, We Are A Camera, Canadiens Say, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 14,
1992, at D4 (stating that many television stations actively encourage viewers to submit
amateur videotapes); Bill Lohmann, A Call For Amateur News Hounds; UPI Arts &
Entertainment, UPI, Feb. 13, 1987, available in NEXIS, NEWS library, MAJPAP file
(discussing program established by Cable News Network to solicit amateur videos); see also
Beck, supra note 185, at 45 ("The threats to individual rights and reputations are all the
more worrisome when TV news becomes involved, instantly disseminating tapes of
incriminating scenes nationwide."); Bill Stamets, When Is Recording a Protected Right, And
When Is It an Invasion of Privacy?, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 4, 1994, at 54 (Weekend Plus
section) (quoting George Washington University law professor Jonathan Turley: " 'The
media and the police have, in a way, encouraged a dangerous voyeuristic tendency in
people.' ").
199. George Holliday filmed the police beating of Rodney King. Retired Los Angeles
Superior Court Judge Robert Weil commented: "It reminds me of Watergate-when
everyone wanted to be an investigative reporter turning over all the stones in government.
... After Rodney King, everyone with a video camera wants to be a George Holliday."
Beck, supra note 185, at 43.
200. Amy Fisher was a seventeen-year-old woman who shot Mary Jo Buttafuoco.
Fisher allegedly was having an affair with the victim's husband, Joseph Buttafuoco. Judges
Refuse to Lower Bail for L.I. Teen-Ager, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1992, at B4. The shooting
captured the attention of not only the tabloid media, but also the respected press. A
NEXIS search showed 221 stories appearing in the New York Times mentioning Amy
Fisher. Search of NEXIS, NEWS library, MAJPAP file (July 21,1993) (search term "Amy
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Hard Copy allegedly paid $100,000 to a former boyfriend of Fisher
who secretly videotaped a conversation with her in which they
discussed sex in jail and her prospects for capitalizing upon her
notoriety.2°'
Others suffered from the tabloid coverage flowing from Fisher's
misfortunes. Representatives of the program A Current Affair
stopped students at Fisher's high school and asked them to view a
videotape of an apparent act of prostitution by a young woman.=
A camera hidden in a van parked across the street secretly filmed the
students as they identified the woman in the videotape as Fisher.20 3
According to the principal of the high school, the event left some
students "shaken, angered and saddened."'
The high school students, like many of the subjects described
above, were filmed in public places. Should that fact deprive them of
a legal right to complain about the secret taping? Does one surrender
all right to be free from surreptitious surveillance and videotaping
when she ventures outside her home? Existing tort law provides
affirmative answers to these questions. The next section explains why
these answers are wrong.
IV. PROTECTION IN PUBLIC: A THEORY OF "PUBLIC PRIVACY"
Courts have held almost uniformly that the tort of intrusion
cannot occur in a public place or in a place that may be viewed from
a public place. 5 In reaching this conclusion, judges take their cue
from Dean Prosser. In his landmark article delineating the four
separate privacy torts,2°6 Prosser stated:
On the public street, or in any other public place, the
plaintiff has no right to be alone, and it is no intrusion of his
privacy to do no more than follow him about. Neither is it
such an invasion to take his photograph in such a place,
since this amounts to nothing more than making a record,
not differing essentially from a full written description, of a
public sight which any one present would be free to see.
Fisher").
201. Sharing the Bucks From 'Hard Copy', NEWSDAY, Jan. 13, 1993, at 3.
202. Fred Cohen, The Tabloid Press Abuses Children, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13,1993, at 21
(opinion piece by principal of the high school).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See supra notes 6, 13 (citing cases).
206. Prosser, supra note 38.
207. Id. at 391-92.
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The Restatement (Second) of Torts incorporated these views in the
comments to section 652B, which defines the tort of intrusion." 8
To the extent Prosser was endorsing the view that legitimate
privacy interests do not exist in public places (as opposed to merely
surveying existing law), I suggest that he was wrong.2 9 Privacy in
public places does exist, or at least people expect it to exist, albeit
with obvious limitations. To test this proposition, one need only
imagine the following hypothetical.
A man we will call the Watcher parks in front of Joe's house and
observes it. Whenever Joe or a member of his family comes or goes,
the Watcher films them with a video camcorder. The Watcher does
not try to conceal his conduct. To the contrary, he behaves quite
openly, waving to Joe with a friendly smile every time he leaves the
house. Joe approaches the man and questions him about his activity.
The Watcher assures Joe that he means no harm to anyone, and, in
fact, this is true. He simply wants to videotape Joe and his family.
Perhaps he is a modern anthropologist studying household migration
patterns. Whatever the reason for his observations, we may assume
for purposes of our hypothetical that Joe is satisfied that the Watcher
presents no physical threat. Nevertheless, Joe does not want himself
and his family to be watched and videotaped, so he calls the police.
The police explain to Joe that so long as the Watcher does not
trespass or make some threatening or harassing gesture, he is
208. The Restatement comments provide in pertinent part:
c. The defendant is subject to liability under the rule stated in this Section
only when he has intruded into a private place, or has otherwise invaded a
private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or affairs. ....
Nor is there liability for observing him or even taking his photograph while he
is walking on the public highway, since he is not then in seclusion, and his
appearance is public and open to the public eye.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 652B cmt. c; see also PROSSER &
KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 43, § 117, at 855-56 (reiterating these principles). Prosser
served as Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Torts and, as such, was responsible for
preparing all drafts for the project. See supra note 40 (discussing the dominant role served
by the Reporter to a Restatement project).
The Restatement comments recognize a narrow exception to the general rule that an
intrusion cannot occur in public. Following the portion of comment c quoted above, the
comment states: "Even in a public place, however, there may be some matters about the
plaintiff, such as his underwear or lack of it, that are not exhibited to the public gaze; and
there may still be invasion of privacy when there is intrusion upon these matters."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 652B cmt. c. For discussion of this
exception, see infra notes 290-98 and accompanying text.
209. Perhaps it would be fair to say that Prosser's conclusions may have been valid
when written, but have lost force in light of declining social civility and technological
advances. See supra notes 100-204 and accompanying text.
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breaking no law.210 Several days pass and the Watcher gives no sign
that he intends to discontinue his activity.
Has Joe's privacy been invaded? Reasonable people presumably
would agree that the Watcher's intrusive conduct is highly offen-
sive" and that the law should provide a remedy. However, to
make this concession is to agree that there is such thing as a right to
privacy in public. If one accepts that the Watcher's conduct should
be actionable under tort law,21 the dispute over the existence of a
210. This would be true in most jurisdictions. Only one state has enacted a statute that
explicitly regulates videotaping, and it is limited to conduct that occurs "in any private
place and out of public view." GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-62(2) (Michie 1992). One
interesting legal development in recent years has been the wave of so-called "stalking
statutes" passed by state legislatures. The statutes prohibit activities such as following,
surveilling, or harassing another person and, to this extent, may constitute implicit
recognition of the concept of public privacy. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-90(a)
(Michie Supp. 1993) ("A person commits the offense of stalking when he or she follows,
places under surveillance, or contacts another person at or about a place or places without
the consent of the other person for the purpose of harassing and intimidating the other
person. For the purpose of this Article, the term 'place or places' shall include any public
or private property occupied by the victim other than the residence of the defendant.");
IDAHO CODE § 18-7905(a) (Michie Supp. 1993) ("Any person who wilfully, maliciously and
repeatedly follows or harasses another person or a member of that person's immediate
family is guilty of the crime of stalking....").
The problem with applying stalking statutes to the Watcher (in addition to overcoming
questions concerning their constitutionality) is that they are directed at activity presenting
a risk of physical harm. This is usually expressed as a statutory requirement that the
stalker make a "credible threat" of death or serious bodily injury to the victim. See, e.g.,
ALA. CODE § 13A-6-90a (Supp. 1993) ("A person who intentionally and repeatedly follows
or harasses another person and who makes a credible threat, either expressed or implied,
with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily harm is
guilty of the crime of stalking."); CAL. PENAL CODE § 646.9(a) (West Supp. 1994) ("Any
person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person and
who makes a credible threat with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear for his
or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediate family, is guilty of the crime of stalking.
... "); IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.11(1)(a) (West 1993) ("A person commits stalking when
the person, on more than one occasion, willfully follows, pursues, or harasses another
person and, while doing so and without legitimate purpose, makes a credible threat against
the other person.").
Because we are operating under the assumption that the Watcher presents no physical
danger to Joe or his family and that Joe realizes this fact, it is unlikely that the stalking
statutes could be invoked against the Watcher.
211. This is the standard for intrusion under the Restatement definition. See supra note
5.
212. Apart from claims grounded in invasion of privacy, Joe might seek tort relief for
intentional infliction of emotional distress. However, such a claim would likely fail due
to the requirement that the plaintiff prove the conduct was "extreme and outrageous."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 46. Most courts have accepted the
stringent definition of extreme and outrageous conduct set forth in comment d of
Restatement section 46: "Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
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right of public privacy becomes only a question of degree.213
A. Defining Privacy
By holding in intrusion cases that actions that occur in public
places cannot be private, courts place primary emphasis upon physical
areas in defining the scope of privacy.2 14 However, as demonstrated
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."
Id. § 46 cmt. d. This standard has proven to be a difficult obstacle for privacy plaintiffs
to overcome. See Thorpe v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 984 F.2d 541, 545 (1st Cir. 1993)
(holding surveillance of personal injury claimant by private detective "did not even
arguably rise to the level of 'extreme and outrageous conduct,' and the issue was properly
withdrawn from the jury"); Pemberton v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 502 A.2d 1101,1115 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (defendant employer placed plaintiff employee under surveillance,
sent mug shot and police record of plaintiff stemming from fourteen year-old-criminal
conviction to fifty union employees, and sent evidence of plaintiff's marital infidelity to
wife; court held conduct was not sufficiently extreme and outrageous to constitute
intentional infliction of emotional distress); Forster v. Manchester, 189 A.2d 147, 151 (Pa.
1963) (surveillance by private detectives not sufficiently outrageous to amount to
intentional infliction of emotional distress).
Plaintiffs raising claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress also must prove
that they suffered "severe emotional distress." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra
note 4, § 46. Comment j to Restatement section 46 explains that "[tihe law intervenes only
where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to
endure it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 46 cmt. j. This
requirement would likely present proof problems for most victims of public intrusion. See
Forster, 189 A.2d at 149, 151 (plaintiff's evidence that surveillance caused her to become
extremely nervous and upset and to have frequent nightmares and hallucinations which
required medical treatment insufficient to show severe emotional distress).
213. Interestingly, the first Restatement of Torts might allow tort recovery in this
instance. The first Restatement contained only one section pertaining to invasion of
privacy. It stated: "A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's
interest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to the public is
liable to the other." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939). While the comments to the
section state that one may not complain of the "casual observation of his neighbors" or
"the possibility that he may be photographed as a part of a street scene or a group of
persons," id. § 867 cmt. c, they do not preclude liability for public intrusions that go
beyond these situations. Indeed, one of the illustrations to section 867 strongly suggests
that liability for invasion of privacy could be imposed upon the Watcher: "A, seeking to
describe for the Sunday paper the habits of different kinds of people, follows B without
B's knowledge, and publishes a statement of every act of B which A could observe for a
period of a week. B has a cause of action against A." Id. § 867 cmt. d, illus. 1.
214. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. Most courts today do not require a
physical penetration of a private area. Wiretapping, bugging rooms with microphones, and
peering into windows have all been held to constitute actionable intrusions. See PROSSER
& KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 43, § 117, at 854-55 (citing cases). However, most
successful intrusion cases do involve invasions into zones of privacy delineated by physical
boundaries. See, e.g., Dietmann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (invasion of
plaintiff's home); Rogers v. Buckel, No. 1807.99, 1992 WL 328676 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 5,
1992) (invasion of home where plaintiff was a guest); Snakenberg v. Hartford Casualty Ins.
Co., 383 S.E.2d 2 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989) (invasion of closed bedroom in defendant's home
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by the above hypothetical, this view is too restrictive. Most modem
definitions of privacy offered by scholars are expansive enough to
allow recognition of a right to privacy in public. The classic definition
comes from Alan Westin's book, Privacy and Freedom: "Privacy is
the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to determine for
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others." 15 Under this broad definition, Joeand
his family have lost privacy by the Watcher's conduct because they
have lost control over when, how, and to what extent information
about them is communicated to others. Westin himself recognized
that expectations of privacy can exist in public places2 16 Other
modem definitions of privacy lead to the same conclusion.'
Constitutional criminal law also has transcended the notion that
privacy is defined by physical boundaries only.218
by hidden video camera). Some states limit the tort to situations involving physical
intrusions. See supra note 65 (citing cases); see also Post, supra note 100, at 971
("Certainly in common usage a basic meaning of privacy is that of a private space, like a
bathroom or a home, from which others may be excluded.")
215. ALAN F. WESTiN, PRIvACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967); see also Ruth Gavison,
Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE LJ. 421,426 n.19 (1980) (collecting several other
definitions of privacy that focus upon this aspect of self-determination over disclosure of
information).
216. Westin recognized in 1967 that privacy could be invaded in public:
When people go into stores, hotels, restaurants and other places of public accom-
modation, they do not expect solitude and total freedom from observation.
However, they do not expect to be under secret surveillance, especially in those
times and places for which social custom has set some norms of privacy, even in
'public' situations.
WESTIN, supra note 215, at 112.
217. See, e.g., Richard Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REv. 275,280-81
(1974) (defining privacy as control over who senses us); Ernest Van Den Haag, On
Privacy, in NOMOS XIII: PRIvACY 149 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds.,
1971) (defining privacy as the exclusive access of a person to a realm of his own, which
includes the right to exclude others from watching, utilizing or invading his private realm).
218. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 349-50 (1967), the United States Supreme
Court was confronted with the issue of what constitutes a "search" within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. The issue is a critical one for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
because conduct qualifying as a search is subject to the protection of the Fourth
Amendment, whereas conduct not deemed to be a search is left wholly unregulated by the
Constitution. The narrow issue in Katz was whether the attachment of an electronic
listening device to the outside of a phone booth, which involved no physical penetration
of the booth, was a search. Prior cases had focused upon whether the police conduct
invaded a constitutionally protected area. E.g., Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 57-59
(1967); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 438-39 (1963); Silverman v. United States,
365 U.S. 505, 510, 512 (1961). In holding that the attachment of the listening device
constituted a search, the Court rejected this limited view of Fourth Amendment protection.
The Court stated:
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Professor Ruth Gavison, in her article Privacy and the Limits of
the Law,219 offered a comprehensive "neutral" definition of privacy
that demonstrates the flaws in the narrow view of privacy that courts
take in intrusion cases. By "neutral," she meant a definition of when
loss of privacy occurs without regard to whether such loss should be
considered undesirable or actionable under the law."2  She con-
sidered separately which losses of privacy are undesirable and which
warrant legal protection.221
Professor Gavison defined privacy as "a limitation of others'
access to an individual."' She divided this into three components:
(1) secrecy, which relates to the information known about a per-
son;' (2) anonymity, which has to do with the attention paid to a
person; 4 and (3) solitude, which relates to physical access to a
person.' The rule that an actionable intrusion under tort law
cannot occur in a public place focuses too narrowly upon the last
aspect of Professor Gavison's definition: solitude, or physical access
to a person. 6  This is apparent from the definition of intrusion in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which speaks specifically in terms
of intrusions upon "the solitude or seclusion" of another.227
However, the other two components of privacy delineated by
Professor Gavison-secrecy and anonymity-are also important. To
[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.... But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.
Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52 (citations omitted). Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, set
forth what has become the modem standard for determining when police conduct
constitutes a search: The subject must have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation
of privacy in the place searched or the items seized and the expectation must be one that
society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
219. Gavison, supra note 215, at 428.
220. Id. at 423.
221. Id. A similar approach will be used here. At this point, my goal is to establish
that privacy does exist and can be invaded in public places. Part VI will discuss the
circumstances under which invasions of privacy in public places should be actionable under
tort law. See infra notes 365-495 and accompanying text.
222. Gavison, supra note 215, at 428.
223. Id. at 429-32.
224. Id. at 432-33.
225. Id. at 433.
226. See Post, supra note 100, at 971 ("The intrusion branch of the privacy tort has
intuitively obvious connections to ordinary understandings of privacy. Certainly in
common usage a basic meaning of privacy is that of a private space, like a bathroom or
a home, from which others may be excluded.").
227. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs, supra note 4, § 652B.
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appreciate why this is so, let us return to Joe and the Watcher and
analyze the impact of the Watcher's conduct under Professor
Gavison's definition of privacy.
1. Solitude-Physical Access to a Person
Professor Gavison defined "solitude" as the interest in preventing
"physical access" to a person, which she in turn defined broadly to
mean "physical proximity."' This definition includes being close
enough to a person to touch or observe him through the normal use
of the senses,' 9 which is a much broader definition of privacy than
that contemplated by the Restatement definition of intrusion."
Under Professor Gavison's definition of solitude, Joe lost privacy
simply by the Watcher's physical presence across the street from Joe's
house. However, if this were the sole basis for objecting to the
Watcher's conduct, he could avoid invading Joe's privacy simply by
parking farther down the street and using the zoom lens that is
standard equipment on most camcorders. Professor Gavison
acknowledged that technologically enhanced observation would not
constitute "physical access" to a person. 31 Accordingly, it is likely
that the intuitive conclusion that the Watcher has invaded Joe's
privacy is more closely connected to the remaining two components
of Professor Gavison's definition of privacy.
2. Secrecy-Information Known About a Person
The amount of information known about a person can result in
a loss of privacy. As Professor Gavison noted, this is not a new
insight. 2 Indeed, the right to "informational privacy" is one of the
most discussed privacy issues in modern times. 3 Less discussed,
228. Gavison, supra note 215, at 433.
229. Id.
230. Professor Gavison offered the following examples of situations in which physical
access to an individual results in a loss of privacy: "(a) a stranger who gains entrance to
a woman's home on false pretenses in order to watch her giving birth; (b) Peeping Toms;
(c) a stranger who chooses to sit on 'our' bench, even though the park is full of empty
benches; and (d) a move from a single-person office to a much larger one that must be
shared with a colleague." Id. (citations omitted).
231. Id. ("The ability to watch and listen, however, is not in itself an indication of
physical access, because Y can watch X from a distance or wiretap X's telephone.").
232. Id. at 429 (citing sources that have defined privacy in this way).
233. See, e.g., Glenn C. Smith, We've Got Your Number! (Is It Constitutional To Give
It Out?): Caller Identification Technology and the Right to Informational Privacy, 37
UCLA L. REv. 145, 169-71 (1989); George B. Trubow, Protecting Informational Privacy
in the Information Society, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 521,522 (1990); Richard C. Turkington,
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though still not novel, is the idea that information about an individual
obtainable in a public place may be properly subject to a claim of
privacy.
In Relations In Public,' Erving Goffman analyzed the claims
human beings make with regard to various "territories."' 5  These
include everything from the claim to maintain one's personal
space"6 to the claim to one's turn in lineO'7  The prototypical
territory or preserve is spatial, 8 although the concept is not so
limited. Important to this Article is Goffman's identification of what
he called "information preserves"; T9 that is, "[tihe set of facts about
[one's] self to which an individual expects to control access while in
the presence of others."' Goffman mentioned several varieties of
information preserves, but concluded that the "most important.., is
what can be directly perceived about an individual, his body's sheath
and his current behavior, the issue here being his right not to be
stared at or examined." 241
Scrutinizing and filming Joe and his family severely intruded
upon their personal information preserves. Monitoring the comings
and goings at Joe's house would likely reveal a tremendous amount
of private information. Who are Joe's friends? How does he like to
dress? What kind of hours does he keep? Does he drink? Smoke?
Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article: The Emerging Unencumbered Constitutional
Right to Informational Privacy, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 479, 519-20 (1990); Bruce E. Falby,
Comment, A Constitutional Right to Avoid Disclosure of Personal Matter: Perfecting
Privacy Analysis in J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981), 71 GEo. L.J. 219,224-25
(1982); Jonathan P. Graham, Note, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial Dissemination
of Personal Information, 65 TEX. L. REv. 1395, 1397 (1987); John A. McLaughlin,
Comment, Intrusions Upon Informational Seclusion in the ComputerAge, 17 J. MARSHALL
L. REV. 831, 833-36 (1984).
234. ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF THE PUBLIC
ORDER (1971).
235. Id. at 28-61.
236. Goffman defined personal space as "[tihe space surrounding an individual,
anywhere within which an entering other causes the individual to feel encroached upon,
leading him to show displeasure and sometimes to withdraw." Id. at 29-30 (footnote
omitted).
237. Goffman defined "The Turn" as "[t]he order in which a claimant receives a good
of some kind relative to other claimants in the situation." Id. at 35. It is represented in
Western society most often by the principle of "first come, first served." Id. at 36.
238. Id. at 29.
239. Id. at 38.
240. Id. at 38-39 (footnote omitted).
241. Id. at 39 (footnote omitted). Goffman observed that our concern with spatial
preserves is tied to our concern with protecting informational preserves, the former
supporting the latter. Id. at 39 n.16.
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Exercise? Is he seeing anyone? Is it a woman or a man? How does
he treat his children? All of these types of information, and more,
may be obtained by watching someone in a public place.
The example of the Watcher is an extreme one because it
hypothesizes observation of Joe's public activity for several days.
While prolonged surveillance is not uncommon among private
detectives or personal injury investigators,242 most public intrusions
do not extend for long periods of time. However, even brief obser-
vations may seriously invade a person's private information preserve.
One tactic of abortion protesters has been to videotape or photograph
women entering abortion clinics. Though this intrusion may be brief
in duration, it obviously captures an extremely intimate fact about the
person filmed: that she is getting or considering an abortion.
Lawsuits filed against abortion protesters employing this tactic have
resulted in injunctions prohibiting the activity, suggesting at least
limited recognition under state constitutional law of the concept of
public privacy.2 43
3. Anonymity-Attention Paid to a Person
Perhaps Professor Gavison's most important contribution in
defining privacy is her discussion of anonymity as an essential
component of privacy.2 In obscurity, there is privacy. When no
one is paying attention to us, we are free to go about our business
even in public with little concern for relinquishing personal infor-
mation about ourselves to others. Personal information is still
disclosed, but to the air only, much like the sound of that tree falling
in the forest. The freedom enjoyed in anonymity disappears,
242. See, e.g., McClain v. Boise Cascade Corp., 533 P.2d 343, 345 (Or. 1975) (private
detectives took eighteen rolls of movie film of a worker's compensation claimant engaged
in activities outside of his home). Despite the fact that the detectives physically trespassed
on plaintiff's property, the plaintiff lost his invasion of privacy suit because "[a]ll the
surveillance in this case was done during daylight hours and when plaintiff was exposed
to public view by his neighbors and passersby." Id at 347.
243. Planned Parenthood v. Aakhus, 17 Cal. Rptr. 2d 510, 515 (Ct. App. 1993) ("[B]y
photographing and videotaping respondent's clients, appellants actually did deny them
their right of privacy under the California Constitution."); Chico Feminist Women's Health
Ctr. v. Scully, 256 Cal. Rptr. 194, 196-97 (Ct. App. 1989) (upholding provisions of
injunction prohibiting abortion protesters from photographing persons or license plates of
persons entering or leaving abortion clinic).
244. Professor Gavison was not the first to recognize this aspect of privacy. Alan
Westin stated many years earlier that "[a] major aspect of privacy for individuals.., is the
ability to move about anonymously from time to time." WESTIN, supra note 215, at 69.
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however, the moment someone begins paying attention to us.245
The moment the Watcher began focusing attention on Joe, a
substantial loss of privacy occurred. No longer could Joe count on
his obscurity to provide cover for his daily activities. Whereas he
formerly was free to "be himself" in public, secure in the knowledge
that he was conveying information about himself only in a
metaphysical sense, Joe now must act in light of the awareness that
this information is being conveyed to another (and possibly many
others in light of the Watcher's camcorder). He must now confront
the choice of either allowing the Watcher to acquire this information
or modifying his conduct.
This latter option is the most likely choice. All of us have traits,
characteristics, habits, and quirks which we would prefer not be
exhibited to others. On this point, I take issue with the observations
made by Professor Harvey Zuckman in his article regarding the tort
of public disclosure of private facts.246 In noting that this tort
protects the interest of persons in not "having their true and more
complete personas exposed to public view,"'247 Professor Zuckman
stated that "[w]hile no doubt persons embarrassed by publicity [of
private information] would prefer 'to be let alone,' their interest in
presenting a false or incomplete image to others is not one that seems
very compelling."2'
Professor Zuckman's comment ignores the fact that all persons
present a false or incomplete image of themselves to others, because
we all keep some aspects of ourselves hidden.249 Alan Westin's
245. As stated by Professor Gavison:
We enjoy our privacy not because of new opportunities for seclusion or because
of greater control over our interactions, but because of our anonymity, because
no one is interested in us. The moment someone becomes sufficiently interested,
he may find it quite easy to take all that privacy away. He may follow us all the
time, obtain information about us from a host of data systems, record our
conversations, and intrude into our bedrooms. What protects privacy is not the
difficulty of invading it, but the lack of motive and interest of others to do so.
The important point.., is that if our privacy is invaded, it may be invaded today
in more serious and more permanent ways than ever before.
Gavison, supra note 215, at 469.
246. Zuckman, supra note 30, at 260.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Some of these aspects are hidden even from ourselves. Carl Jung recognized that
everyone carries a "shadow" side to his psyche, which he defined as "the 'negative' side
of the personality, the sum of all those unpleasant qualities we like to hide, together with
the insufficiently developed functions and the content of the personal unconscious."
Introduction to Part I in MEETING THE SHADOW: THE HIDDEN POVER OF THE DARK
SIDE OF HUMAN NATuRE 3 (Connie Zweig & Jeremiah Abrams eds., 1991) [hereinafter
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words on this point eloquently refute Professor Zuckman's conclusion:
Each person is aware of the gap between what he wants
to be and what he actually is, between what the world sees
of him and what he knows to be his much more complex
reality... Every individual lives behind a mask in this
manner; indeed, the first etymological meaning of the word
"person" was "mask" .... If this mask is torn off and the
individual's real self bared to a world in which everyone else
still wears his mask and believes in masked performances,
the individual can be seared by the hot light of selective,
forced exposure50
To maintain this mask, persons who know they are being watched
(or that there is a possibility that they are being watched) may be
forced to modify or curtail their behavior." "We act differently if
we believe we are being observed," wrote Hubert Humphrey. "If we
can never be sure whether or not we are being watched and listened
to, all our actions will be altered and our very character will
change."' 52 When Joe knows that his conduct is being monitored,
MEETING THE SHADOW] (quoting Jung's 1917 essay On the Psychology of the Un-
conscious). The editors of the cited work offer a more modem definition of the shadow:
Each of us contains both a Dr. Jekyll and a Mr. Hyde, a more pleasant persona
for everyday wear and a hiding, nighttime self that remains hushed up much of
the time. Negative emotions and behaviors-iage, jealousy, shame, lying,
resentment, lust, greed, suicidal and murderous tendencies-lie concealed just
beneath the surface, masked by our more proper selves. Known together as the
personal shadow, it remains untamed, unexplored territory for most of us.
Connie Zweig & Jeremiah Abrams, Introduction: The Shadow Side of Everyday Life, in
MEETING THE SHADOW, supra, at xvi.
250. WESTIN, supra note 215, at 33. Stanley Benn made similar observations in his
essay Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons:
We are all under strong pressure from our friends and neighbors to live up to the
roles in which they cast us. If we disappoint them, we risk their disapproval, and
what may be worse, their ridicule. For many of us, we are free to be ourselves
only within that area from which observers can legitimately be excluded. We
need a sanctuary or retreat, in which we can drop the mask, desist for a while
from projecting on the world the image we want to be accepted as ourselves, an
image that may relect the values of our peers rather than the realities of our
natures.
Benn, supra note 108, at 24-25.
251. See Van Den Haag, supra note 217, at 151-52 ("The formation of an image of me
in the minds of others, which includes involuntary contributions of my private realm, may
also force me to modify my private acts, or otherwise to attempt to control the image
being formed by others so as to gain the approval of my fellows or, at least, to avoid their
contempt or anger.").
252. Hubert H. Humphrey, Foreword to EDWARD V. LONG, THE INTRUDERS viii
(1967). Anyone who disputes the truth of this statement need only consult a parent who
has been forced to contend with a disobedient child in a public place. As children intuit
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he will be compelled to assess every aspect of his public behavior with
a view towards modifying it.
The above discussion demonstrates that persons have a
legitimate, albeit limited, privacy interest even while they are in places
accessible to the public or open to public view. Existing tort law fails
to recognize this fact by adhering flatly to the rule that there is no
privacy in public places. The next subsection analyzes and criticizes
the underpinnings of this rule.
B. Refuting Dean Prosser's Premises
The near unanimous acceptance by courts of the rule that no
actionable intrusion can occur in a public place derives from Dean
Prosser's early observations on the issue, ' 3 as incorporated into the
comments to the Restatement (Second) of Torts.' 4 Perhaps curious-
ly, judicial analysis of the issue of intrusions in public places seldom
progresses beyond rote recitation of these observations. Thus, careful
examination of Dean Prosser's comments is warranted.
Prosser's conclusion that there can be no intrusion in a public
place depends upon the acceptance of two premises, one implicit and
one explicit. The implicit premise is that one assumes the risk of
public inspection when she ventures into a public place. The explicit
premise is Prosser's statement, adopted by the comments to the
Restatement (Second) of Torts,'55 that there is no difference between
merely observing a person in a public place and taking her
photograph. Because most of the public intrusions that I believe
should be actionable under tort law will involve either photographing
or videotaping, this is a critical assumption. Close scrutiny shows that
both of these premises are flawed.
1. Assumption of the Risk
Underlying the rule that there is no legitimate expectation of
privacy in public places is the idea that persons effectively assume the
risk of scrutiny when they venture from private sanctuaries such as
early on, most parents are reluctant to discipline their children in public with the same
level of firmness as they would in private. See also Stamets, supra note 198, at 54
(discussing video surveillance conducted by private citizens: "All those lenses aimed at us
inflict a chilling effect on everyday behavior.").
253. See supra text accompanying note 207 for text of Prosser's comments.
254. See supra note 208 for text of the Restatement comments. See also supra note 41
(listing citations of cases adopting definitions of the four privacy torts described by Prosser
and incorporated into the Restatement).
255. See supra note 208.
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dwellings or offices. This assumption of risk analysis is clearly
discernible in Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 6 a famous privacy case
relied upon by Dean Prosser as support for his comments regarding
the non-existence of privacy in public places.2 7 The case arose from
a photograph taken of a couple sitting together at their confectionery
and ice cream stand in the Farmer's Market in Los Angeles. 258 The
256. 253 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1953).
257. Prosser, supra note 38, at 391 n.81.
258. Gill actually involved two separate lawsuits and three separate opinions by the
California Supreme Court: Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co., 239 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1952), and Gill
v. Hearst Publishing Co., 239 P.2d 636 (Cal. 1952) [hereinafter Gill v. Hearst 1], reh'g after
remand, 253 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1953) [hereinafter Gill v. Hearst 1].
Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co. arose from publication of the couple's photograph in the
Ladies Home Journal to illustrate an article entitled "Love." 239 P.2d at 632. Under the
picture appeared the caption: "Publicized as glamorous, desirable, 'love at first sight' is
a bad risk." Id The article suggested that love at first sight is based solely upon sexual
attraction and is the "wrong" kind of love. Id. The California Supreme Court reversed
the trial court's judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendants, recognizing for the
first time a tort cause of action for invasion of privacy. Id. at 632-33. The court failed to
articulate the specific nature of the privacy invasion it recognized (the case was decided
prior to Prosser's article delineating the four separate privacy torts). Various language in
the opinion suggests that the cause of action recognized by the court could be charac-
terized alternatively as intrusion, public disclosure of private facts and false light. See id
at 634-35. However, as subsequently refined in the court's later opinions in Gill v. Hearst
I and Gill v. Hearst II, it appears that the claim recognized in Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co.
was grounded not simply in the taking of the photograph (which might be characterized
as intrusion) or the publication of the photograph (which might be characterized as public
disclosure of private facts), but in the use of the photograph to illustrate the unflattering
article about the "wrong" kind of love. See Gill v. Hearst 1, 239 P.2d at 637; Gill v. Hearst
11, 253 P.2d at 443. This suggests that the true basis of the court's holding was false light.
It has been so construed. See WILLIAM L. PROSSER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORTS 974 (8th ed. 1988) (citing Gill v. Curtis Publishing Co. as a "representative" false
light case).
In Gill v. Hearst I, the plaintiffs initially sued Hearst Publishing Co. for publishing the
same photograph in an issue of Harper's Bazaar to illustrate an article entitled "And So
the World Goes Round," a paean to the wonders of love. 239 P.2d at 636. The complaint
was dismissed because the statute of limitations had run. Id. at 637. An amended
complaint was grounded in the allegations that a Hearst photographer shot the photograph
and that Hearst gave consent for Curtis Publishing Co. to publish the photo in the Ladies
Home Journal to illustrate the article concerning the "wrong" kind of love. Id
Defendants filed a demurrer, asserting that plaintiffs failed to expressly allege that the
defendants had given consent for the photograph to be used specifically in connection with
the unflattering Ladies Home Journal article, as opposed to consenting generally to
publication of the photograph. Id. The trial court, recognizing no relevant distinction in
the nature of the consent given, dismissed the amended complaint without leave to amend.
Id.
The California Supreme Court reversed, stating:
[P]laintiffs have stated a cause of action for an infringement on their right of
privacy by the publication without their consent of the photograph standing
alone. Members of opposite sexes engaging in amorous demonstrations should
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picture portrayed the couple "sitting romantically close to one
another, the man with his arm around the woman." 9  Only one
year earlier, the California Supreme Court had held in the same case
that the couple had a cause of action for publication of the
photograph, reasoning that "[m]embers of opposite sexes engaging in
amorous demonstrations should be protected from the broadcast of
that most intimate relation," and that this "should be true even
though the display is in a public place." '261 Upon reconsideration
after remand, however, the court held that "mere publication of the
photograph standing alone does not constitute an actionable invasion
of plaintiffs' right of privacy." 26
The court grounded much of its reasoning in a kind of as-
sumption of risk analysis, commenting that the plaintiffs were "in a
pose voluntarily assumed in a public market place";263 that they
"had voluntarily exposed themselves to public gaze in a pose open to
the view of any persons who might then be at or near their place of
business";26 that "[b]y their own voluntary action plaintiffs waived
their right of privacy so far as this particular public pose was
assumed";265 and that the plaintiffs' right of privacy ceased by "their
own voluntary assumption of this particular pose in a public
place."2s6
While the affirmative defense of assumption of risk in tort law
does not apply in this context,267 the principles underlying the
doctrine are highly relevant. The Restatement (Second) of Torts
defines implied assumption of risk in pertinent part as follows: "[A]
be protected from the broadcast of that most intimate relation. Nothing could
be more intrinsically personal or more within the area of a person's private affairs
than expressions of the emotions and feelings existing between such persons.
That should be true even though the display is in a public place.
Id. at 638 (emphasis added). The court did an about face in Gill v. Hearst IL See infra
note 262 and accompanying text.
259. Gill v. Hearst II, 253 P.2d at 445.
260. Gill v. Hearst 1, 239 P.2d at 638. See supra note 258 for discussion of the prior
case.
261. Gill v. Hearst 1, 239 P.2d at 638.
262. Gill v. Hearst II, 253 P.2d at 443.




267. Assumption of risk is an affirmative defense to claims based upon negligent or
reckless conduct. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 496A (stating
the general principle that one "who voluntarily assumes a risk of harm arising from the
negligent or reckless conduct of the defendant cannot recover for such harm").
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plaintiff who fully understands a risk of harm to himself ... caused
by the defendant's conduct ... and who nevertheless voluntarily
chooses to ... remain within the area of that risk, under circumstan-
ces that manifest his willingness to accept it, is not entitled to recover
for harm within that risk."2" Thus, assumption of risk is grounded
in the notion of consent. Under negligence law, when a person
assumes the risk she consents to relieve the defendant of the duty to
exercise reasonable care toward her.269 However, as the Restatement
provision recognizes, to findtrue consent, the plaintiff must have full
knowledge of the risk and voluntarily choose to encounter it.
Judged by these standards, the court's assumption of risk analysis
in Gill v. Hearst 11 breaks down. First, the plaintiffs did not have
knowledge of the risk in any meaningful sense. While they
presumably knew it was possible that someone might stop to
scrutinize them and take their photograph, they had no particular
reason to believe that would happen. Using negligence law as an
analogue, it cannot be said that a pedestrian assumes the risk of being
hit by a negligent driver simply because he knows such an event is
possible. To satisfy the knowledge element of assumption of risk, the
plaintiff "must not only be aware of the facts which create the danger,
but must also appreciate the danger itself and the nature, character,
and extent which make it unreasonable."'27  If the risk, though
known, is "so slight as to be negligible," the knowledge component of
the assumption of risk equation is not satisfied.271
More importantly, it surely cannot be said that the Gill plaintiffs
voluntarily consented to the risk of the defendant taking their
photograph, much less publishing it in a national magazine. The
excerpts from the Gill opinion quoted above show that the court
emphasized the voluntariness of the plaintiffs' conduct at four
separate points.272 However, the court's analysis was flawed for
failing to distinguish between merely voluntarily appearing in a public
268. Id. § 496C(1).
269. See PROSSER & KEEON ON TORTS, supra note 43, § 68, at 480 ("In its most basic
sense, assumption of risk means that the plaintiff, in advance, has given his express consent
to relieve the defendant of an obligation of conduct toward him, and to take his chances
of injury from a known risk arising from what the defendant is to do or leave undone.").
270. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 496D cmt. b.
271. See id- § 496D cmt. b ("[Tihe condition of premises upon which he enters may be
quite apparent to him, but the danger arising from the condition may be neither known
nor apparent, or, if known or apparent at all, it may appear to him to be so slight as to be
negligible. In such a case the plaintiff does not assume the risk.").
272. See supra text accompanying notes 263-66.
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place and voluntarily consenting to be stared at, photographed, and
publicized. It is not enough that the plaintiffs voluntarily engaged in
some conduct. They must have voluntarily consented to the specific
risk at issue.
To decide, as the Gill court did, that one who voluntarily appears
in public also voluntarily consents to be stared at, photographed, and
publicized is unrealistic and places an unfair burden on those who
value their privacy. There is nothing "voluntary" about assuming a
public pose except in the most trivial sense. Merely to survive in
society requires that people spend a considerable amount of their time
in places accessible to the public. Under the Gill rationale, the only
way one may avoid "voluntarily" exposing herself to unwarranted
scrutiny would be to not hold a job, go to the grocery store, obtain
medical help, take children to school, seek outdoor recreation, etc.; in
other words, harkening back to the opening sentence of this Article,
to stay inside with the blinds drawn.
The notion of voluntariness withers even further when one takes
account of cultural and economic factors that force some people to
conduct a much larger portion of their activities outdoors. Affluent
persons can purchase refuge in large houses with fenced yards hidden
from view, but "people in crowded living quarters find privacy
outdoors-in the streets of cities, in the corners of bars, in motion-
picture houses, and in a host of 'public' places where the necessary
solitude, intimacy, anonymity and reserve can be found."'273
Increasing numbers of American citizens live their entire lives on the
streets.274 To say that homeless people have "voluntarily" consented
to any and all public inspection, no matter how intrusive, would be
insensitive and inappropriate.
Dean Prosser implicitly adopted the Gill assumption of risk
analysis when he stated that "[o]n the public street, or in any other
public place, the plaintiff has no right to be alone, and it is no
invasion of his privacy to do no more than follow him about., 275
This approach, however, which treats privacy as an all-or-nothing
273. WESTIn, supra note 215, at 41; see also David E. Steinberg, Making Sense of Sense-
Enhanced Searches, 74 MINN. L. REV. 563,586-88 (discussing "cultural criticism" of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence which places primary emphasis upon physical trespasses in
determining reasonable expectations of privacy).
274. A 1990 Census Bureau survey counted 220,000 homeless Americans. William P.
Cheshire, Don't Trust Everything You Hear, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 1, 1993, at C1.
Unofficial estimates of homeless people in the United States have ranged as high as five
million. Id.
275. Prosser, supra note 38, at 391.
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concept, is too rigid. Privacy is a matter of degree. Although persons
surrender much privacy when they venture to a public place, it does
not follow that they automatically forfeit all privacy 76 There is a
difference, which the law should recognize, between being "seen" in
public and being closely scrutinized or, as discussed below, recorded
on film or videotape.2'
2. The Relevance of Photography and Videotaping
After commenting that it is not an invasion of privacy to follow
a person about in a public place,278 Dean Prosser stated: "Neither
is it such an invasion to take his photograph in such a place, since this
amounts to nothing more than making a record, not differing
essentially from a full written description, of a public sight which any
one present would be free to see."' 7 9  In other words, Prosser saw
no distinction between observing a person with the naked eye and
making a permanent photographic record of that observation.
Prosser cited Gill as support for this proposition.' However,
the difference between observing the couple in Gill with the naked
eye and photographing them was large and dramatic. A photograph
intensifies an invasion of privacy in three important ways. First,
because it makes a permanent record of a scene, it allows the invader
to, in effect, take a part of the subject with him. The victim loses
control over an aspect of her sel?' The temporal limitations that
276. It is logically fallacious to characterize a matter requiring a relative judgment as
all one thing or all something else. This all-or-nothing fallacy has been described as
follows:
Where a situation requires a relative judgment, it is a fallacy to wrap up a
judgment on it into one hasty bundle labeled All or Nothing, Good or Bad,
Blameworthy or Blameless....
The all-or-nothing mistake assumes a naked dichotomy where no such
simplification is warranted. Mr. Justice Frankfurter has called this "the great
either-or."
W. WARD FEARNSIDE & WILLIAM B. HOLTHER, FALLACY: THE COUNTERFEIT OF
ARGUMENT 30 (1959).
277. Stanley Benn made this observation: "Anyone who wants to remain unobserved
and unidentified, it might be said, should stay at home or go out only in disguise. Yet
there is a difference between happening to be seen and having someone closely observe,
and perhaps record, what one is doing, even in a public place." Benn, supra note 108, at
4-5.
278. Prosser, supra note 38, at 391. See supra text accompanying note 208 for the full
text of relevant comments by Prosser.
279. Prosser, supra note 38, at 391-92.
280. Id. at 391 n.81.
281. See WESTIN, supra note 215, at 62. Discussing aural and optical recording, Westin
stated:
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are otherwise inherent in public intrusions are eliminated. Absent a
camera, even the most voyeuristic of visitors attending the Farmers'
Market that day would probably be limited to a brief observation of
the couple. Prolonged staring draws attention to oneself, and is thus
discouraged by the fear of public embarrassment. Even if the
observer were not sufficiently motivated by self-consciousness to avoid
discovery, once noticed, he most probably would continue on his way
rather than risk confrontation with the subjects or the police. Even
assuming the person was in a position to concentrate his observation
upon the couple undetected, however,' the observation necessarily
would terminate when the couple changed location. A photograph,
however, allows the scrutiny to be extended indefinitely.
Second, because of this permanent record, information may be
revealed that would not be noticed by transitory observation with the
naked eye. Because we can study a photograph at leisure, we may be
able to detect subtleties not otherwise discernible. We know the
Mona Lisa smiles with her eyes because we can study her famous
portrait. It is doubtful one would notice such a nuance passing her on
the sidewalk. In Gill, the court commented that the photograph of
the couple in the Farmers' Market disclosed their "sentimental
mood,"' something a casual passerby would be likely to miss.
Most important, because a photograph creates a permanent
record of a scene, it has the potential to multiply the impact of the
original invasion through wide dissemination. In Gill, the court stated
that the photograph of the couple in the Farmers' Market "did not
disclose anything which until then had been private, but rather only
extended knowledge of the particular incident to a somewhat larger
public than had actually witnessed it at the time of occurrence.""
To label these words an understatement is itself an understatement.
In the absence of the photograph, few persons would have taken
notice of the couple, perhaps only the photographer himself.
Assuming the Farmers' Market in Los Angeles is like most busy
outdoor markets, the couple reasonably could count upon their
obscurity and anonymity among the moving crowd as protection from
scrutiny. Instead, with the photograph, the "somewhat larger public"
It is almost as if we were witnessing an achievement through technology of a risk
to modem man comparable to that primitive men felt when they had their
photographs taken by visiting anthropologists: a part of them had been taken
and might be used to harm them in the future.
Id.




to which they were displayed as an object of attention was the
nationwide audience of a. popular magazine.
Moreover, a photograph permits dissemination of an image not
just to a larger audience, but to different audiences than the subject
intended. Persons dress and behave differently depending upon their
immediate social environment. Conduct which would be appropriate
for one environment may be inappropriate and embarrassing in
another. For example, although many persons are willing to expose
their flesh at the beach or poolside, most would not willingly expose
the same image to other audiences or in other contexts.
In short, because photography creates a permanent record of an
event, one which may be disseminated far and wide, 5 it substantial-
ly intensifies the original privacy invasion. Dean Prosser was wrong
when he equated observation by the naked eye with photography.
The already large difference between merely observing a person
and photographing the person is magnified considerably when the
recording is by means of videotaping." The same basic concerns
voiced above with regard to photography-permanence and dis-
semination-apply to videotaping, but they are accentuated by the
nature of videotape. Videotape has the capacity to capture not just
a single image of a person, but much of her personality. All of the
external aspects of personhood may be permanently recorded and
reproduced: appearance, facial expressions, gestures, gaze, posture,
and even speech. These, in turn, may reveal important internal
aspects of the self as well. In speech, of course, we are likely to
reveal tremendous amounts of private information. While many
persons would be careful, to curtail their private speech in the
284. As one writer stated:
If one's image, voice, or activity is displayed to a wider public ... than could
reasonably be expected to perceive it, one's privacy is violated. Sitting in a
restaurant or walking along a street, one has no reason to expect that his filmed
image will be made available to TV viewers. Such a filming or recording violates
one's reasonable expectations of limited privacy, even if unreleased or
unused-although in practice the matter is likely to come to notice only if some
use is made of the material.
Van Den Haag, supra note 217, at 158.
285. Dissemination is one of the factors I include in my proposal to expand the tort of
intrusion to include certain public intrusions. See infra notes 420-58 and accompanying
text.
286. See supra notes 147-05 and accompanying text for discussion of the threat to
privacy posed by video cameras. Video cameras did not exist when Prosser wrote his
article, but movie cameras did. There is nothing in Prosser's words to suggest he would
make a distinction between single-frame photography and multiple-frame movie film or
videotape.
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presence of a video camcorder, enhanced technology permits audio
recording from greater and greater distances.2 Moreover, even
non-verbal communication captured on videotape can disclose
important information about a person, such as mood (anxiety,
depression, happiness), attitude towards others (anger, love, wariness,
boredom, impatience), mental state (concentration, puzzlement, self-
confidence), or bodily state (fatigue, alertness, hunger).m Social
scientists have long recognized that while "[w]e speak with our vocal
organs[,] ... we converse with our whole body." 9
"Public privacy" sounds like an oxymoron, but only because we
tend to think of the words "public" and "private" in absolute terms.
"Public" connotes community; hence, to think of something as public
is to think of it as the community's business. "Private," on the other
hand, evokes images of fences, walls, drawn shades and other physical
barriers that block out the community. However, privacy is not an all
or nothing concept. While a person necessarily surrenders a great
deal of privacy when she ventures from a place of physical solitude
into the light of public view, it does not follow that she forfeits all
legitimate expectations of privacy. As the preceding discussion
demonstrates, there are important components of privacy that have
nothing to do with physical solitude. When these components are
invaded in a highly offensive manner, even in a public place, tort law
should recognize a remedy.
V. INDIRECT RECOGNITION OF A REMEDY FOR PUBLIC
INTRUSION UNDER CURRENT LAW
Thus far, this Article has focused upon the resoluteness of courts
in refusing to acknowledge a remedy for public intrusion. In
disposing of claims arising in public intrusion contexts, courts are
generally content to recite the rule that a person in public has no
cognizable privacy claim. However, in several cases courts have
intuitively recognized a right to recover for invasion of privacy under
circumstances amounting to a public intrusion. The opinions in these
287. See supra notes 156-60 and accompanying text (discussing audio surveillance
equipment, including a microphone that can hear at a distance of 100 yards).
288. See generally MICHAEL ARGYLE, BODILY COMMUNICATION 105-345 (1975)
(containing extensive analysis of the different forms and uses of non-verbal com-
munication).
289. John Galvin, Out on a Limb; Your Body Speaks Volumes; Body Language, British
Telecommunications PLC (England), Sept. 1990, available in NEXIS, News library, Arcnws
file (quoting a behavioral scientist).
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cases are radically underwritten and recognition of the right is usually
by implication only. Nevertheless, the cases are important for their
acknowledgement, however indirect, of a right to public privacy.
An early case of public intrusion caused the drafters of the
Restatement to include an exception to their comments regarding the
nonexistence of a right of privacy in public. "Even in a public place,
however, there may be some matters about the plaintiff, such as his
underwear or lack of it, that are not exhibited to the public gaze; and
there may still be invasion of privacy when there is intrusion upon
these matters."2"
The illustration cited to support this proposition is patterned after
the facts of Daily Times Democrat v. Graham.29 In Graham the
defendant's photographer took a picture of a woman inside a carnival
"Fun House" when her skirt was blown over her head by a concealed
air jet.29 The defendant published the photo, which showed the
woman's underwear, on the front page of its newspaper.2 3  The
Alabama Supreme Court affirmed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
on her invasion of privacy claim.294 Though the specific basis for
the holding is not made clear, the court referred to " 'wrongful
intrusion[s] into one's private activities, in such manner as to outrage
or cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of
ordinary sensibilities.' 295 The court rejected the defendant's
argument that its conduct was not actionable because the plaintiff's
photograph "was taken at the time she was a part of a public scene
,,296
Accordingly, Graham recognized a cause of action for public
intrusion, albeit a very limited one. In dismissing the defendant's
argument that the plaintiff was entitled to no privacy protection
because she was part of a public scene, the court emphasized that the
embarrassing image captured by the defendant's camera was
290. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 652B cmt. c.
291. 162 So. 2d 474 (Ala. 1964). The Restatement illustration reads as follows:
7. A, a young woman, attends a "Fun House," a public place of amusement
where various tricks are played upon visitors. While she is there a concealed jet
of compressed air blows her skirts over her head, and reveals her underwear. B
takes a photograph of her in that position. B has invaded A's privacy.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 652B cmt. c, illus. 7.
292. Graham, 162 So. 2d at 476.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 478.
295. Id. at 476 (quoting Abernathy v. Thornton, 83 So. 2d 235, 236 (Ala. 1955))
(emphasis added).
296. Id. at 477-78.
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involuntarily assumed.297  Thus, the assumption of risk
rationale-which provides central support to the general rule that no
privacy exists in public--did not apply.29 Nevertheless, the crack
in the general rule recognized by Graham and the Restatement
comment endorsing it is significant; for once it is recognized that an
actionable intrusion up6n privacy may occur in public under one set
of circumstances, no logical reason exists for not considering whether
other circumstances might also warrant relief,
Some courts have intuitively recognized this. Several cases have
allowed relief for public intrusions under circumstances falling outside
the scope of the narrow Graham exception. Unfortunately, the
opinions in these cases lack analysis. They usually fail to clearly
specify that intrusion is the basis for recovery, perhaps because the
judges, though wishing to allow recovery under the particular facts,
did not want to rewrite existing law. In fact, none of the cases
allowing recovery in situations involving public intrusions mention the
general rule that privacy cannot be invaded in a public place.
Accordingly, recognition of a cause of action for public intrusion in
these cases usually proceeds by implication only.
One exception is Rafferty v. Hartford Courant Co.,299 in which
an uninvited photographer employed by the defendant newspaper
took pictures of the plaintiffs as they held a mock "unwedding"
ceremony on an open hill." The defendant published a photograph
of the ceremony, along with an accurate account of the event .30
The plaintiffs filed an invasion of privacy complaint raising three
claims: intrusion, public disclosure of private facts, and false light.3°
The trial court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment
on all claims, including the claim of intrusion.30 3 Without extensive
analysis and without mentioning the general rule that an intrusion
cannot occur in a public place, the court stated: "The plaintiffs'
affidavits support an intentional physical intrusion by the defendant's
employees upon the private affairs or concerns of the plaintiffs. 3
4
The court opined that it was for a jury to determine whether the
297. Id. at 478.
298. See supra notes 256-77 and accompanying text for discussion of assumption of risk.
299. 416 A.2d 1215 (Conn. Super. 1980).
300. Id. at 1216. The plaintiffs had recently divorced their respective spouses. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 1221.
304. Id. at 1216 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 652B,
which defines the tort of intrusion).
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intrusion was " 'highly offensive to a reasonable person' " within the
meaning of section 652B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 5
Kramer v. Downey3 6 also came close to recognizing an express
right to recovery for public intrusion. In Kramer the plaintiff sued his
former lover for invasion of privacy based upon a long-continuing
course of conduct in which she "maintained visual contact with him
in public places" after he broke off their relationship.3°  The
defendant conceded that she engaged in this conduct, but asserted
that it was not actionable "so long as she kept her distance from [the
plaintiff], always stayed on public property and always skirted arrest
by the police."308  A Texas appellate court upheld a judgment
against the defendant for money damages and injunctive relief,
stating: "[W]e now hold that the right to privacy is broad enough to
include the right to be free of those willful intrusions into one's
personal life at home and at work which occurred in this case."309
Other cases have implicitly recognized a right of action for public
intrusion, without mentioning the tort by name. In Galella v.
Onassis,31 Donald Galella, a free lance photographer and self-styled
"paparazzo,, 311 filed suit against Jacqueline Onassis and three Secret
Service agents for false arrest.312 Onassis counterclaimed for
invasion of privacy, assault and battery, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, seeking damages and injunctive relief. 313 The
events arose out of a campaign of harassment by Galella against
Onassis, her son (John Kennedy, Jr.), and her daughter (Caroline
Kennedy). Examples of the harassment cited by the court included
taking pictures of John riding his bicycle, jumping in front of the boy's
path, interrupting Caroline while playing tennis, invading the
children's private schools, driving a power boat close to Onassis while
she was swimming, and taking pictures of Onassis and her party in
305. Id. This is the section of the Restatement defining the tort of intrusion. See supra
note 5 for the full text of the definition.
306. 680 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
307. Id. at 525.
308. Id.
309. Id. (emphasis added). The court did not specifically discuss the tort of intrusion,
nor did it make any reference to the general rule that intrusions in public places are not
actionable.
310. 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
311. As defined by the court, paparazzi are photographers who "make themselves as
visible to the public and obnoxious to their photographic subjects as possible to aid in the
advertisement and wide sale of their works." Id. at 992.
312. Id at 991.
313. Id. at 992.
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public places on numerous occasions. 14 Galella's false arrest claim
stemmed from his detention by Secret Service agents attempting to
prevent Galella from harassing Onassis and her family.315
The district court dismissed Galella's false arrest claim316 and
Onassis dropped her claim for damages. 317  However, the court,
applying New York law, enjoined Galella from further harassment of
Onassis and her family and found Galella "guilty of harassment,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery,
commercial exploitation of defendant's personality, and invasion of
privacy."31  The court of appeals narrowed the injunction, but
affirmed the basic findings of the district court.31 9
With respect to Onassis's invasion of privacy claim, the federal
court of appeals noted that New York courts had not yet recognized
a right of privacy beyond a statutorily created cause of action for
commercial appropriation.32 However, the court expressed its
belief that the New York courts might well modify their position if
faced with the issue again.321 The appellate judges proved inac-
curate as prognosticators. The New York Court of Appeals has
reaffirmed that no common law right of privacy exists in the state.32
Nevertheless, Galella is significant because a federal district judge
and three federal appellate judges assumed that Galella invaded the
privacy of Onassis and her children, even though most of his conduct
occurred in public places. This amounted to implicit acceptance of a
cause of action for public intrusion, since intrusion is the only privacy
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 991.
317. Id. at 992 n.3.
318. Id at 994 (emphasis added).
319. Id. at 998.
320. Id. at 995 n.12. Section 50 of the New York Civil Rights Law makes it a
misdemeanor to use the name, portrait, or picture of any person without consent "for
advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade." N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 50
(McKinney 1992). Section 51 authorizes an action for damages and injunctive relief under
the same circumstances. I&. § 51. These statutes were enacted in response to the famous
decision in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 64 N.E. 442, 447-48 (N.Y. 1902), in
which the New York Court of Appeals rejected the claim of a young girl whose
photograph was used by the defendant without her consent to advertise its flour. See
supra note 60 (discussing Roberson and the invasion of privacy tort known as ap-
propriation).
321. Galella, 487 F.2d at 995 n.12.
322. See, e.g., Delan v. CBS, Inc., 458 N.Y.S.2d 608, 612 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983) ("At
common law, a cause of action for violation of the right of privacy is not cognizable in this
State.... ."); see also Manufacturas Int'l, LTDA v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 792
F. Supp. 180, 193 (1992) (applying New York law).
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tort that was even arguably applicable under the facts. There were no
allegations that Galella gave publicity to private facts or that he
presented Onassis and her children in a false light. Moreover, Onassis
prevailed separately on her claim for commercial appropriation."
An older New York case provides a similar example of a court
willing to bend existing privacy law to afford relief for a sympathetic
victim of public intrusion. In Blumenthal v. Picture Classics, Inc.,324
the defendants made a short movie called Sight-Seeing in New York
with Nick and Tony, which depicted ordinary street scenes in
Manhattan.3' Six seconds of the film showed the plaintiff, a widow,
selling bread and rolls from a basket to passersby.326 The only
privacy claim available in New York is for commercial appropriation
under a statute that prohibits use of another's name or likeness "for
advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade."3" Nevertheless,
in Blumenthal, in an opinion less than one page long, a majority of
the New York Supreme Court enjoined the defendant from showing
the motion picture, holding that defendants had used plaintiff's
likeness "for trade purposes" within the meaning of the New York
statute, "even though her trade brings her into public view."'3  On
appeal, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the injunction. The
court expressly declined to answer the question of whether use of the
plaintiff's likeness was for trade purposes,3 29 even though such a use
must be found to justify injunctive relief under the New York
statute.330
In the New York Supreme Court, the dissenters attacked the
proposition that the use of the plaintiff's likeness was for trade
purposes, characterizing such use as "incidental.""33 Indeed, because
plaintiff's likeness had no commercial value, it is doubtful that her
claim was predicated upon misappropriation for trade purposes.
Rather, the true basis of her claim most likely rested in her allegation
323. See supra text accompanying note 318.
324. 257 N.Y.S. 800, 801 (App. Div. 1932).
325. Id. at 801 (O'Malley, J., dissenting).
326. Id. at 802 (O'Malley, J., dissenting).
327. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAw § 50 (McKinney 1992).
328. Blumenthal, 257 N.Y.S. at 801.
329. Blumenthal v. Picture Classics, 185 N.E. 713-14 (N.Y. 1933).
330. N.Y. Civ. RIGHs LAW § 51 (McKinney 1992) ("Any person whose name, portrait
or picture is used within this state for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade without
the written consent first obtained... may maintain an equitable action ... to prevent and
restrain the use thereof. .. ."). There was no assertion in the case that the plaintiff's
likeness was used for "advertising" purposes as opposed to "trade" purposes.
331. Blumenthal, 257 N.Y.S. at 804 (O'Malley, J., dissenting).
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that the movie "depicted her in a foolish, unnatural, and undignified
manner, and held her up to public ridicule and the contempt of her
neighbors and friends." 3
32
Subsequent New York cases have borne out the dissent's view
that use of a person's likeness under circumstances similar to those in
Blumenthal is incidental and not for trade purposes. 33 Moreover,
at the same time Blumenthal was decided, New York courts were
developing a broad privilege protecting the use of one's likeness in a
publication concerning a newsworthy event or an event of public
interest.' Viewed in its full context, the Blumenthal decision seems
best explained as a court's clumsy attempt to fashion relief for a
332. Id. at 801 (O'Malley, J., dissenting).
333. See, e.g., Delan v. CBS, Inc., 458 N.Y.S.2d 608, 614 (App. Div. 1983) (holding that
a four second appearance of plaintiff, a patient at a mental hospital that was the subject
of a television documentary, was "too fleeting and incidental to be actionable").
334. See, e.g., Sarat Lahiri v. Daily Mirror, Inc., 295 N.Y.S. 382, 389 (1937) (holding
there may be no recovery for publishing a photograph to illustrate an article pertaining to
current news or public interest unless "the photograph used has so tenuous a connection
with the news item or educational article that it can be said to have no legitimate relation
to it and be used for the purpose of promoting the sale of the publication").
A somewhat shocking example of just how broad this privilege is in modern times
comes from Howell v. New York Post, Co., 612 N.E.2d 699,705 (N.Y. 1993). The plaintiff
was a patient at a private mental hospital, where Hedda Nussbaum was also hospitalized.
I& at 700. Nussbaum was the adoptive mother of six-year-old Lisa Steinberg, whose death
from child abuse was highly publicized. Id. The defendant's photographer trespassed on
the hospital grounds and used a telephoto lens to photograph the plaintiff walking with
Nussbaum. Id. The photograph was printed to illustrate a story about Nussbaum's
emotional and physical recovery from the events, which allegedly included beatings
inflicted by her live-in lover, Joel Steinberg, who stood accused of murdering the child.
Id. The photo of plaintiff and Nussbaum appeared alongside another photo of Nussbaum
taken shortly after the child's death. Id. In this earlier photo, Nussbaum's face was
severely disfigured from the beatings by Steinberg. Id.
The plaintiff sued the New York Post on a variety of grounds, including invasion of
privacy based upon the use of her likeness for trade purposes. Id. She alleged that it was
imperative that her hospitalization remained a secret from her family and stated that
hospital officials had telephoned a Post editor requesting that no photographs of patients
be printed. Id. at 704. Nevertheless, all of the plaintiff's claims, including her invasion of
privacy claim, were dismissed. I& at 701.
The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. Id. With regard to plaintiffs
privacy claim, the court stated that because the article concerned a newsworthy event,
plaintiff could prevail only if she demonstrated "the picture bore no real relationship to
the article, or that the article was an advertisement in disguise." Id. at 704. In response
to plaintiff's assertion that her photo (as opposed to Nussbaum's) was not related to the
article, the court stated that "[t]he visual impact would not have been the same had the
Post cropped plaintiff out of the photograph" because "[t]he photograph of a visibly
healed Nussbaum, interacting with her smiling, fashionably clad 'companion' offer[ed] a
stark contrast to the adjacent photograph of Nussbaum's disfigured face." Id. Thus, the




sympathetic plaintiff whose right to be let alone was intruded upon by
being filmed in a public place and having her image disseminated to
others without her consent.
In some cases involving public intrusions, courts have allowed
plaintiffs to succeed by applying legal theories other than intrusion,
with results resembling an effort to force a square peg into a round
hole. In Best v. District of Columbia,35 the plaintiffs were a group
of prisoners videotaped without their consent while they were being
transported by airplane from Washington, D.C., to Spokane,
Washington.336 While the prisoners were seated on the airplane in
handcuffs and chains, one of the defendants walked down the aisle
and videotaped them.337 The prisoners sued, raising constitutional
claims, as well as a common-law invasion of privacy claim.338 In a
motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for summary judgment, the
defendants asserted that the plaintiffs failed to make out a claim for
invasion of privacy.33 9
The court denied the motion and allowed plaintiffs to proceed
under the theory of public disclosure of private facts.' However,
the allegations of the plaintiffs' complaint did not support recovery
under that theory, at least as it has traditionally been defined. Even
if one accepted that the videotape captured private facts concerning
the prisoners, which is questionable, the defendant must give publicity
to the private facts to make out the tort.341 The comments to the
Restatement section defining public disclosure of private facts state
that "publicity" means communicating the matter "to the public at
large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as
substantially certain to become one of public knowledge."' 4 While
335. 743 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1990).
336. Id. at 45.
337. Id. "Some of the plaintiffs objected, some hid their faces, some tried to hide their
faces but the hand-cuffs and chains prevented them from doing so, and others were
sleeping." Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 49.
340. The plaintiffs cited a District of Columbia case involving such a claim. Id. In
Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, 492 A.2d 580, 586-88 (D.C. Cir. 1985), the court reinstated a
verdict against a plastic surgeon on a claim of public disclosure of private facts based upon
the surgeon's use of "before and after" photographs of the plaintiff's cosmetic surgery in
a medical presentation.
341. Section 652D of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which defines the tort of public
disclosure of private facts, contains as an element the requirement that the defendant give
"publicity" to the private matter. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, §
652D cmt. a. See supra note 56 for the full text of the Restatement's definition of this tort.
342. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 652D cmt. a.
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the defendants conceded that the film was shown to correctional
personnel, and the plaintiffs alleged that the video was shown to
unknown third parties, 3 there were no allegations that the defen-
dants gave "publicity" to the videotape within the meaning of the Res-
tatement definition. Moreover, in discussing the plaintiffs'
constitutional privacy claim, the court noted that the "plaintiffs may
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the film itself whether or
not it is publicly disclosed."'
In Muratore v. MIS Scotia Prince5 the court allowed the
plaintiff to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress
under circumstances that seem better analyzed as a case of public
intrusion. The plaintiff was a passenger on the defendant's cruise
ship, and on several occasions two photographers employed by the
defendant took the plaintiff's picture over her objection. 46 On one
occasion, one of the photographers made a lewd comment concerning
the plaintiff. 7
The court rejected the plaintiff's claim for intrusion because
Maine law requires that the plaintiff allege a " 'physical intrusion
upon premises occupied privately by a plaintiff,' "m whereas all of
the conduct to which the plaintiff objected occurred in public.
Instead, the court resorted to the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The court held that the defendant's conduct
constituted "extreme and outrageous conduct," despite recognizing
that the definition of such conduct in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts "suggest[s] a rather rigorous test for 'outrageousness.' "349
This is indeed true. Comment d to Restatement section 46, which
defines intentional infliction of emotional distress, states: "Liability
has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in
character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly
intolerable in a civilized community."'35 Mere insults or profanity
343. Best, 743 F. Supp. at 48.
344. Id
345. 656 F. Supp. 471 (D. Me. 1987).
346. Id. at 473-75.
347. When approached by one of the photographers, the plaintiff turned her back to
him. One of the photographers told the other: "Take the back of her-she likes things
from the back." Id. at 475.
348. Id. at 483 (quoting Nelson v. Maine Times, 373 A.2d 1221, 1223 (Me. 1977))
(emphasis added in Muratore).
349. Id. at 481.
350. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 46 cmt. d.
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are not sufficient to constitute extreme and outrageous conduct."
Apart from one lewd comment,35 2 the defendants' objectionable
conduct consisted primarily of taking the plaintiff's photograph over
her objection. While the court stated that the defendants had
knowledge of the plaintiff's unusual sensitivity to being photographed
(as indicated by her initial reaction),33 and that such knowledge
may be a factor in assessing the outrageousness of conduct,354 the
court's conclusion that the defendants' conduct constituted extreme
and outrageous conduct is out of step with the strict construction most
courts apply to that test.355
Moreover, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
also requires proof by the plaintiff that she suffered "severe emotional
distress."356 The Restatement comments to section 46 explain that
"[t]he law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that
no reasonable man could be expected to endure it."357 There is no
indication in the Muratore opinion that the plaintiff suffered the kind
of severe emotional distress which courts usually require358 and
351. Id. § 46 cmt. d ("The liability clearly does not extend to mere insults, indignities,
threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities."); see also PROSSER & KEETON
ON TORTS, supra note 43, § 12, at 59 ("[I]t is generally held that there can be no recovery
for mere profanity, obscenity, or abuse, without circumstances of aggravation, or for
insults, indignities or threats . . . ."). This is not to trivialize the offensiveness of the
defendant's lewd comment. However, it did not rise to the level of extreme and
outrageous conduct as that standard usually is interpreted.
352. Perhaps to bolster its case for finding extreme and outrageous conduct, the court
made reference in its discussion of this issue to "lewd comments" of the defendants.
Muratore, 656 F. Supp. at 481 (emphasis added). This suggests there was more than one
such comment. However, the court mentioned only one specific comment in the detailed
factual summary at the beginning of the opinion. Id. at 475.
353. Id. at 481.
354. 1&
355. See, e.g., Logan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 466 So. 2d 121, 122, 124 (Ala. 1985)
(affirming summaryjudgment for defendant who had made statement to a fellow employee
that plaintiff, who was gay, was "as queer as a three-dollar bill"); Pemberton v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 502 A.2d 1101, 1115 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) (holding that conduct was not
sufficiently extreme and outrageous to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress
where defendant-employer placed plaintiff-employee under surveillance, sent plaintiff's
mug shot and police record stemming from a 14-year-old criminal conviction to 50 union
employees, and sent evidence of plaintiff's marital infidelity to his wife).
356. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 46.
357. IL § 46 cmt. j.
358. See, e.g., Forster v. Manchester, 189 A.2d 147, 151 (Pa. 1963) (holding plaintiff's
evidence that surveillance caused her to become extremely nervous and upset and to have
frequent nightmares and hallucinations which required medical treatment was 358.12
insufficient to show severe emotional distress where there was no evidence that the
defendant intended to cause such distress).
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which is contemplated by the Restatement.39 Nevertheless, the court
found this element satisfied because it was "an appropriate case in
which to infer severity from the extreme and outrageous nature of the
photographers' conduct alone. ' '360 Given the court's questionable
conclusions concerning the outrageousness of the defendants'
conduct, 361 this portion of the holding amounts to little more than
bootstrapping.
What Muratore and the other cases discussed in this section
demonstrate is that some courts want to allow recovery in appropriate
cases involving public intrusions, but they lack a sufficient vehicle to
accomplish the desired result. Thus, they have been forced either (1)
to rely upon the tort of intrusion and simply ignore the rule that
actionable intrusions cannot occur in public places (as in Rafferty and
Kramer); (2) to speak generally in terms of recovery for invasion of
privacy without delineating the particular privacy tort relied upon (as
in Galella and Blumenthal); or (3) to press other legal theories into
service which are not applicable (as in Best and Muratore).
Thus, the situation parallels that faced by Warren and Brandeis
when they wrote their seminal article on The Right To Privacy in
189062 Warren and Brandeis discerned that lack of recognition of
a right to privacy in tort law was forcing courts to stretch other legal
theories (defamation, property, copyright, and implied contract) to
allow recovery for what were, in truth, invasions of privacy.363 The
solution, in their view, was for courts to be forthright in recognizing
"the right to be let alone" as an independent tort. 64
The time has come for courts to recognize openly and forthrightly
the existence of the concept of "public privacy" and to afford
protection of that right by allowing recovery for intrusions that occur
in or from places accessible to the public. The next section suggests
how the tort of intrusion should be redefined to implement this
proposal.
359. The only specific reference to the distress suffered by the plaintiff was that she was
"embarrassed" by the defendants' efforts to photograph her. Muratore v. M/S Scotia
Prince, 656 F. Supp. 471, 475 (D. Me. 1987).
360. Id. at 481.
361. See supra notes 349-55 and accompanying text.
362. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 33.
363. Id. at 197-213.
364. Id. at 195.
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VI. REDEFINING THE TORT OF INTRUSION TO INCLUDE A RIGHT
OF ACTION FOR "PUBLIC INTRUSION"
A majority of American jurisdictions have adopted the definitions
of the four invasion of privacy torts, including intrusion, set fprth in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.365 The obstacle to making
instances of public intrusion actionable under existing law lies not so
much in the Restatement definition of the tort of intrusion as in the
judicial acceptance of the Restatement comments that elaborate upon
that definition. Section 652B of the Restatement defines "Intrusion
upon Seclusion": "One who intentionally intrudes, physically or
otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private
affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person."366
While both the title of the section and its references to intrusions
upon "solitude" and "seclusion" suggest that privacy may be invaded
only in a private physical space, the definition goes on to include,
disjunctively, intrusions upon a person's "private affairs or concerns."
This definition is broad enough to include intrusions in public places.
A person's ability to move about in a public place without being
followed, photographed, or videotaped could properly be regarded as
a "private concern" of the person.
However, the comments to Restatement section 652B make it
clear that, except under one narrow set of circumstances,367 a person
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in a public place. There is no
liability, the comments state, for merely observing a person or taking
his photograph in a public place, "since he is not then in
seclusion." '368 This view of privacy is too limited because it fails to
take account of important aspects of privacy that have little to do with
physical solitude.369 The goal of this section is to offer a workable
redefinition of the tort of intrusion that would allow, under ap-
propriate circumstances, recovery for intrusions that occur in or from
public places.
365. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (citing cases).
366. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 652B.
367. See supra notes 290-98 and accompanying text (discussing exception).
368. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 65213 cmt. c; see also supra
note 208 (providing complete text of relevant comments).
369. See supra notes 215-52 and accompanying text.
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As a point of departure, it must be recognized that neither the
right to privacy nor the right to invade privacy is absolute. In
identifying legally protectable privacy interests, there is probably
unanimous agreement that privacy interests must be balanced against
opposing communitarian interests.'7 Obviously, in the area of
public privacy, a balance must be struck between privacy and
interaction. Members of society must be able to function freely in
public, unburdened by the fear of invading others' privacy. Moreover,
many situations involving intrusions in public implicate free speech
and press issues, so any proposal to expand the tort of intrusion must
take these important interests into account.
Currently, the balance is struck by the more or less bright-line
rule that privacy cannot be invaded in public. About the only thing
commending this rule is its ease of application. While this is not an
insignificant virtue, it does not by itself justify maintaining a rule that
forecloses privacy rights in public places. The current rule represents
not so much a balancing of privacy rights against other rights as a
preclusion of privacy rights in one of the dominant spheres of civilized
life.
Fixed rules do not work well in tort law because the human
behavior to which they must be applied comes in infinite varieties. 71
The history of tort law shows that fixed rules invariably lead to one
of two undesirable consequences: (1) bad results in cases where
application of the rule to the particular facts is harsh and unfair; or
(2) judicial manipulation of the rule to avoid such results. In the
context of the rule that intrusions in public are not actionable, the
former consequence is demonstrated by many of the cases discussed
in this Article;372 the latter is revealed by the several decisions dis-
370. See, e.g., Machleder v. Diaz, 801 F.2d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1986) (discussing need to
balance privacy rights of individuals against constitutional guarantee of freedom of the
press); Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 960 (D.Minn. 1948)
(discussing need to balance personal privacy rights against press rights); Barber v. Time,
Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291,295 (Mo. 1942) ("[E]stablishing conditions of liability for invasion of
the right of privacy is a matter of harmonizing individual rights with community and social
interests."); Post, supra note 100, at 996-97 ("From the beginning, ... the task of the
common law has been to balance the importance of maintaining individual information
preserves against the public's general interest in information.").
371. For example, fixed rules in negligence law regarding the standard of conduct to
be applied in a particular situation "[a]Imost invariably... [have] broken down in the face
of the necessity of basing the standard upon the particular circumstances, the apparent
risk, and the actor's opportunity to deal with it." PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra
note 43, § 35, at 218.
372. See, e.g., supra notes 7-12, 17-23, 93-99 and accompanying text.
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cussed in Section V in which courts either ignored the rule or
circumvented it by manipulating other legal theories to allow victims
of public intrusions to recover.373
Now comes the hard part. Once one casts loose from the
relatively secure mooring of the rule that privacy does not exist in
public places, is it possible to keep from drifting into a sea where any
and all offensive observations in public become the subject of tort
litigation? In other words, is it possible to impose a meaningful legal
profile upon a tort cause of action for "public intrusion"?
A. A Proposed Multifactor Redefinition
The tort of intrusion can be redefined in a way that would allow
recovery in suitable cases of public intrusion while also accom-
modating the competing interests of free social interaction and free
speech. This can by accomplished by retaining the basic standard of
liability included in the current Restatement definition of intrusion,
which imposes liability for intrusive conduct "highly offensive to a
reasonable person,"374 and adopting a multifactor test for assessing
whether this standard has been met. The proposed redefinition set
forth below is comprised of two parts. Subparagraph (1) matches the
current Restatement definition of intrusion, except that it omits the
reference to "solitude or seclusion" and makes it clear that an
intrusion can occur in a public place. 5 Subparagraph (2) sets forth
seven factors for evaluating whether the defendant's conduct was
highly offensive to a reasonable person.
Included within these factors are two considerations not
traditionally part of the tort of intrusion: (1) whether the defendant
disseminated information concerning the plaintiff to others;376 and
(2) whether the subject of the intrusion involved a matter of
legitimate public interest. 7 Currently, these factors are elements
of the privacy tort known as public disclosure of private facts, rather
than the tort of intrusion.378 Thus, to some extent, the proposed
373. See supra notes 299-61 and accompanying text.
374. The Restatement's definition of intrusion requires proof that the "intrusion would
be highly offensive to a reasonable person." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra
note 4, § 652B; see also supra note 5 (providing complete text of Restatement definition of
intrusion).
375. See supra text accompanying note 366 (providing full text of the current
Restatement definition).
376. See infra notes 41-58 and accompanying text.
377. See infra notes 459-95 and accompanying text.
378. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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redefinition constitutes a hybrid of these two torts. The justifications
for this, not the least of which is the death blow recently dealt by the
United States Supreme Court to the tort of public disclosure of
private facts,379 are discussed extensively below.3"
With that introduction, I submit that the following redefinition of
the tort of intrusion strikes a workable balance between legitimate
privacy interests in public places and the competing interests of free
social interaction and freedom of speech:..
INTRUSION
A. One who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise,
upon the private affairs or concerns of another, whether
in a private physical area or one open to public inspec-
tion, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of her
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.
B. In considering whether an intrusive act is one which
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, the
following factors shall be taken into account:
1. the defendant's motive;
2. the magnitude of the intrusion, including the
duration, extent, and the means of intrusion;
3. whether the plaintiff could reasonably expect to
be free from such conduct under the habits and
customs of the location where the intrusion
occurred;
4. whether the defendant sought the plaintiff's
consent to the intrusive conduct;
379. See infra notes 447-58 and accompanying text.
380. See infra notes 420-95 and accompanying text.
381. For the sake of clarity, the terms "plaintiff" and "defendant" are used in the
proposed redefinition and throughout the ensuing discussion to denote, respectively, the
victim of the intrusive conduct and the perpetrator of the intrusive conduct.
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5. actions taken by plaintiff which would manifest to
a reasonable person the plaintiff's desire that the
defendant not engage in the intrusive conduct;
6. whether the defendant disseminated images of the
plaintiff or information concerning the plaintiff
that was acquired during the intrusive act; and
7. whether images of or other information concer-
ning the plaintiff acquired during the intrusive act
involve a matter of legitimate public interest.
Under the proposed redefinition, it would not be necessary that
each factor weigh in the plaintiff's favor to establish liability. On the
other hand, no one factor is controlling, although a single factor might
predominate in a particular case.3
B. Commentary on the Factors for Evaluating "Offensiveness"
Commentary pertaining to each of the seven factors is offered
below. Illustrations Similar to those used by the American Law
Institute in its various restatements of the law are included to help
explain the relevance and application of each factor. While the
proposed redefinition would apply to all instances of intrusive
conduct, regardless of where they occur, the commentary below
focuses exclusively upon intrusions in public places. The commentary
and illustrations are not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to
provide an analytical framework within which to apply the proposed
redefinition. To demonstrate the independent relevance of each
factor, the illustrations attempt to isolate the particular factor being
discussed. However, the factors are interconnected and overlap
inevitably occurs.
1. The Defendant's Motive
More than one hundred years ago, Thomas Cooley stated that
"[m]alicious motives make a bad act worse, but they cannot make that
382. The American Law Institute has adopted similar multifactor balancing tests in
several areas of tort law. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, §
222A (multifactor test for tort of conversion); id. § 339 (multifactor test for assessing
liability of possessor of land to child trespasser); id. § 520 (multifactor test for determining
the existence of an abnormally dangerous activity).
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a wrong which in its own essence is lawful."3" While one modern
writer asserts that this statement "is part of the conventional wisdom
of most writers of basic tort texts,'' 384 the most popular legal treatise
on the subject of torts opines that Cooley's pronouncement "merely
begs the question, ' 38 because "unless motive is to be eliminated
altogether, it must be taken into account in determining whether the
act is 'in its essence lawful' in the first place. ' '316
The defendant's motive or purpose in acting is highly relevant in
assessing whether his conduct should constitute an actionable
intrusion;387 specifically, it is important in determining whether his
actions meet the standard of conduct "highly offensive to a reasonable
person. '' 3' A person asked to evaluate the offensiveness of the
defendant's conduct in an intrusion case understandably would be
interested in knowing why the defendant acted the way he did. The
fact that the defendant acted with a pure motive-that is, lacking any
desire either to benefit himself at the plaintiff's expense or to harm
the plaintiff3 9-would help to cast a favorable light on conduct that
might otherwise be considered highly offensive. Conversely, if an
intrusive actor was motivated by a desire to obtain economic gain or
sexual gratification, or by spite, malice, or some other bad motive,
such motivation might cause a reasonable person to view otherwise
acceptable conduct as highly offensive.
Existing invasion of privacy case law provides examples
demonstrating these contrasting influences of motive. In Elmore v.
Atlantic Zayre, Inc.,390 the defendant's employee watched through
a crack in the ceiling as the plaintiff engaged in homosexual activity
in a restroom furnished by the defendant for customer use. In
affirming summary judgment for the defendant on the plaintiff's
383. THOMAs M. COOLEY, TORTS 497 (2d ed. 1888).
384. Martin A. Kotler, Motivation and Tort Law: Acting for Economic Gain as a
Suspect Motive, 41 VAND. L. REV. 63, 64 (1988).
385. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 43, § 5, at 27.
386. Id.
387. Id. § 117, at 856 (stating that recent cases seem to indicate that the defendant's
purpose in acting is a factor of primary importance in determining whether an intrusion
is actionable). But see Kalven, supra note 30, at 335 (asserting that because motive is not
relevant in intentional torts or defamation actions, it should not be considered relevant to
invasion of privacy actions).
388. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 652B (incorporating this
standard in defining intrusion).
389. See generally Kotler, supra note 384, at 65-66 (classifying different types of
motive).
390. 341 S.E.2d 905, 905 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986).
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invasion of privacy claim, the court stressed that "the observations
were made, not for the purpose of personally invading the privacy of
others, but while investigating suspected criminal activity on those
premises."39' In other words, the presence of what the court
thought to be a legitimate motive worked to immunize conduct that
might otherwise have been viewed as highly offensive.
In Norris v. King,3" the presence of a bad motive tipped the
balance toward liability. The defendant, owner of a laundromat, used
a hidden camera to photograph the plaintiff stealing money from a
soda machine at his business establishment.393 The plaintiff was
charged with theft and pled guilty to the offense.394 Subsequently,
the defendant displayed the photographs of the plaintiff on a bulletin
board in the laundromat with captions stating the plaintiff's name and
making reference to his conviction.39 The trial court granted
judgment in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the defendant displayed
the photos as part of an effort to coerce the plaintiff to make
restitution.396 In affirming the judgment over defendant's argument
that it violated his constitutional right to free speech, the Louisiana
Court of Appeals stated that "[a]ny such right... Were [sic] lost to
391. Id. at 906-07; see also Johnson v. Corporate Special Servs., Inc., 602 So. 2d 385,387
(Ala. 1992) (finding defendant's purpose important in intrusion cases and noting that
personal injury claimants must expect reasonable investigation of their claims even though
this means their privacy will be curtailed).
392. 355 So. 2d 21 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 995 (1978).
393. Id. at 22.
394. Id.
395. Id. The captions read in part:
CAUGHT IN THE ACT!
THESE ARE ACTUAL PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN BY HIDDEN CAMERAS
OF A THEFT IN PROGRESS.
ANY THIEVES OR VANDALS OPERATING ON THIS PRIVATE
PROPERTY SHOULD REMEMBER TO SMILE ... THEY'LL BE ON
CANDID CAMERA!
HMMM ... HERE WE HAVE [PLAINTIFF'S NAME AND ADDRESS].
[PLAINTIFF] IS CAREFUL-HE WANTS TO BE SURE NO ONE IS
WATCHING!
WOW... [PLAINTIF] IS SWIFT-IF HE RUNS FAST ENOUGH WHILE
HOLDING THE MONEY BOX WITH BOTH HANDS-MAYBE HE WON'T
GET CAUGHT.
TOO BAD ... [PLAINTIFF] ISN'T FASTER THAN OUR CAMERAS!
AND [PLAINTIFF] ISN'T FASTER THAN THE POLICE!
[PLAINTIFFI PAYS THE COURT $105.00
[PLAINTIFF] GETS 91 DAYS IN JAIL (suspended).
Id.
396. Id. at 25.
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him when his motives evolved into continued punishment and
harassment of the plaintiff.',31
The following illustrations suggest how the defendant's motive
may influence the result in a public intrusion case:
ILLUSTRATIONS:
1. A accompanies his family to the beach, bringing his video
camcorder to record the event. While panning the beach
with his camcorder, A pauses with the camera focused upon
B, who is building a sand castle with her child. A records
the scene because he is touched by the child's laughter and
excitement. A is not liable for intrusion.
2. A takes his video camcorder to the beach. He records B,
who is sun bathing. A's purpose in filming B is to use the
videotape for sexual gratification, which he later does. A
may be liable for intrusion.398
In these two nearly identical illustrations, motive separates non-
liability from potential liability. In Illustration 1, A should not be
liable for intrusion even if B was aware of the videotaping and was
annoyed by it.39 Because A's motive was innocent, and none of the
other proposed factors support the imposition of liability, B did not
commit an actionable intrusion. On the other hand, in Illustration 2,
which differs significantly from the first illustration only by a change
in motive, B may be liable for intrusion.
As a practical matter, in many cases of the kind represented in
Illustration 2, the plaintiff will be unaware of the intrusion. Obvious-
ly, if B is not aware the intrusion occurred, no action will be brought.
Moreover, even in situations in which B is aware of the intrusion, it
is doubtful that A's bad motive would be known to her or, if known,
that B would be able to prove it. Nevertheless, where evidence of
bad motive does exist, it should be considered and, in appropriate
cases, may be the determinative factor in imposing liability.
397. Id.
398. If this illustration seems implausible, see supra notes 189-94 and accompanying text
(citing numerous examples in which persons have been discovered using video cameras for
sexual purposes).
399. If A persisted in filming B after B made it clear that she wished the filming to
cease, factors 4 and 5 would come into play and may dictate a contrary result. See infra
notes 412-19 and accompanying text.
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2. The Magnitude of the Intrusive Conduct, Including the
Duration, Extent, and the Means of Intrusion
The magnitude of the intrusion, measured by the defendant's
conduct and its correlative impact upon the plaintiff's privacy, is a
factor of obvious importance in determining liability. Slight inter-
ferences with privacy, even if annoying or offensive, do not warrant
judicial reieft particularly in light of the substantial countervailing
interests in free social interaction and free speech and press. The
greater the magnitude of the intrusion, whether because of the means
used to accomplish it, the duration of the intrusion, or other factors
that accentuate its dimensions, the more likely the act will be
considered highly offensive to a reasonable person .4,
With respect to the means used to accomplish an intrusion, a
critical factor in the area of public intrusions is whether the defendant
employed mechanical or electronic technology to record the plaintiff,
either visually or aurally. Indeed, the author contemplates that most
situations involving actionable public intrusions would involve the
defendant using some form of technological device (e.g., video
camcorder, single-frame camera, audio recording device, binoculars,
telescope, night vision scope) to view and/or record the plaintiff
As discussed extensively in Section IV, creating a permanent
record of the plaintiff by photography or videotape carries the
potential for magnifying an intrusion in three important ways: (1) it
allows the invader to, in effect, take a part of the victim with him,
thereby allowing intrusive scrutiny of the victim to continue in-
definitely;" (2) a permanent photographic image may convey more
information about the victim than would observation with the naked
eye;' and (3) a durable recording by whatever means has the
potential to multiply the impact of the intrusion through dis-
semination.' Use of mechanical or electronic means to record the
plaintiff is a factor that should carry great weight in assessing whether
the defendant's conduct was highly offensive to a reasonable person.
400. See PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 43, § 117, at 856 (stating that
means used to accomplish an intrusion are a factor of primary importance in determining
whether conduct is actionable).
401. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
402. See supra note 282 and accompanying text.
403. See supra text accompanying notes 283-84. Dissemination is important enough to
be included as a separate factor under the proposed test. See infra notes 420-58 and
accompanying text (discussing dissemination as a separate factor).
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ILLUSTRATIONS:
1. A, a nosy neighbor, spends a considerable amount of
time watching B and his family through a crack in A's
curtains as they go about their normal business. A is not
liable for intrusion.
2. The same facts as in Illustration 1, except that A uses a
video camcorder set up on a tripod to record the comings
and goings of B and his family. A may be liable for
intrusion.
There is no liability in Illustration 1 because, though we may not
like it, we all are aware of the possibility that nosy neighbors may pay
too much attention to our business. Indeed, most of us at some time
have demonstrated curiosity in our neighbors' behavior. However, it
is one thing to say we run the risk of our neighbors spying on us from
time to time and quite another to say we run the risk that they are
electronically recording our movements. Liability may be appropriate
in Illustration 2.
While the use of technology is an important factor in assessing
the magnitude of intrusive conduct, it is not the only relevant
consideration. Unwarranted surveillance of a person in public, even
if unaided by technology, may constitute an actionable intrusion.
However, to be actionable, such surveillance must be extensive in
duration or repetition.
ILLUSTRATIONS:
1. A, sitting at a table in a restaurant located in a shopping
mall, stares at B, making B feel uncomfortable. A is not
liable for intrusion.
2. The same facts as in Illustration 1, except that when B
leaves the restaurant, A follows her about the shopping mall.
When B leaves the shopping mall, A attempts to follow her
in his automobile. A may be liable for intrusion.
As parents teach children at an early age, staring at a person in
public is rude. It is likely to cause offense, and, in today's violent
society, even fright. However, being the object of another's visual
scrutiny, by itself, would not justify tort liability. It is simply one of
the many petty annoyances one is forced to endure in a crowded,
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often uncivil society. Nevertheless, if the observation progresses into
a course of conduct that constitutes harassing surveillance, as in
Illustration 2, the conduct may be considered highly offensive to a
reasonable person and could constitute an actionable public
intrusion.'
Allowing recovery in situations like that hypothesized in
Illustration 2 could provide important common law assistance in
combatting the kind of conduct targeted by criminal "stalking
statutes," recently passed by forty-eight states.405 Stalking statutes
usually are directed at persons who engage in a repeated course of
surveillance or harassment of another under circumstances raising a
credible threat of bodily harm.4°6 While criminal stalking statutes
have been lauded as "an important anti-crime tool that would save
lives," they have been attacked as unconstitutionally vague or
overbroad,4°8 too narrow, and insufficiently enforced.41 With
so many problems, they may prove ineffective in accomplishing their
deterrent purpose. Recognizing a civil cause of action for public
intrusion for episodes of harassing surveillance would help further this
deterrent purpose, as well as furnish a vehicle to the victims of such
conduct for obtaining compensation.41'
404. A good faith motive by the actor may negate liability for public intrusion based
upon surveillance, demonstrating how the proposed factors are interconnected. In
Illustration 2, if B were a law enforcement officer or private investigator acting reasonably
within the scope of an official work assignment, liability would not be appropriate. See,
e.g., McLain v. Boise Cascade Corp., 533 P.2d 343,346 (Or. 1975) (holding that reasonable
surveillance of personal injury claimant by private investigator is not actionable).
405. Bill Duryea, Making Stalking Laws Stick, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 3, 1994,
at B1; see also supra note 210 (discussing stalking statutes and quoting the text of several
such statutes).
406. See supra note 210 (quoting statutory examples).
407. Janan Hanna, Confusion Clouds Stalking Law; 2 New Slayings Call Police
Enforcement Into Question, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 21, 1993, at N1.
408. Duryea, supra note 405, at B1 (discussing constitutional challenges to Florida's
stalking statute); Richard Seven, Stalking Law Too Narrow, Lawyers, Victims Complain,
SEATrLE TIMES, July 6, 1993, at B1 (quoting defense attorney attacking Washington
stalking statute as unconstitutionally vague).
409. Seven, supra note 408, at B1 (quoting prosecutor commenting upon Washington
stalking statute: "The Legislature just has not written a statute that defines stalking as
broadly as the public wants. The law isn't very useful.").
410. Gayle Reaves, Limited Protection; Stalking Victims, Officials Cite Loopholes In
New Law, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 16, 1993, at Al (quoting director of victim
protection group commenting upon Texas stalking statute: "The feedback I've gotten is
that there's virtually no enforcement at this stage of the game.").
411. Two state stalking statutes expressly provide for a right of civil recovery. CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1708.7 (West 1994 Supp.); MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 600.2954 (West 1993).
Moreover, it is possible that some states might construe their stalking statutes to give rise
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3. Whether the Plaintiff Could Reasonably Expect to be Free
from Such Conduct Under the Habits and Customs of the Location
Where the Intrusion Occurred
This factor makes it clear that the location of the plaintiff
remains an important consideration in determining liability. The
essential premise of this Article is that legitimate expectations of
privacy do exist in public places; however, those expectations
obviously are far more limited than the expectations of a plaintiff
secluded in a private physical space such as a home or hotel room.
Privacy in private physical places is more or less absolute. Virtually
any unwarranted entry into a person's home, for example, would be
an actionable intrusion, regardless of the actor's motive or the
duration of the intrusion. However, as the factors in the proposed
redefinition indicate, privacy in public is a matter of degree. Whether
the plaintiff could reasonably expect to be free from the defendant's
conduct in the particular location, under the normative standards of
conduct for that location, is a significant factor in gauging the
offensiveness of the defendant's conduct.
ILLUSTRATIONS:
1. At an amusement theme park, A films B with her video
camcorder as B stands in line to board a ride. Absent the
applicability of other factors, A is not liable for intrusion.
2. A films B with his video camcorder as B sunbathes in the
nude in his fenced backyard. A may be liable for intrusion.
3. In a remote, wooded section of a state park, A films B
and C with her video camcorder as they are lying on a
blanket embracing. A may be liable for intrusion.
to an implied right of action for damages. The test for implying a tort cause of action
from a statute that does not expressly provide for it "is whether [a tort] remedy is
consistent with the legislative provision, appropriate for promoting its policy and needed
to assure its effectiveness." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 874A
cmt. h. The Restatement lists several factors to be used in making this determination: (1)
the nature of the legislative provision; (2) the adequacy of existing remedies; (3) the extent
to which a tort action would aid or supplement or interfere with existing remedies; (4) the
significance of the purpose that the legislative body is seeking to effectuate; (5) the extent
of the change in tort law; and (6) the burden the new cause of action would place on the
judicial machinery. Id. § 874A. Applying these factors, a strong argument could be made
for implying a private right of action for damages from state criminal stalking statutes.
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In the video age, persons in crowded public settings, particularly
recreational sites where families are likely to gather, must accept the
possibility of being captured within the view of the omnipresent
camcorder. However, the reasonable expectation is that, to the extent
unconsented-to filming or photography occurs, the subject's ap-
pearance on the film will be incidental only. If the nonconsenting
subject becomes the focus of extensive videotaping or photography,
the conduct may transcend the boundary from reasonable to
unreasonable. Moreover, other factors, such as the actor's bad motive
or subsequent dissemination of the film, may come into play and
affect liability.
Not all places that are legally accessible to the public are equally
"public" in terms of one's privacy expectations. While one expects his
conduct to be viewed and perhaps even scrutinized in a crowded
public area, he reasonably expects greater privacy in more isolated
settings, even those that are technically open to the public. Persons
frequently seek solitude and refuge on empty beaches, nature trails,
in meadows, and among trees and shrubbery. While they no doubt
are aware of the possibility of encountering others, they reasonably
expect that those encountered will, by virtue of the surroundings,
exercise greater respect for their privacy than would occur in more
populated areas.
4. Whether the Defendant Sought the Plaintiff's Consent to the
Intrusive Conduct
Because a fundamental function of the right of privacy is to
protect individual autonomy,41 individuals should have some control
over whether and to what extent they wish to surrender their privacy.
As Professor Gavison stated in her work on privacy, "the notion that
choice should be respected is almost universally accepted as a starting
point for practical reasoning.""41  Professor Gavison concluded,
however, that this principle of "want-satisfaction" '414 cannot be
extended too far in the realm of privacy because it does not help us
412. See GOFFMAN, supra note 234, at 33-34 (recognizing that personal autonomy is a
fundamental value in democratic societies and that protection of individual privacy is an
important means by which autonomy is maintained); Benn, supra note 108, at 8 (suggesting
that privacy is grounded in respect for persons); Gavison, supra note 215, at 449-50
("Autonomy is another value that is linked to the function of privacy in promoting
liberty.").
413. Gavison, supra note 215, at 441.
414. As applied to privacy, "[t]he want-satisfaction argument posits the desirability of
satisfying wishes and thus provides a reason to protect all wishes to have privacy." Id.
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decide why we should prefer one person's desire for privacy over
another person's desire to invade privacy.415 To honor one party's
desires in such a situation necessarily involves denying the desires of
the other party.
However, because an invasion of privacy involves one party, in
effect, taking something important from another without consent and
without giving anything in return, it seems reasonable to assert that,
absent the intervention of other factors, the desires of the losing party
should take precedence over the desires of the taking party. This is
not to say that the desires of the party whose privacy is invaded are
absolute. As discussed earlier, privacy interests must be balanced
against competing social interests. 416  Justifications may exist for
invading privacy against one's wishes-such as a need to acquire
information in furtherance of the public interest. The only point here
is that whether the defendant sought or obtained the plaintiff's
consent for the invasion is a proper factor to be balanced with other
relevant factors.
Present law recognizes the effect of consent, but skews the
analysis by implicitly assuming that a person effectively consents to
any and all intrusive conduct once he leaves the protected confines of
a private physical area. 17 If this assumption were correct, imposing
the burden on the defendant to seek consent would have little effect
because one could expect that consent would always be given. On the
other hand, if this assumption is erroneous, as it surely is, then
invasion of privacy law should be modified to reflect how society
really thinks about privacy.
In most situations a defendant would have no justification for
persisting in intrusive conduct as to which the subject has refused
consent. However, an exception would exist where the subject of the
intrusion or his present circumstances are a matter of legitimate public
interest.418  The substantial social interest in free access to infor-
mation related to matters of public concern, embodied in the free
speech and free press protection of the First Amendment, might
trump the subject's wish for privacy in appropriate cases. In such
cases, it would be unnecessary to seek or obtain consent. This issue
415. Id.
416. See supra note 370 and accompanying text.
417. See supra notes 256-77 and accompanying text (discussing "assumption of risk"
analysis which underlies present rule that there is no privacy in public places).
418. Other justifications might also be recognized. For example, a law enforcement
officer or private investigator acting reasonably within the scope of employment would not
be expected to obtain consent from the target of an investigation.
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is specifically addressed by factor 7 of the proposed redefinition,
discussed below.419
By obtaining the plaintiff's consent, the defendant could assure
herself protection from liability. While it would be desirable for
consent to be obtained in advance of the intrusive conduct, the time
sequence should not affect the validity of the consent. By consenting
after the fact, the subject would, in effect, waive any complaint she
might otherwise have had about the conduct.
ILLUSTRATIONS:
1. A asks B for consent to film B's child while the child is
climbing on playground equipment at a local park. B
refuses consent. If A proceeds to videotape the child, A
may be liable for intrusion.
2. Same facts as in Illustration 1, except that B consents to
the filming. A is not liable for intrusion.
5. Actions Taken by Plaintiff Which Would Manifest
to a Reasonable Person the Plaintiff's Desire that the
Defendant Not Engage in the Intrusive Conduct
This factor is closely related to factor 4 discussed immediately
above, but involves situations in which the defendant has not sought
the plaintiff's consent to the intrusive conduct. Even in the absence
of a specific request for consent by the defendant and refusal by the
plaintiff, actions by the plaintiff which would convey to a reasonable
person that the plaintiff does not wish to be the subject of another's
attention are relevant in assessing the offensiveness of the other's
conduct. Such actions may be either explicit or implicit. Faced with
an explicit indication that a person wishes to be let alone, akin to an
express refusal of consent, a defendant would seldom be justified in
persisting in intrusive conduct.
ILLUSTRATIONS:
1. A uses his video camcorder to film persons sunbathing at
the beach. B, a sunbather, requests that A not videotape
her. A ignores her request. A may be liable for intrusion.
419. See infra notes 459-95 and accompanying text.
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2. Same facts as in Illustration 1, except that, instead of
making an oral request, B covers herself with a towel and
scowls at A. If A persists in filming B, A may be liable for
intrusion.
3. A follows B about in a shopping mall. B requests that he
desist, but A continues to follow him. A may be liable for
intrusion.
Less clear cut, but still relevant, are situations in which a person,
by his conduct, implicitly indicates a desire to be free from public
scrutiny in a manner that would be apparent to a reasonable person.
ILLUSTRATION:
1. A and B visit a public park to have a picnic lunch.
Rather than eat their lunch at the well-attended area
designated for picnics, they sit on a blanket in a remote
comer of the park, sheltered by trees. C takes their
photograph from a distance using a high-power zoom lens.
The action of A and B in situating themselves in a remote
area is a factor to be considered in determining whether C
may be liable for intrusion.
6. Whether the Defendant Disseminated Images of or Other
Information About the Plaintiff Acquired During the Intrusive Act
Under current law, the dissemination of images or other
information acquired during an intrusive act is irrelevant to the tort
of intrusion. The tort is complete at the moment of the intrusive
conduct, "even though there is no publication or other use of any
kind of the photograph or information outlined.""42 This is impor-
tant because it insulates the tort of intrusion from many of the free
speech obstacles that infiltrate the other privacy torts, most notably
the tort of public disclosure of private facts. The Supreme Court has
made it clear that the First Amendment, while it affords broad
420. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs, supra note 4, § 652B cmt. b; see also William
E. Lee, Privacy Intrusions While Gathering News: An Accommodation of Competing
Interests, 64 IOWA L. REv. 1243, 1256 (1979) ("Intrusion addresses not the information
that is obtained but the manner in which it is obtained, and it is clear that publication is
not necessary to maintain an intrusion action."). "
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protection to the publication of information, confers only a limited
right to gather information. Specifically, the Court has ruled on
several occasions that the First Amendment does not grant the press
a greater right of access to information than that accorded to the
general public.42'
While the Supreme Court has never addressed the First
Amendment issue in an intrusion case, lower courts have held that the
Constitution does not preclude tort liability for intrusion. For
example, in Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,422 two employees of Life
Magazine, acting in conjunction with Los Angeles County prosecutors,
visited the plaintiff's home pretending to need medical care.'
Their purpose was to expose the plaintiff as a quack.4 24 The Life
employees used a hidden camera to photograph the plaintiff and a
concealed radio transmitter to transmit their conversation to a tape
recorder in an automobile outside the house.4' The plaintiff sued
in a federal district court and recovered a judgment after a bench
trial.4 26
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, after concluding that
California would recognize the tort of intrusion,427 rejected the
421. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (plurality opinion of Burger,
CJ.) (stating that the First Amendment does not create a right of access to information
within governmental control "different from or greater than that accorded the public
generally"); Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978) (denying to
communications organizations the right to copy and sell tape recordings admitted as
evidence in trials of Watergate figures on ground that general public was not permitted
physical access to the tapes and the First Amendment "generally grants the press no right
to information about a trial superior to that of the general public"); Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817, 834 (1974) ("The Constitution does not.., require government to accord the
press special access to information not shared by members of the public generally."); see
also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) (rejecting argument that government's refusal
to validate passport for travel to Cuba violated First Amendment rights of citizen who
asserted the travel restrictions inhibited the flow of information, and stating: "The right
to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information.").
But cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972) (stating that "news gathering is not
without its First Amendment protection").
422. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
423. Id. at 246.
424. Id. at 245-46. The investigation yielded an article entitled Crackdown on
Quackery, which was published in Life Magazine. Id. at 245. There apparently was no
serious dispute that plaintiff was a quack, and the district court so found. Id. Plaintiff,
after examining one of the Life employees, told her she had a lump in her breast and
"concluded that she had eaten some rancid butter 11 years, 9 months, and 7 days prior to
that time." Id. at 246.
425. Id. at 246.
426. Id. at 247.
427. Id. at 249.
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defendant's argument that the First Amendment right to gather news
immunized it from liability.4' "The First Amendment," the court
stated, "has never been construed to accord newsmen immunity from
torts or crimes committed during the course of newsgathering. '429
Other courts have held similarly.43 In short, "[i]ntrusion does not
raise First Amendment difficulties since its perpetration does not
involve speech or other expression.""43
Given that liability may constitutionally be imposed for intrusion
regardless of whether material acquired during the intrusion is
disseminated, one might question why it is desirable to cloud matters
by introducing dissemination as a relevant factor in the proposed
redefinition of the tort. One good reason is that it would help to
counter the expansion of intrusion proposed herein. Many intrusive
acts may be annoying and offensive but not warrant the imposition of
tort liability. By enlarging the tort of intrusion as proposed in this
Article to include potential liability for intrusive conduct that occurs
in public places, many more acts will potentially fall within the ambit
of the tort. Considering dissemination as a factor would help to offset
the impact of this expansion. In otherwise close cases involving public
intrusions, the lack of any dissemination of material acquired during
the intrusion might influence the court to decide against liability.
Other important practical reasons for considering dissemination
warrant more extensive discussion.
i. The Importance of Dissemination in Evaluating
Offensiveness
From the victim's point of view, dissemination may be the single
most important factor in gauging the magnitude of an intrusive act.
Consider as an example the plaintiff in Daily Times Democrat v.
428. Id.
429. I&
430. See, e.g., Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668, 685 (Ct. App.
1986) (quoting from Dietemann); Annerino v. Dell Publishing Co., 149 N.E.2d 761,762 (111.
Ct. App. 1958) (finding that First Amendment protections are not "a license by which
various press media may overstep the bounds of propriety and decency and thereby justify
an invasion of the solitude of the individual"); Anderson v. WROC-TV, 441 N.Y.S.2d 220,
223 (Sup. Ct. 1981) ("The gathering of news and the means by which it is obtained does
not authorize, whether under the First Amendment or otherwise, the right to enter into
a private home by an implied invitation arising out of a self-created custom and practice.").
431. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak From 'Times' to 'Time': First




Graham, whose photograph was taken in a carnival fun house while
her dress was blown up over her head.432 While most people would
be upset to have their picture taken in such a pose, it is doubtful
many would be offended enough to go through the trouble and
expense of filing a lawsuit based solely on the taking of the
photograph. More likely, the defendant's publication of the
photograph on the front page of its newspaper prompted the plaintiff
to sue.
However, under current law, the intrusion occurred the moment
the camera shutter clicked. The subsequent dissemination of the
plaintiff's image to hundreds or thousands of newspaper readers is
technically irrelevant under intrusion law. Common sense tells us,
though, that dissemination is extremely relevant in assessing the
offensiveness of an invasion of privacy.
The importance of dissemination in evaluating the offensiveness
of invasive conduct is reflected in the sister tort of public disclosure
of private facts. Section 652D of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
makes it actionable to give publicity433 to the private life of another
"if the matter publicized is of a kind that ... would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, and... is not of legitimate concern
to the public. 434 Although the quoted language suggests otherwise,
the focus of section 652D's "highly offensive" element is upon the act
of giving publicity to the private matter, rather than the content of the
matter itself435 Thus, invasion of privacy law already acknowledges
that dissemination is relevant to assessing the offensiveness of invasive
acts.
The impact of dissemination is also considered important in the
related, more firmly established area of defamation law, as a factor in
432. 162 So. 2d 474,476 (Ala. 1964). For discussion of Graham, see supra notes 291-98
and accompanying text.
433. "Publicity" is defined in the comments to mean "that the matter is made public,
by communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be
regarded as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 652D cmt. a.
434. Id. § 652D. See supra note 56 for full text of the Restatement definition of the tort
of public disclosure.
435. See id. § 652D cmt. c (defining "[h]ighly offensive publicity," and stating that the
rule protects "only against unreasonable publicity"). Further evidence supporting this
conclusion comes from illustration 10, which states that it would be an invasion of privacy
to publish without consent a photograph of a woman nursing her child. Id. § 652D cmt.
c, illus. 10. Because there is obviously nothing highly offensive about a woman nursing her
child, it must be the act of giving publicity to such a matter that is the focus of the highly
offensive requirement of section 652D; cf Post, supra note 100, at 979-82 (endorsing this
interpretation).
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distinguishing libel from slander. Under the common law, slander was
limited to spoken words, while libel consisted of written words.436
The distinction was an important one because, unless the slander fit
within one of the four categories of slander per se,437 slander re-
quired proof of special damages, whereas damages for libel were
presumed.438 While the common-law distinction has been criticized
as unprincipled and overly formalistic,439 the distinction found
support in the greater capacity of written words to cause harm."0
When the common law rules were developed, written words had
greater potential to injure than spoken words because of their
permanence and, hence, the possibility that they could be dis-
seminated to larger audiences.
As technology progressed, the law took cognizance of the fact
that new forms of communication such as radio and television could
cause harm as great or greater than written words."1 The drafters
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts recognized this development by
defining libel broadly to include, in addition to written words, "any
... form of communication that has the potentially harmful qualities
characteristic of written or printed words."442  The Restatement
definition specifically emphasizes "[t]he area of dissemination" and
"the persistence of the defamation" as relevant factors in distin-
guishing the greater injury of libel from the lesser injury of
slander.443
436. See generally PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 43, § 112, at 785
(discussing the distinction between libel and slander).
437. The law recognized four categories of slander per se actionable without proof of
special damages: (1) imputation of a crime; (2) imputation of a loathsome disease; (3)
slander affecting a person in her business or trade; and (4) imputation of unchastity to a
woman. Id. § 112, at 788-93.
438. Id. § 112, at 793, 795. The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the First
Amendment imposes restrictions upon when states may allow presumed damages for libel.
See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,763 (1985) (holding
that private figure plaintiff may recover presumed and punitive damages if speech does not
involve a matter of public concern).
439. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 568 cmt. b.
440. PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 43, § 112, at 785.
441. See, e.g., Shor v. Billingsley, 158 N.Y.S.2d 476, 481 (Sup. Ct. 1956), affd, 169
N.Y.S.2d 416 (Ct. App. 1957) (holding that an ad-libbed radio broadcast was libel rather
than slander because "it is evident that the broadcast of scandalous utterances is in general
as potentially harmful to the defamed person's reputation as a publication by writing").
442. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 568(1).
443. Id. § 568(3). Comment d explains:
The wide area of dissemination, the fact that a record of the publication is made
with some substantial degree of permanence and the deliberation and
premeditation of the defamer are important factors for the court to consider in
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One might argue that analogies to the torts of public disclosure
of private facts and defamation are inapposite to demonstrate the
relevance of dissemination to intrusion, because intrusion is not a
communicative tort. Traditionally, of course, this has been true.
Existing law is clear that the tort is complete at the moment of the
physical intrusion and that subsequent publication of images or other
information acquired 'during the intrusion is not a necessary
element."6
The proposed redefinition would not change this basic principle.
Intrusive acts that are highly offensive to a reasonable person would
remain actionable regardless of whether dissemination occurred.
However, in close cases, the fact of dissemination or lack thereof
might tip the balance one way or the other.4 5  To ignore dis-
semination in assessing the offensiveness of intrusive acts would be
like calculating the harm to a person wrongly transfused with HIV-
infected blood by focusing upon the pin prick in her arm. To many
intrusion victims, the act of dissemination is far more offensive and
damaging than the original act."
It might not be necessary to complicate the law of intrusion by
incorporating dissemination as a factor if the privacy tort known as
the public disclosure of private facts remained viable. However, as
determining whether a particular communication is to be treated as a libel rather
than a slander.
Id. § 568 cmt. d. The Restatement contains a separate provision specifically stating that the
broadcasting of defamatory material by radio or television is libel. Id. § 568A. Comment
a to section 568A explains that the "wide dissemination" that results from radio and
television broadcasting is one reason for characterizing it as libel rather than slander. Id.
§ 568A cmt. a.
444. See supra text accompanying notes 420-31.
445. As explained earlier, in many instances, including dissemination as a factor would
help to limit the expansion of the proposed enlarged tort. See text following supra note
431.
446. A recent case illustrating this point is Desnick v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 851 F.
Supp. 303 (N.D. Ill. 1994). Representatives of the television news magazine program
PrimeTime Live hired "undercover" patients to visit branch offices of the plaintiff eye
clinic as part of a segment exposing the clinic's allegedly unethical ophthalmological
marketing practices towards senior citizens. Id. at 305. The patients were accompanied
by persons posing as friends or relatives who carried concealed video cameras and audio
recording equipment. Id. After the segment was broadcast, a lawsuit was filed asserting,
among other things, a claim of intrusion. Id. at 305-06. The court dismissed the intrusion
claim of the individual doctors because they could not allege any legally cognizable harm
arising from the intrusive conduct other than that which resulted from the broadcast itself.
Id at 307-08 ("[Ihe offensive conduct and the subsequent harm resulted from the
broadcast of PrimeTime Live, which, according to the Plaintiffs falsely depicted Plaintiffs
as unethical and unprofessional.").
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discussed below, the demise of that tort has created a huge gap in
invasion of privacy law, a gap that could be partially filled by making
dissemination a relevant factor in evaluating the offensiveness of the
defendant's conduct in intrusion cases.
ILLUSTRATIONS:
1. A photographs beach scenes while on vacation in Florida.
Included in one photograph is B, who was sunbathing at the
time. Without more, A is not liable for intrusion.
2. The same facts as in Illustration 1, except that A later
publishes the photograph of B in a men's magazine above a
caption which makes sexual references concerning the
photograph. A may be liable for intrusion.
ii. Filling the Gap Left by the Death of the Tort of Public
Disclosure of Private Facts
In Florida Star v. B.J.F,4 7 the United States Supreme Court
"obliterate[d]" the tort of public disclosure of private facts."8  As
a result, there is no longer any viable tort remedy for injuries
resulting from the dissemination of true information concerning an
individual, no matter how private the information or how offensive
the dissemination would be to a reasonable person.
Florida Star involved a rape victim who sued a Florida
newspaper for printing her name in a report of the rape, contrary to
a Florida statute making it unlawful to publish the names of rape
victims." 9 Relying upon the statutory violation as negligence per se,
the trial court directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and awarded
her damages."5 The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the
award was inconsistent with the First Amendment freedoms of free
speech and free press.45' While the Court stopped short of holding
that a state may never punish true speech,452 the test it adopted for
447. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
448. Id. at 550 (White, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court accepts appellants' invitation...
to obliterate one of the most note-worthy legal inventions of the 20th century: the tort of
the publication of private facts.")
449. Id. at 526 n.1 (quoting text of statute).
450. Id. at 528-29.
451. Id. at 526.
452. Id. at 532-34 ("Nor need we accept appellant's invitation to hold broadly that
truthful publication may never be punished consistent with the First Amendment.").
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when a state may do so consistent with the Constitution is so stringent
as to be almost impossible to satisfy.
The Court reaffirmed the test it had suggested in an earlier case
involving the indictment of two newspapers for printing the name of
a juvenile criminal defendant contrary to state law.453 The test,
from Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,45 is "if a newspaper
lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public
significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish
publication of the information, absent a need to further a state
interest of the highest order."'455 This test erects two formidable
obstacles for privacy plaintiffs: (1) the requirement that the published
material not concern a matter of public significance; and (2) the
requirement that the plaintiff prove that punishment of the defendant
through state sanctioned tort damages is necessarj to serve a state
interest of the highest order.
In Florida Star, the Court construed the first requirement so
broadly and the second requirement so narrowly as to almost
guarantee disappointment for plaintiffs raising claims of public
disclosure of private facts. With regard to what constitutes "a matter
of public significance," the Court did not consider whether B.J.F.'s
name was a matter of public significance. Rather, the Court focused
on the general subject matter of the article which, the court said,
concerned a matter of public significance because it "involved a
matter of paramount public import: the commission, and inves-
tigation, of a violent crime which had been reported to
authorities."4 6  By focusing on the broad subject matter of the
published material, rather than the specific fact alleged by the plaintiff
to be private (i.a, her identity), the test pulls an incredibly wide range
of information under the umbrella of "matter[s] of public sig-
nificance."
Conversely, the Court indicated that what constitutes a "state
interest of the highest order" warranting state punishment of
453. Id. at 533.
454. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
455. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 533 (quoting Smith, 443 U.S. at 103). Writing in dissent,
Justice White commented that the rule from Daily Mail was introduced "with the cautious
qualifier that such a rule was 'suggest[ed]' by our prior cases, '[n]one of [which] ...
directly control[led]' in Daily Mail." Id. at 545 (White, J., dissenting). Thus, he opined
that the Daily Mail rule was "offered only as a hypothesis ... [and] should not be so
uncritically accepted as constitutional dogma." Id. (White, J., dissenting).
456. Id. at 536-37.
1995] 1077
NORTH CAROLINA' LAW REVIEW
dissemination of truthful information is to be construed strin-
gently.457 The court readily agreed that the state interests suppor-
ting punishment for the publication of a rape victim's name (i.e., the
privacy and physical safety of the victim and the goal of encouraging
victims of sex crimes to report offenses) were "highly significant," but
it nevertheless held that the facts in Florida Star did not support a
need to punish the publication in that case.45s
The demise of the tort of public disclosure of private facts
provides additional justification for introducing dissemination as a
relevant factor in intrusion cases. After Florida Star, a person has
virtually no protection against unwarranted, highly offensive dis-
semination of images or other information concerning her. Including
dissemination as a relevant factor in intrusion cases would help to
partially fill this hole in privacy law.
The free speech concerns at issue in Florida Star would be
substantially diminished by the fact that dissemination would not be
a required element of the tort, as in the case of public disclosure of
private facts, but only one of seven factors to be weighed in
evaluating the offensiveness of the defendant's conduct. Dis-
semination of private information would never by itself support a
cause of action for intrusion. An initial intrusive act would remain
the crux of the tort. Any remaining constitutional concerns could be
minimized by adopting a more limited, reasonable view as to what
constitutes a matter of public significance, as proposed in the next and
final factor of the proposed redefinition.
7. Whether Images of or Other Information About the Plaintiff
Acquired During the Intrusive Act Involve a Matter of Legitimate
Public Interest
Under current law, it is technically irrelevant whether the subject
of the intrusion is a public figure and/or whether information acquired
457. Id. at 537-38.
458. Id. at 537-41. Three factors influenced the court's decision on this point: (1) the
defendant obtained BJ.F.'s name lawfully from the sheriff's office, which inadvertently
placed the report including her full name in the press room, id. at 538; (2) to allow
recovery based upon negligence per se for violation of the statute would, in effect, allow
the imposition of strict liability for the publication of true speech, id. at 539; and (3) the
Florida statute was underinclusive because it applied only to " 'instrument[s] of mass
communication' " and not to the backyard gossip who maliciously spreads the identity of
a rape-victim, id. at 540.
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during the intrusion is a matter of public interest.459 As Judge
Skelly Wright stated in a famous intrusion case:
Where there is intrusion, the intruder should generally be
liable whatever the content of what he learns. An
eavesdropper to the marital bedroom may hear marital
intimacies, or he may hear statements of fact or opinion of
legitimate interest to the public; for purposes of liability that
should make no difference.'
While the above may be true as a matter of hornbook tort law,
it is questionable whether it comports with constitutional law. This
Article has already noted that the United States Supreme Court has
held on several occasions that the primary interest protected by the
First Amendment is the publication of information, rather than the
gathering of it.461 Nevertheless, the Court also has said that "news
gathering is not without its First Amendment protection."'46
Though the Court did not elaborate on what those protections are, it
may be that the First Amendment shields some intrusive conduct
from liability if it is directed at acquiring information concerning a
matter of legitimate public interest.
As a practical matter, it is hard to imagine that a judge ruling
upon an intrusion claim would not be influenced by whether the
defendant overheard a couple speaking about marital intimacies or
overheard a public official plotting political corruption. This is
demonstrated by Aisenson v. American Broadcasting Co. 463  The
defendant in Aisenson polled local attorneys and elicited their
opinions concerning the performance of Los Angeles Superior Court
criminal judges.4 4 The plaintiff received the lowest rating in the
poll.465 Employees of the defendant videotaped the plaintiff as he
exited his home one morning and broadcast the tape on television
with narration of the poll results.416
The judge sued, alleging, among other things, that the
unauthorized videotaping constituted an intrusion. The trial court
459. See supra note 5 for the complete text of section 6-5213 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, defining intrusion.
460. Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969).
461. See supra note 421 (citing cases).
462. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972).
463. 269 Cal. Rptr. 379 (Ct. App. 1990).
464. Id. at 381.
465. Id.
466. Id. at 381-82.
467. Id. at 387.
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entered summary judgment for the defendant.4" In affirming the
summary judgment, the court of appeals held that the defendant's
unauthorized videotaping did not rise to the level of conduct which
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.469 Supporting this
conclusion was the belief that" '[w]hen the legitimate public interest
in the published information is substantial, a much greater intrusion
into an individual's private life will be sanctioned .... ,,470
Aisenson expressly recognized what we already know intuitively:
social and constitutional interests in access to information concerning
matters of public significance will inevitably invade the tort of
intrusion. This will be much more true under the expanded definition
of intrusion proposed in this Article. By enlarging the tort to allow
recovery for intrusions that occur in public places, more claims will
undoubtedly arise against defendants who assert that they were acting
in the public interest to gather information of public importance.
Accordingly, it is appropriate to help counterbalance this expansion
by expressly including as the last factor in the proposed multifactor
calculus whether the matter pried into by the defendant was of
legitimate public interest.
Attention must be focused on the word "legitimate." Many
private matters are of interest to the public in the sense that we are
all curious about the lives of others, particularly the rich and famous.
Simply because the public is interested in a tidbit of lurid or sen-
sational gossip, however, does not make it a matter of legitimate
public interest. If television executives began broadcasting secret
video footage of couples having sex in their bedrooms, one can
predict that the ratings would be high. However, such "public
interest" would not be legitimate for purposes of privacy law.
The United States Supreme Court acknowledged this distinction
in a 1976 defamation case. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone,47 Mary Alice
Firestone brought a libel action against Time magazine for printing in
its "Milestones" section that her husband, heir to the Firestone family
fortune, had been granted a divorce on the ground of adultery. Time
asserted that the plaintiff was a public figure and, therefore, had to
468. Id at 382.
469. Id at 387. This is the standard for judging actionable intrusions. See RES-
TATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 652B.
470. Aisenson, 269 Cal. Rptr. at 387 (quoting Kapellas v. Kofman, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360,
370 (Cal. 1969) (en banc)).
471. 424 U.S. 448, 452 (1976).
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show "actual malice" to recover.4 72 This conclusion was compelled,
Time argued, by the fact that the divorce had been characterized as
a "cause celebre" by the Florida Supreme Court! 3  The United
States Supreme Court rejected this argument, refusing to "equate
'public controversy' with all controversies of interest to the
public."'474 The Court stated: "Dissolution of a marriage through
judicial proceedings is not the sort of 'public controversy' referred to
in Gertz, even though the marital difficulties of extremely wealthy
individuals may be of interest to some portion of the reading
public.9
475
Though the Supreme Court has waffled back and forth on the
issue of whether courts should be involved in drawing distinctions
between speech of public concern and speech of private concern,476
its most recent pronouncements on the issue firmly suggest the dis-
tinction is "in" rather than "out." In Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,4' the Court held that a private figure
defamation plaintiff may recover presumed and punitive damages
without having to prove actual malice if the speech does not relate to
a matter of public concern.478 A year later, in Philadelphia
472. Id. at 452-53. "Actual malice" is the constitutional fault standard that public
officials and public figures are required to prove in defamation cases. The standard, first
articulated in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), requires a public official
or public figure plaintiff to prove the defendant made a false defamatory statement "with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id.
at 279-80. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), the Court held that states
are free to decide for themselves the standard of fault that must be shown by a private
figure defamation plaintiff, so long as they do not impose liability without fault. Id. at 347.
Most states have opted for a negligence standard for private figure plaintiffs.
473. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454.
474. Id.
475. Id.
476. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), Justice Brennan's plurality
opinion took the position that even private figure defamation plaintiffs should have to
satisfy the "actual malice" fault standard if the subject of the defamation was a matter of
public concern. Id at 52. See supra note 472 for a definition of the actual malice
standard. However, three years later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974),
the Court rejected this rule, in part because it would require "judges to decide on an ad
hoc basis which publications address issues of 'general or public interest' and which do not
...." Id at 346. Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Gertz, "doubt[ed] the wisdom
of committing this task to the conscience of judges." Id.
477. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
478. Id. at 761. The Court retreated from a portion of its holding in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), which suggested that presumed or punitive damages may
never be recovered absent a showing of actual malice. Gertz had stated, seemingly in
unqualified terms, that "States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages,
at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless
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Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,479 the Court again drew a distinction
between public and private speech, holding that a private figure libel
plaintiff bears the burden of proving falsity against a media defendant
if the defamatory speech is of public concern.' Unfortunately, the
Court has failed to offer much guidance as to how such a distinction
should be made. In Dun & Bradstreet, the Court said only that one
must look to the "content, form and context" of the speech "as
revealed by the whole record."'"
Despite the Supreme Court's indication in its defamation cases
that courts can and must distinguish between speech of public concern
and speech of private concern, lower courts have been reluctant to
tread into this quagmire. The result in most cases has been to
"simply accept the press's judgment about what is and is not
newsworthy."' However, this is not a suitable response in an area
requiring the balancing of important competing interests.
In its current definition of the privacy tort known as public
dislosure of private facts, the Restatement (Second) of Torts states
that, in determining what constitutes a matter of legitimate public
interest,
account must be taken of the customs and conventions of
the community; and in the last analysis what is proper
becomes a matter of the community mores. The line is to
be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of
information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a
morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own
sake, with which a reasonable member of the public, with
decent standards, would say that he had no concern.s3
disregard for the truth." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
479. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
480. Id. at 768-69.
481. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138,147-48
(1983)).
482. Zimmerman, supra note 30, at 353 (stating also that "the vast majority of cases
seem to hold that what is printed is by definition of legitimate public interest"). Professor
Zimmerman tacitly approved of this approach, stating "deference to the judgment of the
press may actually be the appropriate and principled response to the newsworthiness
inquiry." Id.
483. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra note 4, § 652D cmt. h. California
courts have developed an alternative three-part test for determining newsworthiness: "(a)
[t]he social value of the facts published; (b) the depth of the intrusion into ostensibly
private affairs; and (c) the extent to which an individual voluntarily acceded to a position
of public notoriety." Maheu v. CBS, Inc., 247 Cal. Rptr. 304, 311 (Ct. App. 1988).
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This standard was endorsed as constitutional by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Virgil v. Time, Inc.,' which also held that it is
constitutionally acceptable to submit to juries the question of what
constitutes legitimate public speech.4
ILLUSTRATIONS:
1. A is a newspaper reporter investigating B, a judge
suspected of public corruption. A secretly takes photographs
of the judge as he eats dinner in a secluded comer of a
restaurant with a suspected organized crime figure. Because
the subject of. A's intrusive act involves a matter of
legitimate public interest, A may not be liable for intrusion.
2. A is a newspaper reporter investigating whether B, a
Catholic priest who has neither gained nor sought any public
notoriety, is involved with a woman in a romantic relation-
ship. A secretly takes photographs of B as he eats dinner in
a secluded comer of a restaurant with a woman. Because
the subject of A's intrusive act does not involve a matter of
legitimate public interest, A may be liable for intrusion.
The Restatement's community mores standard is not flawless and
no doubt fails to satisfy those with a longing for precision and
perfection. However, it is a fallacy of reasoning to demand perfection
from a proposal when perfection is unattainable 86 Drawing lines
between those matters that are of legitimate public interest and those
that are not is admittedly difficult. To refuse to draw lines, however,
484. 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975) ("[S]uch a standard for newworthiness does
not offend the First Amendment. ..
485. Id. at 1130.
486. Fearnside and Holther describe a fallacy of reasoning that they label "Nothing but
Objections":
In the complexity of affairs there are few designs or proposals so well
considered that objections cannot be raised to them. A man must often choose
the lesser of evils and try, if he will accomplish anything at all, to dedicate himself
to a course of action in spite of grave misgivings.
Why choose the lesser evil? Why not, in such cases, reject all proposals?
The answer is that sometimes there is no escape from choice; to fail to decide is
to "decide by default."
FEARNSIDE & HOLTHER, supra note 276, at 129.
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is to abdicate judicial responsibility and completely sacrifice the
interests on one side of the scales.'
Whether the Restatement definition of "legitimate public interest"
remains constitutional following the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Florida Star v. B.J.E is open to question. Though not
offering a specific definition of what it referred to as " 'matter[s] of
public significance,' 89 the Court took a broad view of such matters
in holding that the publication of a rape victim's name was a matter
of public significance because the broader issue of violent crime was
a matter of public significance.4' 9
This approach is misguided. A more reasonable approach would
be to look, as some courts have done, 91 at the particular item of
information that is the subject of the litigation and ask whether it is
a matter of legitimate public interest. Violent crime is indeed a
matter of legitimate public interest, but the identity of a particular
rape victim is not. As Justice White, writing in dissent, stated in
Florida Star. "There is no public interest in publishing the names,
addresses, and phone numbers of persons who are the victims of
crime .... "' It would appear that a workable, relatively clear line
could be drawn by courts between the general subject matter of the
published material and the particular private facts at issue in the
487. As the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Virgil v. Time, Inc.:
The definition of the "line to be drawn" is not as clear as one would wish, but
it expresses the distinction between that which is of legitimate public interest and
that which is not as well as we could do. Where competing values are involved
... , unless one competitor is to be sacrificed outright, those involved with the
competition must accept that risks are inherent and the problem lies in
attempting to minimize them to the extent that the conflict permits.
527 F.2d at 1129.
488. 491 U.S. 524 (1989); see supra notes 447-58 and accompanying text for discussion
of Florida Star.
489. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 536 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S.
97, 103 (1979)).
490. Id. at 536-37. See supra note 456 and accompanying text for additional discussion
of this point. Three of the five Justices who concurred in the majority opinion in Florida
Star have retired, raising the possibility that were the issue to be revisited, a different result
might be reached.
491. See, e.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122,1131 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting that even
if it accepted that a general activity relates to the public interest, "it does not necessarily
follow that it is in the public interest to know private facts about the persons who engage
in that activity"); Barber v. Time, Inc., 159 S.W.2d 291, 295 (Mo. 1942) (finding that even
though plaintiff's unusual ailment was a matter of public interest, "[ilt was not necessary
to state plaintiff's name in order to give medical information to the public as to the
symptoms, nature, causes or results of her ailment").
492. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 553 (White, J., dissenting).
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lawsuit in distinguishing speech of public concern from speech of
private concern. The following illustrations demonstrate this
distinction:
ILLUSTRATIONS:
1. A, a television station, broadcasts film of a serious
automobile accident showing the mangled automobiles and
emergency workers at the scene. B, a victim of the accident
who is not shown in the broadcast, sees the film footage on
television and is deeply offended by being forced to relive
the trauma of the event in this manner. A is not liable for
intrusion.
2. The same facts as in Illustration 1, except that A broad-
casts close-up footage of B, who is bleeding, moaning and
asking to be allowed to die. A may be liable for
intrusion.493
Distinctions can and should be drawn between matters which are
of proper concern to the public and those in which the public has no
legitimate interest. If courts are unwilling to engage in this exercise,
they should discard any notion that they are "balancing" interests494
and be forthright in conceding that they do not consider privacy to be
an interest worthy of protection in situations involving the disclosure
of information.495
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has attacked the generally accepted rule of tort law
that privacy cannot be invaded in a place accessible to the public.
One would expect that a rule which has gained such prominence
would be supported by well-reasoned justifications, but one searches
judicial opinions in vain to find them. Guided more by reflex than
reason, courts espousing the rule have been content to parrot Dean
493. These are the facts of Shulman v. Group W, discussed supra at notes 17-23 and
accompanying text.
494. See supra note 370 (citing cases discussing the balancing of free speech interests
against privacy interests).
495. The constitutional implications of attempting to distinguish speech of public
concern from speech of private concern are lessened in this context because the inquiry
is only one of seven factors to be considered in assessing the offensiveness of the
defendant's conduct. An original intrusive-act remains the crux of the tort.
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Prosser's early observations on the issue (as incorporated into the
Restatement (Second) of Torts)496, observations that themselves were
unsupported by analysis or explanation.4w
Perhaps the best explanation for the rule is an intuitive sense that
what is public cannot, by definition, be private. "Public privacy" does
sound like an oxymoron, but only because we tend to think of
"public" and "private" in black and white terms. However, privacy
is not an absolute, all-or-nothing concept. While one necessarily
surrenders a great deal of privacy when she ventures from a place of
physical solitude into the light of public view, it does not follow that
she forfeits all legitimate expectations of privacy. Traditionally, we
have defined privacy in terms of physical barriers such as walls,
fences, and window shades. The focus on physical boundaries is too
narrow, however, because it ignores other important aspects of
privacy such as the need to maintain informational preserves 498 and
the desire to protect anonymity.49
The basic premise of this Article is that the privacy tort known
as intrusion should be expanded to recognize and protect limited
privacy rights in public places. This modification of the law is
mandated by both legal and societal developments. Legally, the
protection afforded by the four invasion of privacy torts is
shrinking.5" If the other three privacy torts were strong, the
weakness of the tort of intrusion would not be so objectionable, but
this is not so. Appropriation has developed into a property-based
right, the modem usefulness of which is limited to helping celebrities
protect their right of publicity."1 False light never has been and
never will be a viable tort remedy because of its incestuous relation-
ship with defamation.5" Public disclosure of private facts-a tort
that potentially could be useful to victims of public intrusion-has
been largely extinguished by the United States Supreme Court. 3
Finally, of course, the tort of intrusion, as currently defined, does not
496. See supra text accompanying note 207 for Prosser's comments and note 209 for
the Restatement comments.
497. See supra notes 253-89 and accompanying text for discussion refuting the premises
underlying Prosser's observations regarding the "no privacy in public" rule.
498. See supra notes 232-43 and accompanying text for discussion of this aspect of
privacy.
499. See supra notes 244-52 and accompanying text for discussion of this aspect of
privacy.
500. See supra notes 30-99 and accompanying text.
501. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
502. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
503. See supra notes 447-58 and accompanying text.
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permit recovery for intrusions in public.' ° The result is a huge gap
in privacy law with respect to invasive conduct in public places.
As legal protection for privacy disappears, the threat to privacy
is growing. Wo particular developments are combining to endanger
public privacy: (1) the decline in social standards of civility and
respect for other persons, which has increased the inclination of
persons to invade the privacy of others;"5 and (2) the ready
availability of technology, most notably the video camcorder, which
has dramatically magnified the ability of persons to invade the privacy
of others. 6
Several courts have instinctively recognized that a remedy should
be afforded in appropriate cases for public intrusions0 7  Unfor-
tunately, they have not been inclined to accept the challenge of
rewriting existing law, choosing instead to offer murky, radically
underwritten opinions that concentrate on results rather than analysis.
Nevertheless, their decisions are important for their ack-
nowledgement, however indirect, of a right to public privacy.
This Article proposes a more forthright approach to solving the
problem: a comprehensive multifactor redefinition of the tort of
intrusion consisting of two parts.5 8 The first part tracks the current
definition of intrusion incorporated in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts by retaining the existing standard of liability for conduct "highly
offensive to a reasonable person." However, unlike the current
definition, the proposed redefinition makes it clear that intrusions in
public places may be actionable.
Part two of the proposed redefinition offers seven factors to be
weighed in assessing the offensiveness of intrusive conduct: (1) the
defendant's motive; (2) the magnitude of the intrusion; (3) the
physical location of the plaintiff at the time of the intrusion; (4)
whether the defendant sought the plaintiff's consent to the intrusion;
(5) actions taken by the plaintiff that reasonably manifest a desire for
privacy; (6) whether the defendant disseminated information
concerning the plaintiff that was obtained during the intrusion; and
(7) whether the subject of the intrusion is a matter of legitimate
public concern. The last two factors are borrowed from the now-
504. See supra notes 4-13, 205-08 and accompanying text.
505. See supra notes 100-46 and accompanying text.
506. See supra notes 147-204 and accompanying text.
507. See supra notes 299-61 and accompanying text for discussion of these cases.
508. See supra notes 374-495 and accompanying text for discussion of the proposed
redefinition.
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moribund tort of public disclosure of private facts, rendering the
proposed new test for intrusion a sort of hybrid tort.
Formulating invasion of privacy law presents greater difficulties
than constructing tort law in other areas because of the need to
balance individual privacy rights against important countervailing
interests such as free social interaction and free speech. Unfor-
tunately, the current "no privacy in public" rule represents not so
much a balancing of rights as a total preclusion of privacy rights in
one of the dominant spheres of civilized life. The proposed
redefinition strikes a more reasonable balance, one which would allow
victims of highly offensive public intrusions to recover tort damages
while at the same time protecting the competing community interests
of free social interaction and free speech.
Public surveillance in America, particularly by means of the
ubiquitous video camera, is becoming commonplace. This Article has
documented dozens of instances in which videotaping has been abused
by neighbors against neighbors, employers against employees, lovers
against lovers, antiabortion activists against abortion clinic patients,
police against protesters, businesses against customers, and television
programmers against just about everyone. When this occurs in a
public place, the victim is remediless under tort law. Those unsym-
pathetic to the plight of such victims would do well to remember that,
under current law, one enjoys privacy protection in public places only
because no one has found a reason to invade it... yet.
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